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ersonal jurisdiction doctrine plays a major role in many civil 
disputes in the United States.1  When the defendant resides in, 
is incorporated or headquartered in (in the case of a 
corporation or other business), or is otherwise found in the particular 
state where suit is brought, personal jurisdiction generally is found to 
exist and is unproblematic. Major personal jurisdiction issues usually 
arise when a plaintiff sues the defendant in a state other than the one 
in which the defendant is located.2   
 In many cases involving parties located in different states, where 
a suit takes place is as extensively litigated an issue as the underlying 
dispute that led to the litigation in the first place.3  In the last seventy 
                                                
1 Personal jurisdiction concerns the authority of a particular court to adjudicate the 
rights of a particular party.  Personal jurisdiction is generally an issue only with 
regard to a defendant, because a plaintiff submits to the jurisdiction of a given 
court by filing suit there.  In contrast, subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s 
competency to litigate a particular type of suit (e.g. a contract dispute under state 
law, as opposed to a federal civil rights claim or a dispute over child custody), and 
cannot be determined by the desires or actions of either party to submit to that 
particular court. 
2 The typical personal jurisdiction dispute arises where parties from two different 
states have a dispute and the plaintiff sues in his or her own state.  For example, 
suppose that an Illinois resident buys a computer from a seller located in 
California by visiting the seller’s website.  The seller ships the computer to the 
buyer in Illinois who finds that the computer frequently crashes and does not 
perform as promised.  If the buyer were to sue in California, there would almost 
surely be no personal jurisdiction dispute.  But if the buyer were to sue in Illinois – 
a likely scenario – then the defendant might argue that it was not subject to the 
personal jurisdiction of Illinois’ courts.  In some cases, as will be discussed below, 
a plaintiff sues in a court that is neither its nor the defendant’s home state.  See 
discussion infra Part II. 
3 Under current doctrine, the issue of whether a court in a given state—including a 
federal court located there—has personal jurisdiction over a given defendant is 
both a statutory and constitutional matter.  All states have long-arm statutes that 
state the extent to which its courts may exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state 
defendants.  The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that generally federal 
courts should follow the long-arm rules of the states in which they are located, 
although there are some federal rules and statutes that allow more extensive 
jurisdiction in these cases.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k).  Whatever a state or federal 
jurisdictional statute provides, however, is also evaluated as a constitutional 
matter, primarily under the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution, 
P 
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years, most personal jurisdiction disputes have been litigated under 
the famous minimum contacts standard first articulated in 
International Shoe v. Washington.4  There is little dispute about what 
the Court said in that case.  But the Supreme Court’s inability to 
cogently explain and consistently apply the standard annunciated in 
International Shoe has confounded litigants and lower courts alike.  
Predicting whether a particular state court has jurisdiction can be 
frustrating.  Parties and courts are hard pressed to know whether 
jurisdiction in a particular forum will be upheld. 
 The problem is not that personal jurisdiction has not been given 
sufficient attention; it is that it has gotten too much attention.  
Although I recognize the irony of writing an article about a topic 
while decrying the focus on that topic, my hope is that this article 
might nonetheless ultimately make personal jurisdiction doctrine 
simpler, more predictable, and therefore less important.   
 Within the more than fifty jurisdictions in the United States, 
where a suit takes place really should not matter very much.  Modern 
travel and communication makes suits throughout the country 
relatively easy for most parties.  Federal and various state judicial 
systems are more alike than different.  And, even though substantive 
law may vary from state to state, modern conflict of law approaches 
allow the application of appropriate substantive law irrespective of 
the location of litigation. 
 The reason that personal jurisdiction has become so important is 
that modern case law made it so.  The Court’s jurisprudential 
approach, which focuses on due process, state lines, and minimum 
contacts, assumes that personal jurisdiction involves a highly 
complex, constitutionally important area of law.  But, it is not that 
personal jurisdiction is inherently complex or important.  It is only 
that the Court’s unfortunate approach has made it so.  
 Personal jurisdiction should be, and can be, straightforward, low 
drama, and simple.  For defendants who are located in the United 
                                                                                                            
located in the 5th and 14th Amendments, and in fact most states’ jurisdictional 
statutes allow the exercise of jurisdiction to the fullest amount allowed under the 
Constitution.  This article’s critique focuses primarily on constitutional limits on 
personal jurisdiction. 
4 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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States,5 personal jurisdiction should be primarily a matter of state 
policy, with minor policing by the Supreme Court and Congress.  
This article argues that a state-focused approach to personal 
jurisdiction is both theoretically sound and practically superior to the 
current minimum contacts approach.   
 Section II of this article provides a critical history of personal 
jurisdiction.  Section III provides an organized critique of the current 
landscape.  With Section II having provided detail of the cases from 
International Shoe through the Court’s case law in its most recent 
term, Section III hones in on what is fundamentally wrong with the 
current approach.  Section IV delineates a new approach to personal 
jurisdiction.  With prior sections arguing that due process and 
minimum contacts are both a practical hindrance and a theoretical 
mismatch, this Section advocates for a non-constitutional approach 
to personal jurisdiction grounded primarily in state legislative policy 
choices.  Section V evaluates the new proposal by considering how 
common personal jurisdiction scenarios will play out under the 
proposed approach.  It demonstrates that if left primarily to state 
policy makers, with minor federal constitutional and legislative 
involvement, the resultant doctrine will be consistent with both 
constitutional and systemic structural norms.  It will also result in 
fairer, more logical, and easier standards to apply than the current 
minimum contacts approach. 
 
II. CRITICAL HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 
A. International Shoe 
 
 Current personal jurisdiction doctrine traces its origins to 
International Shoe Company v. Washington.6  Prior to that case, 
                                                
5 Because defendants located outside of the United States can be forced to answer 
for judgments only by means of comity or agreement between nations, personal 
jurisdiction over those defendants requires a separate analysis outside the scope of 
this article.  The Supreme Court has essentially applied the analysis that it uses for 
domestic defendants to defendants located abroad, with some added frills.  For that 
reason, this article analyzes several Supreme Court cases involving international 
defendants, but only to aid in formulating a sound doctrine for purely domestic 
purposes. 
6 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
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personal jurisdiction doctrine was rooted in a territorial theory as 
expressed in the famous case, Pennoyer v. Neff.7  Put simply, 
Pennoyer held that, with a few narrow exceptions, personal 
jurisdiction existed only if a defendant or the defendant’s property 
could be found and served with process or in the case of property, 
attached in the forum state.8  This cramped view of jurisdiction 
conflicted with the realities of modern commerce and mobility.9  For 
that reason, in the years following Pennoyer, courts created various 
fictions to allow the exercise of jurisdiction in cases involving 
conflicts between plaintiffs and out-of-state defendants.10  
International Shoe sought to create a theory of jurisdiction that 
dispensed with these fictions. 
 The facts of International Shoe case are well known.  In short, 
Washington State brought suit in its own courts to recover taxes 
owed based on the sales-related activities of a Missouri-based 
corporation in Washington.11  The Court concluded that Washington 
had personal jurisdiction.12  In doing so, it delineated the famous 
minimum contacts test.  Under this test, whether a court has personal 
jurisdiction requires that the defendant “have certain minimum 
contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of suit does 
not violate notions of fair play and substantial justice.”13  The Court 
also emphasized that the source and limitation of a court’s 
jurisdictional authority was the Due Process Clause.14  
 The Court provided little guidance on the nature and extent of 
contacts necessary to satisfy jurisdictional requirements.  Rather, it 
painted with broad strokes and created two categories of jurisdiction: 
one in which the dispute arose from the defendant’s contacts, and 
                                                
7 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see also Douglas D. McFarland, Drop the Shoe: A Law of 
Personal Jurisdiction, 68 MO. L. REV. 753, 754 (2003) (“American constitutional 
law of personal jurisdiction largely began in 1877 with the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Pennoyer v. Neff.”). 
8 Id. at 720.  If the defendant was found in the forum state then jurisdiction was 
deemed in personem; if an out-of-state defendant’s property was attached, 
jurisdiction was deemed in rem.  Id. 
9 See McFarland, supra note 7, at 755. 
10 Id. 
11  Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 312. 
12 Id. at 321. 
13 Id. at 320 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
14 Id. at 319. 
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another in which the contacts were unrelated to the dispute.15  The 
former category required less in terms of quantity and/or extent of 
contacts than the latter.16  In essence, however, the test was circular.  
Personal jurisdiction depended upon satisfying due process criteria. 
The Court’s test for whether these criteria were satisfied turned upon 
contacts sufficient to satisfy substantial justice and fair play, which 
is essentially a synonym for due process.  
 International Shoe thus melded personal jurisdiction, due 
process, and territoriality, but replaced the defendant’s presence as 
the keystone of the territoriality—the central point of Pennoyer—
with minimum contacts.17  Although the International Shoe Court 
                                                
15 Id. at 320. 
16 The Court then delineated four scenarios in which jurisdiction might or might 
not be found.  See id. at 317–18; see also Carol Rice Andrews, The Personal 
Jurisdiction Problem Overlooked in the National Debate about “Class Action 
Fairness,” 58 SMU L. REV. 1313, 1337–39 (2005) (“To illustrate and give 
meaning to the new test, the Court in International Shoe collected many of its 
prior decisions and grouped them into four categories.”).  Specifically, jurisdiction 
would be found when a defendant had “continuous and systematic contacts [that] 
also give rise to the liabilities sued upon[.]”  See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317.  In 
addition, certain singular acts “because of their nature and quality and the 
circumstances of their commission, may be deemed sufficient to render the 
corporation liable to suit.”  Id. at 318.  Conversely, for suits not arising from a 
defendant’s forum contacts, “the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his 
conduct of a single or isolated item of activities in a state in the corporation’s 
behalf are not enough to subject it to suit.”  Id. at 317.  But, in some cases a 
defendant has “continuous corporate operations within a state . . . so substantial 
and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of actions arising from 
dealings entirely distinct from those activities.”  Id. at 318.  Eventually, the terms 
“specific jurisdiction” and “general jurisdiction” came to be used to refer to suits 
arising from defendants’ contacts and those not so arising, respectively.  See 
Helicopteros Nacionales v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (citing Von Mehren 
& Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 
1121, 1144–64 (1966) as the original source of the terms “specific jurisdiction” 
and “general jurisdiction”). 
17 Cf. Glenn S. Koppel, Paper Symposium: Making Sense of Personal Jurisdiction 
after Goodyear and Nicastro: The Function and Dysfunctional Role of Formalism 
in Federalism: Shady Grove Versus Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 
909–10 (2012) (“International Shoe’s two-part minimum contacts test married the 
formalist minimum contacts test of ‘purposeful availment’ which requires the non-
resident defendant to target his claim-related activities at the forum state, with the 
functionalist ‘fairness’ assessment, which entails balancing a variety of factors, 
including forum interest and party convenience.”). 
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had criticized the defendant’s presence as begging the question, so 
too did its due process-cum-minimum contacts test.  The Court 
presented a vague and circular concept of what contacts were 
necessary, saying that the minimum required would be those 
contacts necessary to satisfy “traditional notions of substantial 
justice and fair play.”18  Moreover, the Court did not say whether 
contacts were the primary concern as an end in themselves, or 
simply to be used in service of the overarching concept of fairness.  
The Court also did not explain why due process required a 
geographic nexus between the forum state and the defendant.   
 The frequency with which the due process/minimum contacts 
formula has been unquestionably repeated by the Supreme Court and 
other courts might lead one to believe that due process necessarily 
requires some type of geographic relationship between defendant 
and state.  Upon closer examination, due process actually concerns 
whether the defendant had an opportunity to defend himself and 
received fair treatment in whatever court adjudicated his claim, 
rather than the relationship between the defendant and the 
jurisdiction prior to suit.  To the extent case law prior to 
International Shoe held that due process required presence, the 
Court’s conclusion that due process now only required minimum 
contacts seems analytically suspect.  The language of the Due 
Process Clause had not changed, so, if under Pennoyer due process 
had previously required presence, it made no sense to conclude, as in 
International Shoe, that it now required only minimum contacts.  
Similarly, if inherent limits to state power restrict jurisdiction to 
defendants present or served within a state, economic and societal 
changes alone would not justify the transformation to a minimum 
contacts test if prior jurisdictional limits inhered in the nature of the 
states as political entities. 
 
B.   Shoe’s Progeny 
 
 International Shoe changed the direction of the law by setting 
out broad outlines for personal jurisdiction.19  In so doing, the Court 
                                                
18 Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 
(1940)). 
19 See Terry S. Kogan, A Neo-Federalist Take of Personal Jurisdiction, 63 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 257, 268–69 (1990) (“[T]he Court has on occasion employed a paradigm-
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left open the question of exactly how courts should incorporate both 
minimum contacts and notions of fairness in deciding particular 
cases.20  It was left to subsequent Supreme Court decisions to tidy up 
the mess into which Shoe had stepped.   
 Since International Shoe, the Supreme Court has decided twenty 
cases in which the minimum contacts test played a major role in the 
decision: Mullane, Travelers Health, Perkins, McGee, Hanson, 
Shaffer, Kulko, World-Wide, Rush, Insurance Corp., Calder, Keeton, 
Helicopteros, Burger King, Asahi, Burnham, J. McIntyre, Goodyear, 
Walden, and Bauman. 21   
 This section provides a tour through International Shoe’s 
progeny to the Court’s most recent term.  As the discussion will 
serve primarily to set the framework for critique of the current 
approach, this section will emphasize those cases that strongly 
demonstrate the characteristics, including the flaws, of the current 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudential framework.  Other cases will 
only be mentioned in passing. 
 
1. The Early Fairness/Common Sense Approach 
 
  The Supreme Court found the existence of personal jurisdiction 
in the first four minimum contacts cases that it decided following 
International Shoe: Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,22 
Travelers Health Ass’n v. Virginia,23 Perkins v. Benguet Consol. 
Mining Co.,24 and McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co.25  In each, the Court 
essentially took the position that so long as the chosen forum was an 
arguably sensible place to litigate, given the connection between the 
forum and the parties, as well as witnesses and evidence, that 
                                                                                                            
seeking case . . . . [T]he Court does not set forth a single, narrow, drawn 
standard . . . . Rather, the Court utilizes the paradigm-seeking case to invite future 
courts to enter into a dialogue concerning the impact (if any) of the constitutional 
events on the particular doctrinal area.”). 
20 See generally Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310.  
21 These cases do not include those in which personal jurisdiction was evaluated 
based on forum selection clauses, which is treated as more of a contractual, rather 
than a jurisdictional issue.  This list also does not include class action cases. 
22 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
23 339 U.S. 643 (1950). 
24 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
25 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
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jurisdiction would be valid.  Furthermore, absent a burden upon the 
defendant26 that was so great that it would deprive the defendant of a 
meaningful opportunity to litigate and protect its rights, the Court 
found jurisdiction proper.27  
 For example, in Mullane the Court held that New York courts 
could exercise jurisdiction to adjudicate the property rights of out-of-
state trust beneficiaries without any regard to their forum contacts.28  
In so doing, the Court focused purely on fairness and the 
reasonableness of adjudication in New York.  The Court, speaking 
through Justice Jackson, stated that “the interest of each state in 
providing means to close trusts that exist by the grace of its laws and 
are administered under the supervision of its courts is so insistent 
and rooted in custom as to establish beyond doubt the right of its 
courts to determine the interests of all claimants, resident or 
nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to 
appear and be heard.”29  Adding that, “[m]any controversies have 
raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the Due Process Clause 
but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that 
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded 
by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the 
case.”30  Thus, the Court focused on making sure that that the 
affected parties—in this case the trust beneficiaries; while in most 
other cases the defendants—would have a fair opportunity to 
adjudicate their rights in the forum.  Leaving no doubt that the Court 
was wrenching personal jurisdiction away from its formalistic 
moorings of the nineteenth century, the Court explicitly rejected 
Pennoyer’s focus on categories of in personam and in rem 
                                                
26 In Mullane, the affected parties were technically not defendants, but instead 
numerous trust beneficiaries in a suit to settle a large trust.  339 U.S. at 307.  
Settling the trust meant addressing and putting to rest any issues in trust 
management during a given time period.  Id. at 311.  Once the trust was settled for 
a given timeframe, all claims that trust beneficiaries would have against the trustee 
for misfeasance or nonfeasance during that time frame would be extinguished.  Id.  
For this reason, the settlement of the trust impacts beneficiaries’ property rights by 
means of a suit brought by someone else, here the trustee, and they are thus akin to 
defendants.  
27 Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314. 
28 Id. at 312–13. 
29 Id. at 313 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. 
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jurisdiction.31  Instead, the Court held that jurisdiction was proper 
because it made sense to hold the proceeding in New York, and the 
parties’ rights would not be unfairly impinged so long as all affected 
received sufficient notice and an opportunity to respond.32 
 The Court took a similar fairness/common sense approach in 
Travelers Heath,33 Perkins,34 and McGee.35  Thus, the Court’s early 
approach combined a presumption of jurisdiction so long as the 
chosen forum did not appear arbitrary or absurd considering all the 
factors involved in the litigation, and the chosen forum did not so 




 Only a few months passed before the Court’s next jurisdictional 
foray, Hanson v. Denckla,36 but the world of personal jurisdiction 
                                                
31 See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 312 (“Distinctions between actions in rem and those in 
personam are ancient. . . . But in any event we think that the requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution do not depend on classification 
for which the standards are so elusive and confused generally.”). 
32 Id. at 320; see Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 559 n.69 
(2012) (“[Justice Jackson’s analysis in Mullane] reflected the hard-nosed, 
commonsense pragmatism traditionally associated with the procedural due process 
inquiry.”) (citing Martin H. Redish, Personal Jurisdiction and the Global 
Resolution of Mass Tort Litigation: Defining the Constitutional Boundaries, 28 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 917, 936 (1995)). 
33 See 339 U.S. at 646–47 (holding that a state could exert jurisdiction over an out-
of-state insurer who sold certificates within the state). 
34 See 342 U.S. at 445 (holding that the state of Ohio had general jurisdiction over 
a Philippine corporation when the president/owner of the company had moved to 
Ohio during WWII and effectively ran the company from that state, stating that 
“[t]he essence of the issue . . . at a constitutional level . . . [is] one of general 
fairness to the corporation.”). 
35 See 355 U.S. at 221–22 (holding that California could exercise jurisdiction over 
a Texas insurance company who insured a man who died in California despite the 
lack of formal contacts between the insurer and California, and stressing, among 
other thing, state interest and location of witnesses—and noting that the defendant 
insurer would not be so burdened that requiring it to defend in California would 
amount to a denial of due process). 
36 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
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would change drastically with this decision;37 although in many 
ways it was returning to the world of sovereignty and state borders 
that characterized the Pennoyer era.  Hanson broke with the 
common sense approach that the Court had taken in its initial post-
Shoe cases.  In particular the Court disparaged McGee’s observation 
that “the trend of expanding personal jurisdiction over 
nonresidents. . . . [because] technological progress has increased the 
flow of commerce between States. . . . [and] progress in 
communication and transportation has made the defense of suit in a 
foreign tribunal less burdensome.”38  Even though “[t]here [was] no 
suggestion that the court failed to employ a means of notice 
reasonably calculated to inform nonresident defendants of the 
pending proceedings or denied them an opportunity to be heard in 
defense of their interests[,]”39 due process still prohibited 
adjudication in the plaintiffs’ chosen forum of Florida due to the lack 
of physical contacts between the defendants and Florida.40  
Famously—or infamously—the Court said:  
 
[I]t is a mistake to assume that this trend [which 
McGee had highlighted] heralds the eventual demise 
of all restrictions on personal jurisdiction of state 
courts.  Those restrictions are more than a guarantee 
of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation.  
They are a consequence of territorial limitation on the 
power of the respective States.  However minimal the 
burden of defending in a foreign tribunal, a defendant 
may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 
“minimal contacts” with the State that are a 
prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.41 
 
                                                
37 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1340 (“The most important development in the 
[specific jurisdiction] line of cases was [Hanson’s] ‘purposeful availment’ 
factor.”). 
38 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250–51. 
39 Id. at 245 (footnotes omitted). 
40 Id. at 251. 
41 Id. (citations omitted). 
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 The Court’s personal jurisdiction focus was on state power and 
sovereignty, with fairness reduced to secondary status.42  The 
connection between due process and state sovereignty was left 
unexplained.43  It had been so in International Shoe, but that 
incongruity could be explained away by the possibility that Shoe’s 
concern with contacts was as a proxy for fairness, not an end in itself 
required by notions of sovereignty as in a Pennoyerian world.   
 Justice Black dissented, joined by Justices Burton and Brennan 
who carried the mantle for a more permissive fairness-based 
jurisdiction for most of the next thirty years.44  Justice Black 
emphasized that logic dictated that the litigation take place in 
Florida, and allowing that certainly was not going to interfere with 
the ability of affected parties to reasonably protect their interests.45   
 
3. The Late 1970s through 1990:  After an Almost Two Decade 
Break, the Court Reenters the Personal Jurisdiction Fray 
 
 Hanson proved to be a bell-weather.  While the post-Shoe pre-
Hanson cases focused on fairness rather than contacts and found 
jurisdiction present in a variety of circumstances, Hanson shifted the 
equation following which the Court decided no personal jurisdiction 
cases for almost two decades.46  Then “in a flurry of cases [eleven to 
                                                
42 See id. at 254 (“[Florida] does not acquire [] jurisdiction by being . . . the most 
convenient location for litigation.”); see also Freer, supra note 32, at 560 (“In 
Hanson, we see no concern for the state’s interest or relative convenience of the 
parties. . . . [T]he focus is narrowly on whether the defendant itself had created 
sufficient ties with that state.” (emphasis added)). 
43 See Patrick J. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism: International Shoe’s Half-
Buried Legacy, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 561, 575 (1995) [hereinafter “Borchers, 
Jurisdictional Pragmatism”] (“Many commentators have criticized [the] approach 
[that focuses on protecting state power], and even the Court now seems to agree 
that these considerations have nothing to do with personal jurisdiction.  Suffice it 
to say that extending the ambit of a clause that protects ‘persons’ to states has not 
survived close scrutiny.” (footnotes omitted)). 
44 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 256 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Douglas authored a 
separate dissent. 
45 Id. at 258 (“The beneficiaries of the appointment, some of whom live outside 
Florida, and the Delaware trustee were defendants.  They had timely notice of the 
suit and an adequate opportunity to obtain counsel and appear.”). 
46 The Court did decide several cases during this time involving the enforcement 
of forum selection clauses.  Those cases were analyzed primarily in terms of 
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be precise] . . . Hanson’s focus on defendant-initiated contact with 
the forum came to dominate.”47  In the eleven cases between 1977 
and 1990, the Court found jurisdiction lacking in six, by holding 
“that there was no relevant contact” between the defendant and 
forum state in five of these cases.48   
 The first two cases decided in this era were Shaffer49 and 
Kuklo.50  The former dealt with the relatively esoteric subject of 
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction, which requires no additional discussion 
here.  Kuklo applied the minimum contacts test to individuals in a 
domestic dispute, finding that a wife could not force her husband to 
litigate a domestic dispite in a state with which his only contacts 
were the fact that his minor children were living their with the wife 
(their mother).51  This case is notable because thirteen years later, in 
Burnham v. Superior Court,52 the Court reached the opposite result 
on almost identical facts because of minor technical differences that 
played an outsized role under the minimum contacts test.53 
    
(a) World-Wide (and Rush) 
 
 In 1980, the Court issued two minimum contacts opinions on the 
same day, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson,54 and Rush v. 
                                                                                                            
contract law, rather than personal jurisdiction doctrine, so are not given full 
treatment in this article.  See, e.g., National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 
375 U.S. 311 (1964) (approving a contractual appointment of agent in New York 
State for service of process); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 
(1972) (upholding parties’ contractual agreement to litigate disputes in London); 
see also Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (upholding a 
forum selection clause contained in a passenger’s cruise ticket). 
47  Freer, supra note 32, at 562. 
48 Id. The exception was Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102 
(1987), in which the Court split 4-4 on whether the contacts were sufficient, while 
an 8-0 majority found jurisdiction lacking due to other considerations, which 
entered the analysis in the early to mid 1980s as a separate component apart from 
contacts.  See infra part II.B.3.e. 
49 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1975). 
50 Kulko v. Super. Ct. Cal., 436 U.S. 84 (1978). 
51 Id. at 101. 
52 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
53 See discussion infra Part II.B.3.g. 
54 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
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Savchuk.55  World-Wide is truly heartbreaking both for those who 
care about civil procedure and those who care about human beings.  
If McGee represented the high point for a fairness-based common 
sense approach to jurisdiction then World-Wide, along with Hanson 
twenty-two years earlier56 and J. McIntyre v. Nicastro57 thirty-one 
years later, is the high point (or low point) of a jurisdictional analysis 
rooted in rigid notions of sovereignty and the magic of state lines. 
 In 1976, Harry and Kay Robinson purchased an Audi in New 
York from Seaway Volkswagen.58  A year later, while moving with 
their children to a new home in Arizona, Kay was driving the Audi, 
with the couple’s daughter and oldest son through Oklahoma when 
tragedy struck.59  Actually, what struck the rear of the Audi was a 
1971 Ford Torino driven by a drunk driver.60 
 Upon impact, a fire started.61  Although the impact did not cause 
injury itself, it had caused all the doors to jam, making the car a fire 
trap.62  All three passengers suffered severe burns, with Kay 
Robinson suffering the worst.63  She suffered burns over forty-eight 
percent of her body (thirty-five percent were third degree burns), had 
most of her fingers amputated, and had to endure thirty-four 
surgeries.64  The two children traveling with her also received 
disfiguring burns requiring extensive treatment and rehabilitation.65 
 Because the family was receiving this extensive treatment in 
Oklahoma, Harry hired a local attorney.66  This attorney ultimately 
brought a claim on the Robinson’s behalf.67  Because the car turned 
                                                
55 444 U.S. 320 (1980). 
56 See discussion supra Part II.2. 
57 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011); see discussion infra 
Part II.B.3.g. 
58 See Charles W. Adams, World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson – The Rest of the 
Story, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1122, 1123 (1993).  This article provides a fascinating 
account of the facts and legal history of the case. 




62 Id. at 1124. 
63 Id. at 1125–26. 
64 See Adams, supra note 58, at 1126. 
65 Id. at 1125–26. 
66 Id. at 1126. 
67 Id. at 1129. 
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into a tinderbox upon impact, there was good reason to believe that 
the car was defective.68 
 The Robinson’s filed suit in Oklahoma state court, naming the 
German company, Volkswagen, its American importer, the local 
New York area distributor, and the New York based dealer from 
whom the Robinsons bought their car.69  The plaintiffs were 
temporarily located there, and could not easily travel.70  Most of the 
witnesses and physical evidence were also there.71  Moreover, the 
defendants were scattered in different places, so Oklahoma seemed 
as good a location as any.72  The two defendants who objected to 
jurisdiction, the distributor and the car dealer, would surely not 
suffer any inconvenience or burden litigating in Oklahoma.73  In fact, 
there was reason to believe that based purely on fairness, that 
Oklahoma was preferable.74  The Court, therefore, had to squarely 
face how to reconcile the concept of contacts as an end in themselves 
(as had been the focus in cases like Hanson) with the notion that 
personal jurisdiction was about due process and fairness in a case 
where fairness and contacts pointed in opposite directions.  
Additionally, the Court had to address how to apply the minimum 
contacts test in a product’s liability case. 
 Realizing that on the facts it could not equate contacts with 
fairness, the Court tried a new tact through a 6-3 opinion authored by 
                                                
68 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288. 
69 Adams, supra note 58, at 1129. 
70 Id. 
71 See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
19, 96 (1990) [hereinafter Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law]. 
72 See id.  
73 The German manufacturer and its American sister company did not object to 
jurisdiction.  See World-Wide, 44 U.S. at 288 n.3. 
74 See id. (“In fact, the truly ‘convenient’ forum for all concerned was probably 
Oklahoma because the bulk of the evidence, particularly the wrecked car, was in 
that state.  Certainly, the Supreme Court’s solution, litigating against the 
manufacturer in Oklahoma and against the seller and retailer in New York, was 
not ‘convenient’ by any standard.” (footnote omitted)).  There were additional 
tactical concerns.  If these two New York defendants were included then complete 
diversity—and therefore federal—jurisdiction would be lacking, since the 
plaintiffs were still New York domiciliaries.  Id. at 96–97.  Discussion of how 
diversity drives tactics is beyond the scope of this article. 
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Justice White.75  The Whizzer76 stated that the minimum 
contacts/due process approach had a dual purpose.77  In additional to 
ensuring fairness to the defendant, the “Due Process Clause [also] 
act[s] as an instrument of interstate federalism, [and] may sometimes 
act to divest the State of its power to render a valid judgment. . . . 
[e]ven if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience 
from being forced to litigate [there] . . .”78  As such, the Court 
concluded that “[t]he concept of minimum contacts . . . can be seen 
to perform two related, but distinguishable, functions.  It protects the 
defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or 
inconvenient forum.  And it acts to ensure that the States, through 
their courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by 
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system.”79  The Court 
thereby continued its quixotic quest to meld sovereignty and due 
process.80 
 In terms of what this meant in practice, the Court separated the 
personal jurisdiction analysis into two prongs, with one prong 
corresponding to interstate federalism, and the other to fairness.81  
One would expect that one prong would involve contacts and the 
other on fairness.  Yet the Court even botched implementing this 
two-part approach.  Rather than contacts, the Court said that the 
“burden on the defendant [is] always a primary concern,” which then 
can be considered in light of other factors.82  Despite articulating the 
                                                
75 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 287. 
76 Prior to entering law school, Justice Byron White was an All-American running 
back at the University of Colorado, where he acquired the nickname Whizzer; he 
also twice led the NFL in rushing yards.  See DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN 
WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
(1998). 
77 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 291–92. 
78 Id. at 294. 
79 Id. at 291–92. 
80 See Friedrich K. Juenger, A Shoe Unfit for Globetrotting, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
1027, 1029 (1995) (“[Pennoyer had initially] lump[ed] together the two disparate 
ideas of sovereignty and fairness, but ever since the two have coexisted uneasily in 
the realm of jurisdiction.”).  
81 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1340 (“In 1980, the Court in World-Wide [] 
separated the minimum contacts test for specific personal jurisdiction into two 
parts, each correlating to a separate function of the minimum contacts test.”). 
82 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292.  These factors are “the forum State’s interest in 
adjudicating the dispute; the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and 
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two prongs as fairness to the defendant and other policy concerns, in 
applying its test to the facts before it, the Court focused almost 
entirely on the defendants’ lack of contacts with the forum state.83   
 In World-Wide, the Court took a large step in the ever-changing 
concept of minimum contacts as facilitator of due process/fair play.  
In International Shoe it was unclear whether fair play or contacts 
themselves were the jurisdictional touchstone.84  Then, as per 
Hanson, contacts mattered most of all because sovereignty still 
mattered.85  Now, with World-Wide, contacts and fairness both 
mattered, as traditional due process considerations as well as 
interstate federalism (read: sovereignty) remained important.86  
                                                                                                            
effective relief . . . the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”  World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292 
(citations omitted) (citing McGee, 355 U.S. at 223; Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92–93; 
Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 211 n. 37).  In the Court’s formulation, although contacts fall 
into one category, and the secondary (so-called fairness factors) fall into another, 
in application the Court seems to equate contacts with fairness to the defendant, 
even though in practice contacts would seem to be more appropriately an 
instrument for furthering the sovereignty interest.  Id.  In Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, the Court amended this analysis, placing fairness to the defendant 
along with the other secondary fairness considerations to be considered separately 
and apart from contacts.  471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985).  See also Freer, supra note 32, 
at 566 (“[T]he majority makes clear, as the Court strongly implied in Hanson, that 
a court must assess contacts first.  Without a relevant contact, there simply can be 
no jurisdiction, even if the forum would not be unfair.” (footnotes omitted)); John 
T. Parry, Symposium, Making Sense of Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear and 
Nicastro: Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty – 
Some Thoughts on J. McIntyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
827, 834 (2012) (“Justice White’s majority opinion in World-Wide . . . accepted 
the importance of the general inquiry into reasonableness, and he set out five 
factors to guide that part of the inquiry, with the burden on the defendant being the 
chief factor.  But he also insisted that personal jurisdiction analysis require a 
specific inquiry into defendant’s contacts with the forum.” (footnotes omitted)). 
83 See Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the Twenty-First Century: The 
Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 CAL. L. REV. 55 (2012) (“[T]he majority 
makes clear . . . that a court must asses contacts first. Without a relevant contact, 
there simply can be no jurisdiction, even if the forum would not be unfair.” 
(footnotes omitted)).   
84 See discussion supra pp. 68–71. 
85 See discussion supra pp. 75–77. 
86 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1347 (“The Court in World-Wide Volkswagen 
articulated [that] . . . a state must not exceed its sovereignty. . . . [The] Court [later] 
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Although the Court drew on these two concepts, it did not explain 
why it was now parsing them to create a two-part analysis.   
 The Court then had to face an additional issue: how to evaluate 
contacts when the defendant’s product, rather than the defendant 
itself, had contact with the state.  The Court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that because the car’s mobility made it foreseeable for the 
car to end up in Oklahoma, that jurisdiction would be valid there.87  
Rather, for jurisdiction based upon the defendant’s product, harm in 
a state would require affirmative efforts by the defendant to serve the 
forum state, which the Court concluded had not been shown here as 
to the dealer and distributor.88   
 Exactly what would satisfy the Court’s standard in terms of 
knowledge of the product’s destination or volume of sales in a given 
state is an issue the Court still struggles with today.89  In general 
terms, the Court in World-Wide concluded cryptically that 
foreseeability of whether a product would end up in a given state did 
not matter.  Rather what mattered was whether the defendant’s 
contacts (via a product or otherwise) made it foreseeable that the 
defendant would be subject to jurisdiction in the forum.90  This 
formulation of contacts was circular because as long as the 
jurisdictional rules were announced in advance, a defendant meeting 
the criteria could foresee being subject to jurisdiction.91  In short, the 
                                                                                                            
clarified that this aim is a function of due process rather than an aspect of 
federalism . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
87 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295. 
88 Id. at 298. 
89 See discussion of J. McIntyre infra Part II.B.3.g. 
90 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297. 
91 See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 576 (“The idea 
appears to be that due process allows only for ‘foreseeable’ exercises of 
jurisdiction . . . There is some surface appeal to this argument, but it is ultimately 
circular.  State court exercises of jurisdiction become foreseeable when they are 
well-established or when the state announces its intention to exercise jurisdiction 
in a long-arm statute.”).  Consider the criminal procedure case United States v. 
Katz, where Justice Harlan issued a concurring opinion stating that in order to 
merit Fourth Amendment protection, a defendant had to have both an objective 
and subjective expectation of privacy.  389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring).  Justice Harlan later retreated from the subjective prong, since it 
meant that the government could thwart Fourth Amendment protections by 
pervasively engaging in a practice of surveillance or simply announcing in 
advance that certain expectations of privacy would not be respected, thereby 
2015       A 21ST CENTURY APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION       83 
 
Court continued Hanson’s focus on purposeful availment and added 
to the analysis the foreseeability that defendant could anticipate 
being haled into court in the forum as the key components of the 
minimum contacts leg.92  Contacts, of course, were central, but the 
additional fairness factors were also considered.   
 Justice Brennan dissented.93  As Hugo Black had done in his 
Hanson dissent, which Brennan had joined, Brennan argued that 
jurisdiction depended on an overall assessment of all interests 
affected by the litigation as well on the burden on the defendant in 
litigating in the forum, rather than upon the contacts qua contacts 
between defendant and forum state.94  Contacts, while relevant, 
should diminish in importance in the face of other factors.95  In 
particular for Brennan, minimum contacts served as a proxy for the 
burden on the defendant to litigate in the forum.96 
                                                                                                            
thwarting any subjective expectation of privacy.  See Anthony G. Amsterdam, 
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 384 (1974) (“But 
Mr. Justice Harlan himself [dissenting in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 
(1971)] later expressed second thoughts about this conception, and rightly so. . . .  
[T]he government could diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy 
merely by announcing half-hourly on television . . . that we were all forthwith 
being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.”). 
92 See Freer, supra note 32, at 566 (“[I]n assessing contact, the court is to look to 
purposeful availment and foreseeability.  The former, of course, was injected by 
Hanson . . . Foreseeabilty is new [with the World-Wide opinion].” (footnote 
omitted)). 
93 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. at 299–300 (“The Court’s opinions focus tightly on the existence of contacts 
between the forum and the defendant.  In so doing, they accord too little weight to 
the strength of the forum State’s interest in the case and fail to explore whether 
there would be any actual inconvenience to the defendant.”); id. at 300 (“The clear 
focus in International Shoe was on fairness and reasonableness.”). 
95 Id. (“Surely International Shoe contemplated that the significance of contacts 
necessary to support jurisdiction would diminish if some other consideration 
helped establish that jurisdiction would be fair and reasonable.”); see also Freer, 
supra note 32, at 567 (“Interestingly, Brennan here conceded that there must be a 
relevant contact.  But his concept is broader than the majority’s.  For Brennan, 
contact may be ‘among the parties, the forum, and the litigation,’ so as to make the 
forum reasonable.” (citing World-Wide Volkswagon, 444 U.S. at 312)). 
96 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 300–01 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Another 
consideration is the actual burden a defendant must bear in defending the suit in 
the forum.  Because lesser burdens reduce the unfairness to the defendant, 
jurisdiction may be justified despite less significant contacts.” (citing McGee, 355 
U.S. at 223)). 
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 World-Wide marked the emergence of two patterns.  First, the 
Court was engaging in a strained logic that insisted on the primacy 
of sovereignty.97  This approach would continue to result in more 
complex explanations and split decisions, often without a majority, 
thereby retarding the development of a workable personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence.98  Second, personal jurisdiction disputes 
started to become more tactical.  In a case involving life-altering 
injuries, defendants who faced no burden litigating in Oklahoma 
disputed personal jurisdiction for several rounds in that forum and at 
the Supreme Court, arguing that it would be improper to force 
litigation in the plaintiff’s forum.99  That the defendants in this case, 
as well as defendants in future cases, had the resources and ability to 
litigate personal jurisdiction in the forum raises the question of how 
their due process rights would be violated by alternatively requiring 
them to simply litigate the merits in that court system.100 
 Rush,101 issued the same day as World-Wide, involved the 
somewhat unusual situation in which a plaintiff sought to obtain 
jurisdiction based on the citizenship of the tortfeasor’s insurer.102  
Although important to that specific issue, Rush did not play a major 
role in the development of personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
 
(b) Insurance Corp. 
 
                                                
97 See Koppel, supra note 17, at 956 (“[T]he Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence moved further toward the formalist end of the continuum in World-
Wide. ”). 
98 Russell J. Weintraub, Symposium, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction 
Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531, 536 (1995) (“[World-Wide’s focus on 
federalism made] state lines . . . invisible but formidable barriers to basic 
change.”); Parry, supra note 82, at 834 (“[World-Wide] created a . . . tension that 
continues to structure the debate over specific personal jurisdiction doctrine.”). 
99 In World-Wide, the ultimate litigation was still ongoing as of 1992, fifteen years 
after the accident.  Much of that time involved litigation against the defendants 
that occurred after the Supreme Court found jurisdiction lacking over World-Wide 
and Seeway.  Even so, the personal jurisdiction issue dragged on for three years, at 
which point, because no other aspects of the case had been addressed, the 
remaining parties had to begin litigating the merits.  See Adams, supra note 58, at 
1152. 
100 See discussion infra Part III. 
101 440 U.S. 320. 
102 Id. at 322. 
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 Two years after World-Wide, the Court, in Insurance Corp. of 
Ireland v. Compaignes Bauxites de Guinee,103 had to confront 
World-Wide’s precedent that personal jurisdiction involved concerns 
of state sovereignty and federalism and not merely the due 
process.104  Even before Insurance Corp., Hanson, and World-Wide, 
diminished the burden on the defendant in favor of a focus on 
federalism created a tension with the established personal 
jurisdiction doctrine.   
Insurance Corp. involved a diversity suit filed in 
Pennsylvania105 by a company that operated African bauxite 
mines.106  When the company experienced operating problems it 
sought indemnity from its insurers, who refused to pay.107  The 
plaintiff sued and argued that jurisdiction was proper in 
Pennsylvania based upon the defendants’ relationship with that 
state.108 
 When the defendants failed to respond to discovery sought in 
connection with the jurisdictional dispute, the trial court imposed a 
sanction whereby “for the purposes of this litigation the Excess 
Insurers are subject to the in personam jurisdiction of this Court due 
                                                
103 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 
104 See Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: Asahi Metal Inds. Co. 
v. Superior Court, 39 S. C. L. REV. 729, 763 (1988) (“The adoption of the 
sovereignty function or branch of the minimum contacts test in World-Wide set off 
a firestorm of academic protest, and the Supreme Court attempted to clarify its 
view of sovereignty two years later in Insurance Corp.” (footnote omitted)). 
105 Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 698. 
106 Id. at 696.  Although the suit took place in federal court, because the case did 
not involve a federal jurisdictional statue allowing nationwide service, the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction analysis was the same as it would be had the matter been in 
state court.  The Court followed this practice—treating jurisdiction in cases in 
federal court with no governing federal personal jurisdiction statute akin to those 
in state court—due to the strictures of Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 340 U.S. 64 
(1938).  That case required federal courts to follow state law on matters of 
substance absent a controlling federal statute.  Moreover, the Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 4(k) (Rule 4(f) at the time of Insurance Corp.) provided that federal 
courts have the same jurisdictional reach as the courts of the state in which they 
are located, with exceptions not applicable in that case.  That this rule effectively 
incorporates a limitation based upon state lines to cases in federal courts raises 
questions that will be addressed in Part III. 
107 Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 697. 
108 Id. at 698. 
86           UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW       Vol. 13, No. 2 
 
 
to the their business contacts with Pennsylvania.”109  The defendants 
claimed that the trial court could not create jurisdiction by sanction if 
the court lacked jurisdiction in the first place.110  Yet, because the 
personal jurisdiction defense can be forfeited by not properly 
asserting it or otherwise not complying with procedural 
requirements,111 the court’s sanction made sense.  Indeed, that is 
what the Supreme Court ultimately held in Insurance Corp.112  If 
personal jurisdiction was about ensuring fairness to the defendant, 
then this result makes sense.  Parties can waive or forfeit (by 
inaction) even fundamental constitutional protections.  But, if 
personal jurisdiction also acted to “function [as] an instrument of 
interstate federalism,”113 it is hard to understand how sovereign 
power could wax or wane due to the inaction of a private party in 
asserting its rights. 114 
 The Court had twisted itself into knots.  Upholding jurisdiction 
here was logical, but the sovereignty component introduced in 
Hanson and World-Wide created a barrier, allowing the defendant to 
waive or forfeit the claim that personal jurisdiction was lacking.115  
                                                
109 Id. at 699 (internal quotations omitted). 
110 Id. at 696. 
111 Id. at 705. 
112 See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 704–05 (“[T]he requirement of personal jurisdiction 
may be intentionally waived, or for various reasons a defendant may be estopped 
from raising the issue.  These characteristics portray [personal jurisdiction] for 
what it is—a legal right protecting the individual. . . . The expression of legal 
rights is often subject to certain procedural rules:  The failure to follow those rules 
may well result in a curtailment of the rights. . . . A sanction under Rule 
37(b)(2)(A) consisting of a finding of personal jurisdiction has . . . the same effect 
[of waiver].”). 
113 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294.  Starting with World-Wide, the Court began 
using the term “interstate federalism” in personal jurisdiction cases.  This odd 
phrase—since federalism generally refers to the relationship between the federal 
and state governments—was clearly meant as a synonym for respecting the 
sovereignty of co-equal states. 
114 See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10 (“Individual actions cannot change the 
powers of sovereignty, although the individual can subject himself to powers from 
which he may otherwise be protected.”). 
115 See Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or “Totality of the Circumstances”? 
It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction 
Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 87 (2004) (“[The Court’s] 
concession [that the liberty interest of the defendant was the sole limitation on 
personal jurisdiction] did not settle the issue, of course; in fact, it made it more 
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Addressing, or merely ducking, this dilemma, Justice White, writing 
for the Court, held that forfeiture of one’s personal jurisdiction 
defense was consistent with World Wide’s concern with minimum 
contacts and state boundaries, and that it was not reversing course.116  
The Court stated that all it was doing was adding another way to 
establish minimum contacts.117  This position is strained. If 
minimum contacts themselves were central, then it would seem that 
the contacts must be found by looking at the relationship between 
the defendant and the forum state.  The fact that the defendant did 
not follow adequate procedures would not create or increase the 
contacts between the defendant and the state. 
 Moreover, the Court emphasized that the sole source of authority 
limiting personal jurisdiction was the Due Process Clause.  In 
language as notable as its interstate federalism parlance in World-
Wide (and actually more notable due to the contrast) the Court said:   
 
The restriction on state sovereignty power described 
in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., however, must be 
seen as ultimately a function of the individual liberty 
interest preserved by the Due Process Clause.  That 
Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction 
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention 
of federalism concerns.  Furthermore, if the 
federalism concept operated as an independent 
restriction on sovereign power of the court, it would 
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction 
requirement.  118    
 
 Even so, the Court did not jettison the primary role of minimum 
contacts in favor of a general fairness analysis – indeed the Court 
said it was not changing course at all.119  By holding onto minimum 
                                                                                                            
complicated, since the Court then needed to explain how sovereignty concerns 
(e.g. ‘the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute’) could be part of the 
individual liberty interest of litigants.”). 
116 Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 702. 
117 Id. at 703 n.10. 
118 Id. (emphasis added). 
119 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1347 (“Although the Court in [Insurance Corp.] 
clarified that [sovereignty limitations on jurisdiction are] a function of due process 
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contacts, which World-Wide and Hanson said flowed from the state 
sovereignty or horizontal federalism, while asserting that due 
process was the sole constitutional regulator of personal jurisdiction, 
the Court crossed the line from vague to illogical.120  Prior to World-
Wide, the debate in the Court seemed to be between those who 
believed that personal jurisdiction was primarily about due process 
and fairness to the defendant,121 and those who asserted that the 
primary concern was state authority.122  World-Wide tried to satisfy 
both camps, putting a primary emphasis on contacts and sovereignty 
while giving a walk-on part to fairness and common sense, though 
not explaining how to use this new arsenal on a case-by-case basis123  
Later in Insurance Corp., the Court explicitly but cryptically said 
that the sole concern was due process, but that somehow the Due 
Process Clause is a vehicle for state sovereignty.124  This clearly 
represented a shift of the Court’s entire personal jurisdiction focus 
                                                                                                            
rather than an aspect of federalism, the Court did not remove the sovereignty 
component from jurisdictional analysis.  The defendant has a due process right to 
have states act only within the limits of their sovereignty.” (footnotes omitted)); cf. 
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.1 
(3d ed. 2014) (“Notwithstanding the Insurance Corporation of Ireland footnote, it 
does not seem plausible to read territoriality and sovereignty concerns entirely out 
of the minimum contacts analysis.”). 
120 Some have tried to characterize the Court’s approach in Insurance Corp. as a 
valid explanation of how contacts protect the defendant’s due process rights.  See, 
e.g., John N. Drobek, The Federalism Theme in Personal Jurisdiction, 68 IOWA L. 
REV. 1015, 1047 (1983) (“Ireland demonstrates that minimum contacts with the 
forum are necessary to protect the defendant’s own interest in freedom from an 
unrelated sovereign.  On the other hand, World-Wide Volkswagen asserts that 
minimum contacts are necessary to preserve federalism. . . . As the Court said in 
Ireland, the federalism theme in personal jurisdiction cannot be an independent 
restriction on the sovereign power of a court; otherwise, waiver would not be 
possible.  That does not mean, however, that the federalism theme is dead.  
Federalism is preserved by personal jurisdiction as a by-product of the application 
of the doctrine to protect the defendant.”). 
121 E.g., World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Hanson, 357 U.S. 
at 256 (Black, J., dissenting); McGee, 355 U.S. at 221 (Black, J., writing for the 
majority).  
122 E.g., World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 287 (White, J., writing for the majority); 
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 236 (Warren, J., writing for the majority).  
123 See World Wide, 444 U.S. at 292–94. 
124 See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 714. 
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from Hanson through World-Wide, wrapped in the majority’s protest 
that nothing had changed.125 
 The majority’s opinion in Insurance Corp. drew a sharp rebuke 
from Justice Powell.126  He saw that the Court had clearly shifted its 
position and was now adopting an internally inconsistent theory.127  
He stated that the Court’s theory that personal jurisdiction concerned 
only due process, rather than fundamental limits on a Court’s power, 
represented “a sweeping but largely unexplained revision of judicial 
doctrine. . . . [which] could encompass not only the personal 
jurisdiction of federal courts but ‘sovereign’ limitations on state 
jurisdiction as identified in World Wide . . . .”128  Powell did not buy 
the Court’s assertion that citing the Due Process Clause as the sole 
limitation of a court’s personal jurisdiction reach did not 
fundamentally undercut World-Wide’s statement that personal 
jurisdiction served two purposes, one of which was protecting 
sovereignty interests within the American federal system.129 
 The Court had taken another step toward complicating personal 
jurisdiction analysis.  It had traveled from minimum contacts to 
promote fairness,130 to a focus on fairness,131 to a focus on 
                                                
125 See id. at 714 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (“Before today, of course, 
our cases had linked minimum contacts and fair play as jointly defining the 
‘sovereign’ limits on state assertion of personal jurisdiction over unconsenting 
defendants.  The Court appears to abandon the rationale of these cases in a 
footnote.  But it does not address the implications of its action.” (citations omitted) 
(second emphasis added)).  But see Condlin, supra note 115, at 87 (“Admitting 
that it had taken the opposite position in [World-Wide], the Court reversed course 
[in its footnote in Insurance Corp.]”). 
126 See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 715 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment) 
(concluding that the record contains sufficient evidence of minimum contacts to 
support the exercise of jurisdiction based on the standards that Court had applied 
in previous cases).   
127 Id. at 715–16. 
128 Id. at 710. 
129 See id. at 714 (“Before today, of course, our cases had linked minimum 
contacts and fair play as jointly defining the ‘sovereign’ limits on state assertion of 
personal jurisdiction over unconsenting defendants.  The Court appears to abandon 
the rationale of these cases in a footnote.” (emphasis in original) (citing Ins. Corp., 
456 U.S. at 702–03 n.10 (majority opinion); World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292–93; 
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251)) (emphasis in original) (citing Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 
702–03 n.10 (majority opinion); World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292–93; Hanson, 357 
U.S. at 251). 
130 See Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. 
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contacts,132 to a focus on both but with contacts being primary,133 to 
saying that fairness and the defendant’s liberty interest was all that 
matter, all while implicitly continuing to endorse sovereignty by 
pretending that it was merely applying settled law, rather than 
reworking it.134  The doctrinal web that the Court was spinning by 
insisting on the inclusion of sovereignty concerns while also saying 
that due process was the personal jurisdiction North Star was hard to 
understand.  The Court has never truly made an effort to adequately 
explain the inconsistent elements of this doctrine.135 
 
(c)  Keeton, Calder & Helicopteros  
 
 In 1983, the Supreme Court decided three personal jurisdiction 
cases: Keeton v. Hustler Magazine Inc.,136 Calder v. Jones,137 and 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia S.A. v. Hall.138  These cases 
will be discussed briefly. 
 Keeton and Calder, were issued on the same day.  Each involved 
defamation claims, the former against reporters and editors; the latter 
against a magazine itself.139  In Keeton, Kathy Keeton, one of the 
publishers of the magazine Penthouse, alleged that Hustler magazine 
had defamed her.140  Keeton lived in New York, while Hustler141 
was an Ohio corporation with its principal place of business in 
California.142  Yet, Keeton sued in New Hampshire, because that 
                                                                                                            
131 See McGee, 355 U.S. 220; Perkins, 342 U.S. 437; Travelers, 339 U.S. 643; 
Mullane, 339 U.S. 306. 
132 See Hanson, 357 U.S. 235. 
133 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286. 
134 See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. 694. 
135 See Condlin, supra note 115, at 87–88 (“[T]he Court has always taken 
sovereignty concerns into account in personal jurisdiction analysis . . . . and it 
appears that it always will—the debate over how to justify doing this continues to 
swirl.  The Court will come back to this question a number of times over the years, 
but never really put it to rest.” (footnote omitted)). 
136 465 U.S. 770 (1984). 
137 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
138 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
139 Calder, 465 U.S. at 785. 
140 465 U.S. at 772. 
141 An interesting take of Hustler’s history as a Cincinatti, Ohio company is 
presented in the 1996 movie THE PEOPLE VS. LARRY FLINT (Sony Pictures 1996). 
142 Id. 
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was the only state’s whose statue of limitations had not expired at 
the time of suit.143  Keeton’s only connection to New Hampshire was 
the fact that Penthouse was circulated there, a fact that the Court 
noted but treated as irrelevant to the personal jurisdiction analysis.144   
 The sole basis for Keeton’s arguing for jurisdiction in New 
Hampshire was the fact that Hustler’s monthly circulation of about 
fifteen thousand copies of its magazine in that state.145  Although 
that was certainly a small percentage of Hustler’s national 
circulation, under the single publication rule, the plaintiff could 
recover for damages for defamation throughout the country in any 
state having jurisdiction.146  
 The Supreme Court concluded that New Hampshire’s court—in 
this case, the federal district court—could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over Hustler because “[Hustler’s] regular circulation of 
magazines in the forum state is sufficient to support an assertion of 
jurisdiction in a libel action based on the contents of the 
magazine.”147 Although common sense counseled against 
jurisdiction in New Hampshire, which the plaintiff obviously chose 
for tactical reasons, the Court nevertheless allowed the case to go 
forward there merely because the technical requisites of the 
minimum contacts test had been met. 
 In Calder, the Court held that California had personal 
jurisdiction over the two National Enquirer employees, a reporter 
and an editor, both of whom lived in Florida.148  The Court did not 
look at the fact that the magazine had California circulation, but 
rather that the party alleging injury lived and worked in 
                                                
143 Id. at 773; see also id. at 778 n.10 (noting that “[u]nder traditional choice-of-
law principles, the law of the forum State governs on matters of procedure . . . and 
[i]n New Hampshire, statutes of limitations are considered procedural. (citing 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971); Gordon v. Gordon, 
387 A.2d 339, 342 (N.H.1978); Barrett v. Boston & Maine R.R., 178 A.2d 291 
(N.H. 1962)).  
144 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 772. 
145 Id. 
146 See id. at 773 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A(4) (1977)). 
147 Keeton, 465 U.S. at 773–74. 
148 Calder, 465 U.S. at 791. 
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California.149  The Court thus concluded that jurisdiction was proper 
because plaintiff’s claim, if proven, would mean that defendants 
intended to injure the plaintiff in California, i.e., their actions would 
have knowing effects in that state.  Therefore, the Court had to 
contrast this case with unintentional tort cases like World-Wide since 
there is no evidence that the defendants purposefully availed 
themselves of the forum states privileges, the standard that the Court 
had emphasized in World-Wide and Hanson.150  In concluding that 
the defendants had satisfied this requirement, the Court took little 
account of what would seem central to a due process assessment, the 
burden that might be placed on individuals having to litigate three 
thousand miles from their homes. 
 Helicopteros was the second case ever presented to the Supreme 
Court in which a plaintiff attempted to assert general, as opposed to 
specific, jurisdiction i.e., where the cause of action did not arise from 
the defendant’s in-state contacts.151  Because general jurisdiction 
                                                
149 Id. at 789–90.  The suit was brought by the actress, Shirley Jones, who was 
famous for her roles in musicals, as well as for playing the mother on television’s 
Partridge Family. 
150 It would be odd to say that a party committing an intentional tort purposefully 
availed itself of the privilege of harming the plaintiff in the forum state.  That is 
why the Court spoke in terms of effects in California, although this contrasted with 
World-Wide’s conclusion that the felt effects of the car dealer and distributor’s 
unintentional tort in Oklahoma was insufficient to confer jurisdiction.  See Parry, 
supra note 82, at 837 n.44 (“[I]n Calder . . . , a unanimous court further threatened 
the rule of World-Wide Volkswagen.  The Court rejected the defendants’ reliance 
on that case in the course of crafting the plaintiff-centered ‘effects test’ as an 
alternative to purposeful availment in intentional tort cases.  The Court cited 
World-Wide for the proposition that the defendant must reasonably anticipate 
being haled into the courts of the forum state, but it did not refer to purposeful 
availment.”) (citations omitted). 
151 The Court did not actually undertake a full examination of how closely related 
the contacts had to be to the cause of action for the jurisdictional argument to be 
considered specific as opposed to general—and thereby subject to a lesser degree 
of contacts under International Shoe.  See discussion supra note 16.  The court had 
previously said that a cause of action must arise out of the contacts for specific 
jurisdiction, Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319.  Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued that 
even a claim that did not arise out of the defendants contacts, if the dispute was 
related to those contacts, the Court should apply a specific jurisdiction analysis.  
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 425 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  The majority, concluded, 
however that the plaintiff had conceded that her claims did not arise out of and 
were not related to defendant’s contacts with Texas.  Id. at 415.  
2015       A 21ST CENTURY APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION       93 
 
plays a secondary role to specific jurisdiction, the case did not have 
major implications for the evolution of personal jurisdiction 
doctrine.152  In finding general jurisdiction lacking, the Court cited 
general language from Shoe and its progeny, and distinguished the 
facts from Perkins where it had found general jurisdiction, in order 
to reach it’s holding.153  It did not explain how the outcome furthered 
the goals of fairness, sovereignty, or any other interest wrapped upon 
the personal jurisdiction skein.   
 
(d) Burger King 
 
 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz154 represents the only contract 
case that the Court has analyzed purely in terms of minimum 
contacts.155  As Justice Brennan was finally able to garner a 
majority, the Court did make a partial shift towards fairness, but still 
made contacts the primary jurisdictional test.156   
 The case arose out of a franchise agreement for a Burger King 
restaurant between two Michigan businessmen and Florida-based 
                                                
152 See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 771 (“General jurisdiction raises fundamentally 
different concerns than does specific jurisdiction.”).  The present article’s 
prescription would eliminate the distinction between specific and general 
jurisdiction.  See discussion infra Part IV.   
153 See Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 413–19. 
154 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
155 See Ins. Corp., 456 U.S. at 695 (examining the case purely in terms of whether 
a trial court could conclude that personal jurisdiction existed as a sanction for 
discovery violations, and not asking whether the contract itself created sufficient 
contacts between the defendant and the forum state for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction).  The Court has also examined personal jurisdiction in cases involving 
contractual choice of forum clauses.  In those cases the Court has required some 
relationship between the litigation and the chosen forum before allowing 
enforcement of the clause, but has not examined minimum contacts between the 
defendant and the forum state using the International Shoe standard.  See, e.g., 
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
156 Brennan’s overall fairness approach had failed to gain a majority in his prior 
attempts, and he apparently had come to accept that defendant contacts would 
continue to play the primary role in Supreme Court personal jurisdiction decisions.  
Of the personal jurisdiction cases on which Brennan sat (twelve in all), it is ironic 
that in the case in which he finally was able to write a majority opinion that there 
was good reason to think that it would be unfair to subject the defendant to suit in 
the plaintiff’s chosen forum. 
94           UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW       Vol. 13, No. 2 
 
 
Burger King Corporation.157  Rudzewicz and his partner, who did 
not bring his jurisdictional challenge to the Supreme Court, 
negotiated for a Burger King franchise in Michigan.158  The 
contracts were negotiated with Burger King’s Florida headquarters, 
although Burger King’s Michigan office also had some 
involvement.159  Rudzewicz himself did not travel to Florida.160  The 
contract contained a clause that said all disputes were to be decided 
under Florida law, but lacked a forum selection clause.161 
 Soon afterward, the relationship between the parties soured, as 
each side apparently insisted on having things its way.162  Burger 
King brought suit against both defendants in Florida federal court, 
invoking diversity jurisdiction.163  Rudzewicz challenged personal 
jurisdiction in Florida.164 
 The Court, per Justice Brennan, concluded that the Florida 
federal court could exercise personal jurisdiction.165  One senses that 
Justice Brennan wanted to determine the outcome purely on fairness 
concerns, but given the Court’s jurisdictional framework, which 
emphasized contacts as an end in themselves and not simply a proxy 
for fairness, he could not do so.166  Instead, he engaged in an 
extensive rehearsal of the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases from 
International Shoe onward in six pages.167  This portion of the 
opinion serves as a compendium of personal jurisdiction catch 
phrases, like “purposeful direction,” “foreseeability,” “fair play,” 
                                                
157 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 464, 466. 
158 Id. at 466–67. 
159 Id. at 467. 
160 Id. at 479. 
161 Id. at 482 n.24. 
162 Id. at 467–68. 
163 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 468. 
164 See id. at 469–70. 
165 Id. at 487. 
166 Interestingly, Brennan did not rely upon Insurance Corp., whose emphasis that 
personal jurisdiction served solely to protect the defendant’s due process rights 
would seem to provide an opening, highlighted by Justice Powell’s concurrence in 
that case, for a pure fairness based analysis. 
167 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471–78; see also Condlin, supra note 115, at 
106–07 (“Burger King is perhaps best known for its exhaustive summary of 
personal jurisdiction case law. . . . [But] the discussion also often loops back on 
itself, taking up issues that were disposed of earlier, so that it sometimes looks a 
little like the memos of several law clerks stuck together, end-to-end.”). 
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and “litigation arising out of the defendant’s in-state activities.”168  
The opinion then attempts to explain these in terms of a series of 
policy justifications such as fair warning to the defendant, 
predictability in the legal system, fairness both to the defendant and 
plaintiff by not allowing the defendant to escape legal liabilities 
created in the forum state, and the forum state’s interest in affording 
resolution of disputes to its residents.169   
 Brennan stated that although protecting the defendant and other 
interests are important to personal jurisdiction, minimum contacts 
themselves provide the touchstone as to whether jurisdiction will 
lie.170  This argument brought him back to the conundrum that the 
Court faced the Insurance Corp. Court: minimum contacts did not 
square entirely with the defendant’s due process rights, yet the due 
process clause seemed to be the sole constitutional limitation on the 
geographic range of a court’s power.171 Brennan therefore combined 
these factors.  Instead of presenting a unifying theory as he and 
Black had in sundry dissents, Brennan split the criteria into two 
parts, similar to what Justice White had done in waiting for the Court 
in World-Wide.172   
 Applying its test, the Court upheld jurisdiction in Florida.173  In 
terms of contacts, Brennan’s opinion seemed to be most driven by 
the fact that the franchisee defendant chose to enter into an 
arrangement with a Florida corporation.174  The defendant therefore 
received some benefit from contracting with a Florida corporation 
and/or allegedly caused harm in Florida when he breached the 
                                                
168 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 471–78. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. at 476. 
171 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.b.  
172 See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 775 (“Justice Brennan created not a synthesis or 
merger of prior doctrine into a unified conceptual sphere, but rather a forced 
linkage of two very separate doctrines that are not easily harmonized.”). 
173 Burger King, 471 U.S. at 487. 
174 See id. at 479–80 (“Eschewing the option of operating an independent local 
enterprise, Rudzewicz deliberately [reached] out beyond Michigan and negotiated 
with a Florida corporation for the purchase of a long-term franchise and the 
manifold benefits that would derive from affiliation with a nationwide 
organization.” (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original)). 
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contract.175  To be sure, Rudzewicz sought some benefit from a 
transaction with a company that was located in Florida, but it is hard 
to see how this alone implicates Florida’s interest.  In any contract 
between two parties, each party will seek benefit from the other 
party, and if the contract is breached or one party commits a tort, 
then there is potential harm to the other party in the other party’s 
home state.   
 Followed to its logical conclusion, Brennan’s reasoning would 
satisfy the contacts prong of the test in almost any contract case and 
in almost all tort cases.176  Since Brennan took a diminished view of 
contacts, perhaps this was his stealth intent.  Even so, it is surprising 
that he was able to garner a six-justice majority from a Court chary 
about extending jurisdiction, 177 particularly in a case where the 
surface appeal for finding jurisdiction was weak. 
 Ultimately, the outcome in Burger King is probably sensible, 
assuming that the defendant really could litigate in Florida without 
                                                
175 See id. at 480 (“In light of Rudzewicz’ voluntary acceptance of the long-term 
and exacting regulation of his business from Burger King’s Miami 
headquarters . . . Rudzewicz’ refusal to make the contractually required payments 
in Miami, and his continued use of Burger King’s trademarks and confidential 
business information after his termination, caused foreseeable injury to the 
corporation in Florida.  For these reasons it was, at the very least, presumptively 
reasonable for Rudzewicz to be called to account there for such injuries.” (citing 
Keeton, 465 U.S. at 774; World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299; Hanson, 357 U.S, at 253)).  
176 See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 782 (“Notwithstanding the grudging 
acknowledgement that jurisdiction may be divested by the fairness branch, the 
opinion seems deliberately crafted to expand rather than restrict the ambit of state 
court personal jurisdiction.  Certainly, Justice Brennan’s first observation 
concerning the relationship between the two branches suggested that he envisaged 
the fairness branch as increasing opportunities for jurisdiction by a McGee-like, 
multiple-interest balance process. . . . This . . . is not surprising considering that 
the author of the Burger King opinion has consistently been the Court’s leading 
advocate of jurisdiction expansion.”); Condlin, supra note 115, at 105 (“Taken 
literally, [Burger King’s analysis] seemed to create a presumption in favor of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction.”). 
177 See McFarland, supra note 7, at 774–75 (2003) (“[It] is [not] surprising that 
Justice Brennan creates what amounts to a two-step test: he advocated such a sharp 
change in personal jurisdiction standards in earlier dissents.  What is surprising is 
that he gathered the votes of five other Justices to sign on to his previously 
idiosyncratic view that the test should be fractured into two parts.” (footnote 
omitted)).  
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unfair disadvantage.178 Precedent and the apparent unwillingness of 
a sufficient number of justices to get on board from using the overall 
fairness approach that he had advocated in prior cases, foreclosed 
Brennan.  Hemmed in as he was, he had to push the facts of this case 
through the doctrinal strainer that jurisdictional jurisprudence had 
become.179 
 If McGee represented the high point of an overall fairness-based 
expansive view of jurisdiction, Burger King looks like McGee’s 
little brother in retrospect.  While not going as far as the earlier case, 
Burger King brought in fairness factors such as a counter-balance to 
contacts, even if only as a secondary consideration.  Moreover, the 
Court, more so in any case since McGee, seemed to be in favor of 
finding jurisdiction valid absent a strong showing to the contrary.  
This was the last gasp for this type of approach, and strangely, the 
next case would use the fairness factors to cut against finding 
jurisdiction, an issue that Brennan noted was possible but probably 




 Two years after Burger King, the Court decided Asahi Metal 
Indus. v. Superior Ct.181  In Asahi, an allegedly defective tire sold by 
a Taiwanese manufacture, Chein Shin, containing a valve made by a 
Japanese company, Asahi, blew out, seriously injuring a man and 
killing his wife, while the two were riding a motorcycle in 
                                                
178 See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 772 (“Although the result in Burger King . . . 
was understandable, the manner in which the Court reached its decision was 
decidedly unexpected.” (footnote omitted)). 
179 Justice Stevens, joined by Justice White, issued a brief dissent, focusing on the 
unfairness of requiring a franchisee with little bargaining power to litigate against 
its much stronger contractual counterparty in the latter’s state, especially where the 
franchisee dealt directly with Burger King’s local office in his home state.  Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 487–90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  It is odd that Justice White 
joined this opinion, given the disdain that he expressed for fairness in his Word-
Wide opinion. 
180 See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 782 (“Undoubtedly, Burger King was intended 
to expand jurisdiction.  It is therefore ironic that in Asahi, the Court’s first post-
Burger King jurisdictional case, Brennan’s two-branch due process analysis was 
invoked to overturn the assertion of jurisdiction. . . . Even more ironic, perhaps, 
was the Court’s reliance on the fairness branch to reach its decision.”). 
181 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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California.182  The injured man sued Chien Shin in California.183  
The company cross-claimed against Asahi.184  All the plaintiff’s 
claims were disposed of early on, leaving an unusual situation: a 
Taiwanese company essentially suing—technically seeking 
contribution from—a Japanese company in a California state 
court.185  Asahi objected to jurisdiction.186 
 The two-part World-Wide/Burger King personal jurisdiction test 
would come into full relief in this dispute.  The contacts here were 
through the sale of a product.187  World-Wide had addressed, but not 
resolved, the extent to which a defendant could be haled into court 
based upon contacts between its product and the state.188  Even if 
contacts were established, the strange posture of the case, a 
Taiwanese company seeking contribution from a Japanese company 
with no American party left in the litigation, required an assessment 
of considerations beyond contacts. 
 The case for finding contacts sufficient was stronger here than in 
World-Wide. Asahi regularly sold valves to the Taiwanese tire 
manufacturer with the knowledge that some of those tires would end 
up in California.189  World-Wide stated that a seller of a product may 
not be subject to jurisdiction in a given state merely because the 
consumer-purchaser of the product brings the product to that state, 
even if the seller could have foreseen this happening.190  The World-
Wide Court theorized that it would be improper for sellers to be 
subject to jurisdiction in a forum without having intentionally 
directed its product there.191  But World-Wide had suggested that a 
defendant who delivers goods into the stream-of-commerce, a phrase 
borrowed from the famous and influential state court case,192 Gray v. 
                                                
182 Id. at 105–06. 
183 Id.  
184 Id. at 106. 
185 Id.  
186 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106. 
187 Id. at 105. 
188 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a. 
189 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 107. 
190 World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 298. 
191 See id. at 297. 
192 See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 790–91 (“Although only an Illinois Supreme 
Court decision, Gray, which upheld jurisdiction over a domestic component part 
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Am. Radiator & Std. Sanitary Corp.,193 with the expectation that 
they will end up in a given state, can be subject to jurisdiction there 
if the product causes injury.  Therefore, the Court was required to 
determine just how powerful the flow of goods into a given state 
must be before the good is considered to be part of the stream-of-
commerce.  
 Justice O’Connor authored a plurality opinion for herself and 
three other justices that concluded that the fact that Asahi sold tire 
valves to Cheng Shin, knowing that Chen Shin would sell some of 
those tires in California, was insufficient to confer jurisdiction.194  In 
reaching that conclusion, O’Connor stated that “a defendant’s 
awareness that the stream of commerce may or will sweep the 
product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing 
the product into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward 
the forum State.”195  Additional conduct would be required whereby 
the defendant directed its activities toward the forum state, like 
designing its product for the forum state or advertising there.196 
 O’Connor’s opinion does not explain why due process would 
require acts particular to the forum state like advertising or 
incorporating state-specific design.  Those acts might show a greater 
interest in the state’s market, but also would depend on factors 
unrelated to the defendant’s desire to serve the state.  For some 
products there may be no need for state specific design as uniform 
specifications might be adequate for the entire country.  
Furthermore, tire valves are not the type of product that would be 
advertised to the end user.  Even without California specific activity, 
Asahi both clearly benefitted from the California market and took 
affirmative steps that would necessarily cause its valves to end up 
there.197 
                                                                                                            
manufacturer, has on at least two occasions been cited with approval by the 
Supreme Court [in Calder and World-Wide].”). 
193 176 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. 1961). 
194 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105, 107; id. at 114 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).  
195 Id. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
196 Id.  
197 Cf. Stravitz, supra note 104, at 790–91 (“The O’Connor plurality view is . . . at 
odds with [Gray,] the seminal stream-of-commerce case of the post-International 
Shoe era . . . . Significantly, Justice O’Connor failed even to mention Gray.”).  
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 Justice Brennan, also wrote an opinion for four justices.198  He 
argued that additional activity beyond placement of the product into 
the stream of commerce should not be required because “[t]he 
stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, 
but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from manufacture 
to distribution to retail sale.  As long as a participant in this process 
is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, 
the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”199 
 Justice Stevens200 concurrence, however, best demonstrated, 
maybe unintentionally, that the Court’s entire personal jurisdiction 
approach did not really make sense in terms of firm concepts like 
due process and sovereignty, instead consisting of arbitrary line 
drawing.  He noted that “[t]he plurality seems to assume that an 
unwavering line can be drawn between ‘mere awareness’ that a 
component will find its way into the forum State and ‘purposeful 
availment’ of the forum’s market.”201  Indeed, whether a defendant 
has purposefully availed itself of a market does not depend upon the 
volume or nature of its product, as those factors would only affect 
the degree of the defendant’s availment.  Moreover, volume would 
be highly dependent upon the nature of the products, with certain 
items, like tire valves probably being sold in higher volume than, for 
example, a custom designed swimming pool.  These variations do 
not vary the fairness of requiring the defendant to litigate in a 
particular forum, or affect whether a given state has sovereign 
authority to adjudicate a particular claim. 
 A second aspect of Asahi was a majority opinion (8-0) also 
written by Justice O’Connor.  In that opinion, joined by all the 
justices except Scalia, the Court concluded that even if minimum 
contacts existed in this case, it would be unreasonable to allow 
California to exercise jurisdiction.202  In this section, the Court 
                                                
198 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring the 
judgment).  
199 Id. at 117. 
200 Stevens concurred in part and in the judgment in an opinion joined by Justices 
White and Blackmun.  Id. at 116. 
201 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 122 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
202 See id. at 114 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (“A consideration of [several] 
factors [apart from minimum contacts] in the present case clearly reveals the 
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examined the so-called second-leg factors originally discussed in 
World Wide203 and emphasized in Burger King:204  “[T]he burden on 
the defendant, the interests of the forum State, and the plaintiff’s 
interest in obtaining relief. . . . [as well as] ‘the interstate judicial 
system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of 
controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”205 
 Both parts of Asahi are notable.  The Court’s failure to reach a 
majority on whether Asahi had put its valve in the stream of 
commerce is telling and important because products liability claims 
often lead to fights over personal jurisdiction when the product was 
manufactured or distributed by an out-of-state defendant.  The 
failure of the Court to reach a majority here, and twenty-three years 
later in J. McIntyre,206 presents lower courts with a challenge in 
deciding products liability cases, and limits parties’ ability to plan 
either their pre-litigation or post-litigation affairs.   
 The Court’s split demonstrates the lack of coherence of the 
minimum contacts analysis.  The two pluralities split on whether 
selling goods, knowing that they would end up in the forum, 
qualified as purposeful availment, thereby allowing the defendant to 
anticipate being haled into court there—which both opinions agreed 
was the relevant minimum contacts standard.207  This failure to agree 
on a fundamental point indicates a lack of coherence as to the goals 
                                                                                                            
unreasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction over Asahi, even apart from the 
question of the placement of goods in the stream of commerce.”). 
203 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a.  
204 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.d.  
205 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102; id. at 113 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (quoting 
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292) (citations omitted in original). 
206 See Koppel, supra note 17, at 960 (“The plurality and dissenting opinions in 
Asahi parallel the plurality and dissenting opinions in Nicastro.”); see also 
discussion infra Part II.B.3.g. 
207 Compare Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (“The placement of a 
product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”), with id. at 117 (Brennan, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“The stream of commerce refers 
not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of 
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale.  As long as a participant in 
this process is aware that the final product is being marketed in the forum State, 
the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a surprise.”). 
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of minimum contacts test.208  Yes, the justices agreed upon the 
verbiage of the standard: “minimum contacts manifested by 
purposeful availment” but this agreement was illusory.209  
O’Connor’s opinion focuses on targeting the state, and reads 
“purposeful availment” as manifesting the defendant’s intention to 
submit to a sovereign, which is quite Pennoyer-like.210  Brennan’s 
focus on the defendant’s awareness of its product entering the state 
and the fact that it causes harm there, harkens back to McGee with 
assuring fairness to all concerned.  His emphasis was on the fact that 
the product ended up in the forum and caused harm there, not with 
whether the defendant chose to subject itself to that state’s authority. 
 The 8-0 agreement on the secondary factors is also interesting, 
even though the Court has since generally ignored this part of the 
test.211  That a defendant who would not be subject to jurisdiction in 
a given state despite contacts because of overall fairness factors, 
begs the question “why not?”.  If contacts are a proxy for fairness, 
                                                
208 See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 793 (“The two power branch pluralities are 
irreconcilable.”).  The failure to reach a majority is particularly unfortunate here 
because a central component of the Court’s enunciated doctrine is the defendant’s 
reasonable expectations, something that is hard to gauge when there is no 
consistent majority rule. 
209 See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108–09 (O’Connor, J., plurality) (“‘[T]he Constitutional 
touchstone’ of the determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction 
comports with due process ‘remains whether the defendant purposefully 
established minimum contacts’ in the forum state.’”) (quoting Burger King, 471 
U.S. at 474 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316)); id. at 117–18 (Brennan, J. 
concurring) (although not using the words “purposeful availment,” finding that 
contacts were met based on criteria equivalent to that concept by noting that “[a] 
defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits economically 
from the retail sale of the final product in the form state,” while favorably citing 
World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 295, a case in which the purposeful availment standard 
played a central role). 
210 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 77 (“Asahi . . . 
demonstrated the incredible durability of the notion that ‘federalism’ plays a role 
in evaluating the constitutionality of state court assertions of jurisdiction.”).  Judge 
McIntyre’s plurality would continue to emphasize this sovereignty theme.  See 
discussion infra Part II.B.3.g. 
211 Cf. Freer, supra note 32, at 576 (“Because of the unusual facts and international 
wrinkle, it is not clear that Asahi gives much, if any, solace to a defendant trying to 
defeat jurisdiction in the domestic context . . . .”).  Justice Sotomayor has revived 
this portion of personal jurisdiction doctrine in her solo concurring opinion in last 
term’s Daimler AG case.  See discussion infra Part II.B.3.g. 
2015       A 21ST CENTURY APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION       103 
 
then why is there a separate fairness leg?  If the whole matter is an 
issue of state sovereignty, then how can secondary factors weaken 
that sovereign authority?  The Court did not explain.212  Personal 




 By 1990, personal jurisdiction law had evolved, even if that 
evolution was not good.  Not only had the Court not reached a 
consensus on how to apply minimum contacts in all circumstances, it 
was unclear exactly what understanding the justices’ had about the 
essence of personal jurisdiction.  The Court had been very clear that 
due process was the only constitutional limit on personal 
jurisdiction.214  It had been just as clear that state lines remained 
relevant, and that a lack of burden on the defendant to litigate in the 
forum was not alone sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction.215  
The tension thus remained as to whether jurisdiction was proper in 
cases where the defendant was not found physically in the forum but 
easily could defend there in a regime where sovereignty-driven 
jurisdiction still had life.   
 Also left unanswered was the question of whether jurisdiction 
could be exercised over a defendant who might find it burdensome 
to litigate in the forum, but for whom the sovereignty element was 
met because the service was effected upon the defendant while 
fortuitously within the state.  Pennoyer itself said that jurisdiction 
under these circumstances was fine.  In fact, this was pretty much the 
only basis for jurisdiction in Pennoyer’s view.216  But after 
International Shoe, with its homage to fair play, one might question 
whether the defendant’s presence in the forum at the time of service 
alone would be sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction. 
                                                
212 See Stravitz, supra note 104, at 794 (“Part II-B of [Justice O’Connor’s 
majority] opinion, containing [her] fairness analysis, is wooden and overly 
conclusory.”). 
213 Id. at 803 (lamenting that “[t]he confusion emanating from the splintering of 
the Court in Asahi leaves the state of personal jurisdiction seriously unsettled.”).   
214 See Ins. Corp, 456 U.S. 694. 
215 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286. 
216 See discussion supra Part I. 
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 Famously, at least for law school hypotheticals, after 
International Shoe had been decided, a federal district court held in 
Grace v. McArthur that jurisdiction could still be exercised in this 
Pennoyer-like way, so-called “tag service,” even if the defendant’s 
only connection with the state was service upon him during a short 
time when he was in the state’s airspace.217  In 1990 in Burnham v. 
Superior Ct.,218 the Supreme Court would be forced to address the 
question of whether International Shoe’s holding that in-state service 
was not necessary for the exercise of jurisdiction so long as other 
contacts and fairness factors were present, meant that in-state service 
was no longer alone sufficient for finding the existence of personal 
jurisdiction. 
 Burnham represents a baffling case that so divided the Court that 
no majority opinion was reached, even though all the justices agreed 
upon the conclusion that jurisdiction existed.219  The case involved 
in-state service of process, and in that regard fell squarely within the 
rule of Pennoyer.  Beyond that, the facts were almost identical to 
Kulko, a California wife suing her husband, who lived in New Jersey 
for divorce (in Kulko the husband lived in New York, and the suit 
was solely over child support, the parties already being divorced).220  
One would think that with these straightforward facts, the Supreme 
Court, which had decided over a dozen cases under the International 
Shoe framework, would at least be able to garner a majority on the 
basic analytical approach to the case, especially where there was 
unanimous agreement on the outcome.   
 Burnham, a New Jersey resident, was served process during a 
three-day visit to California.221  The suit was brought by his wife 
who was living in California after the couple had separated and 
sought a divorce.222  All the justices agreed that if Burnham had not 
                                                
217 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). 
218 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
219 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 79 (“Like 
Asahi, Burnham produced a unanimous result with splintered reasoning.”). 
220 See Condlin, supra note 115, at 116 (“It is . . . surprising that Burnham did not 
make more use of Kulko.  The two cases were close factually and implicated many 
of the same policy concerns, yet there is only one ‘cf’ reference to Kulko in the 
Burnham opinion, and it was used simply to illustrate a factual point rather than 
support a legal conclusion.”). 
221 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).   
222 Id. 
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been served while he was visiting the state, he lacked the requisite 
contacts with California to be forced to defend there.223  This tag 
service,224 however, would be clearly sufficient to subject Burnham 
to jurisdiction in California under Pennoyer.   
 The issue thus became whether Pennoyer survived International 
Shoe.  This was not important so much for deciding cases where tag 
service was involved, although folks like Burnham would disagree.  
Rather, the decision would say much about what the minimum 
contacts test represented in terms of personal jurisdiction; as an 
expansion of the range of state court jurisdictional reach yet still 
effecting sovereignty principles, or rather an entirely new look at 
jurisdiction, with sovereignty having been scrapped.225 
 The way that Burnham divided the Court underscored the 
dysfunctional nature of the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
jurisprudence.  The attempts of the primary Burnham opinions—
Scalia’s plurality and Brennan’s concurrence in judgment—to situate 
the facts of that case within International Shoe’s personal 
jurisdiction paradigm demonstrated the fallacy and uncertainty of the 
minimum contacts test.  Specifically, the Justices attempt to explain 
                                                
223 See id.  The case generated four opinions.  Justice Scalia wrote the plurality, 
which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice White 
in part; Justice White wrote his own opinion, concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment; Justice Brennan wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, which 
Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O’Connor joined.  Justice Stevens wrote his 
own opinion, concurring in the judgment.  This opinion was two sentences long, 
saying that he concurred because the defendant was served while in California.  
Therefore, one cannot know what his reasoning was, but presumably it did not 
agree with any of the other opinions, none of which he joined. 
224 Tag service involves serving (or tagging) an out-of-state defendant while he or 
she is in the forum state and basing jurisdiction purely on the fact that service was 
obtained while the defendant was within the state.  This practice was seemingly 
approved by Pennoyer in discussing why service outside the forum state would not 
confer jurisdiction and had a long pedigree. 
225 In Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186, the Court had indicated that International Shoe’s 
minimum contacts did not just add an alternate way to find jurisdiction, but rather 
replaced the test regarding in-state attachment of property when it came to quasi-
in-rem jurisdiction.  That exercise of adjudicatory power affected a person’s 
property rights, and therefore required a due process (i.e. minimum contacts) 
analysis.  Now the question was whether a defendant who was served in the state 
too could argue that jurisdiction was improper because he or she lacked minimum 
contacts therewith and/or whether or not the in-state service alone constituted 
sufficient contacts. 
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how the test would apply to a defendant who was served within a 
state, but had very little contact, and therefore lacked minimum 
contacts. These attempts actually demonstrated that the Court’s 
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence neither effected the goals of 
fairness reflected in due process nor supported a jurisdictional 
standard rooted in notions of state sovereignty and federalism. 
 Writing for a plurality consisting of four justices—although one 
of these, Justice White, only joined part of his opinion—Justice 
Scalia concluded that tag service requires no minimum contacts 
analysis.226  Instead, he concluded that because this form of 
obtaining jurisdiction was both of ancient origin and remained 
widely practiced in the decades after International Shoe, those facts 
alone satisfied the Due Process Clause.227  There was no additional 
inquiry into the logic or effect of forcing a defendant to litigate in the 
state’s courts that he was passing through when served with 
process.228 
  Justice Scalia’s opinion most clearly demonstrates that the 
problem with the approach in International Shoe is that personal 
jurisdiction really does not concern due process.  He specifically 
criticized Justice Brennan’s concurrence for concluding the long-
standing practice made tag jurisdiction fair.  Scalia stated that what 
                                                
226 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (“The short of the 
matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone constitutes due process 
because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that define the due 
process standard of ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”).  
That is, Scalia concluded not that tagging the defendant establishes that the 
defendant had minimum contacts.  Id.  Instead, where a defendant is tagged within 
the state, minimum contacts simply have no relevance.  Id.   
227 Id.  Scalia noted that almost all—if not all—states did, and continued to allow 
tag jurisdiction at the time Burnham was decided.  Id. at 613–15.  
228 Id.  Justice Scalia’s opinion tacitly admits that the answer to this question 
would be that it was not fair using the International Shoe criteria.  See id. at 623 
(stating that, regarding Justice Brennan’s argument that the defendant benefitted 
by being in California for three days, “[t]hree days’ worth of these benefits strike 
us as powerfully inadequate to establish, as an abstract matter, that it is ‘fair’ for 
California to decree the ownership of all Mr. Burnham’s worldly goods acquired 
during the 10 years of marriage, and the custody over his children.  We daresay a 
contractual exchange swapping those benefits for that power would not survive the 
‘unconscionability’ provision of the Uniform Commercial Code.”). 
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Brennan called fairness, was really just tradition.229  But, that 
something is long-standing and commonly practiced does not 
necessarily make it fair.230  Due process implies the process that one 
ought to get, not merely what one has traditionally been afforded.  
Thus, Scalia, while not explicitly saying so, was implicitly endorsing 
the view of Hanson, that personal jurisdiction primarily concerns 
notions of federalism, territoriality, and power, not due process or 
fairness.  
 Moreover, Justice Scalia’s opinion not only shows that personal 
jurisdiction and due process are an uneasy fit, it elucidates—albeit 
unintentionally—a fundamental flaw in the minimum contacts 
standard.  If the bounds of a court’s geographic reach are to be 
determined based on rigid conceptions rooted in long-standing 
practice divorced from fairness, then how could the Court in 
International Shoe authorize expanding jurisdiction merely because 
it comports with fair play.  Combining the Burnham plurality with 
International Shoe yields the following unwieldy doctrine: due 
process requires that personal jurisdiction be exercised only when 
the defendant has minimum contacts with the forum state sufficient 
to make the exercise of jurisdiction comport with fair play and 
substantial justice, or if the defendant happens to be served within 
the state, irrespective of how burdensome or fair it is to require the 
defendant to litigate there. 
 The problem is that Scalia does not go far enough.  What he says 
about tag service not ensuring fairness is true about minimum 
contacts generally.  His critique should not be limited to criticizing 
Justice Brennan for finding jurisdiction fair through the act of 
tagging the defendant in the forum.  Minimum contacts might in 
some cases indicate that it is fair to require the defendant to litigate 
in the forum, just as tag jurisdiction might, but neither tag 
jurisdiction nor contacts alone ensures fairness to the defendant.  
And, as has been demonstrated from almost seventy years of 
                                                
229 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 624 (“By formulating it as a ‘reasonable expectation’ 
Justice Brennan makes that seem like a ‘fairness’ factor; but in reality, of course, it 
is just tradition masquerading as ‘fairness.’”). 
230 The practice in Shaffer allowing jurisdiction solely on the presence of property 
in the forum state, which the plurality opinion unsuccessfully tried to distinguish, 
also had a long-standing history and was still used in several states when Shaffer 
pruned that form of jurisdiction. 
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personal jurisdiction cases under the International Shoe regime, 
determinations as to whether minimum contacts have been satisfied 
to an extent that the exercise of jurisdiction is fair in a given case is 
tricky.  Neither tagging nor contacts has a meaningful connection to 
what is typically thought of as due process. 
 Justice Brennan, whose approach to personal jurisdiction in most 
cases represents the most logically sound application of the 
minimum contacts test in the International Shoe era, actually took a 
more illogical approach than Scalia.231  Brennan concluded that 
International Shoe’s minimum contacts test did apply to tag service 
the same as it would to out-of-state service, but the fact that the 
defendant was tagged within the state would alone almost always 
satisfy the minimum contacts requirements.232  That Brennan and 
Scalia so strenuously disagreed on this theory while agreeing on the 
outcome is notable.  In a sense, it is not entirely clear whether they 
actually disagree about anything, or whether the minimum contacts 
test is so difficult to understand that they are simply arguing over 
language that lacks inherent meaning.233 
 Justice Scalia believed that in-state service meant that no-
minimum contacts analysis was required, thereby maintaining a 
central portion of Pennoyer.234  Justice Brennan believed that a 
tagged defendant still had to be shown to have minimum contacts, 
but that the tagging itself would almost always satisfy the contacts.  
What are the differences between Scalia and Brennan’s Burnham 
opinions?  How is finding that in-state service requires the 
dispending of any analysis of contacts (Scalia) different from 
concluding that the in-state service requires and satisfies the contacts 
(Brennan)?  In reality, this spat demonstrates that the Court does not 
really know what purpose the minimum contacts test serves.  Scalia 
thinks that it serves as a de facto expansion of the state’s territory, so 
                                                
231 See Condlin, supra note 115, at 117 (“In many ways, Justice Brennan’s opinion 
consisted of adding up zeroes to get one.”). 
232 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 629, 637–38 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). 
233 Cf. E.B. WHITE, MY DAY, ONE MAN’S MEAT (1944) (“There is nothing more 
likely to start disagreement among people or countries than an agreement.”); 
GEORGE R.R. MARTIN, A GAME OF THRONES 98 (1996) (“Different roads 
sometimes lead to the same castle.”). 
234 See Koppel, supra note 17, at 958 (“Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion . . . 
breathed life into Pennoyer by affirming the continued viability of Pennoyer’s 
‘presence’ principle.”). 
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that someone served outside the state may, with sufficient contacts, 
be treated as being served within the state.  Brennan sees contacts as 
ensuring that the defendant’s rights be protected, although strangely 
he thinks that the sole contact of being handed papers within the 
state, instead of without, meaningfully protects the defendant. 
 Looking more closely at Brennan’s Burnham opinion further 
underscores the weakness of the minimum contacts approach, at 
least as understood by Justice Brennan.  In arguing that that tag 
service generally satisfies minimum contacts, Brennan stresses three 
points.  First, because tag service is so widely used, potential parties 
have notice that they will be subject to suit if they are served within 
a state.235  Second, by being in the state in which they are tagged, 
defendants are necessarily enjoying some benefits of the state, 
however briefly they are there, like police protection, use of roads 
etc.236  Third, the burden on Burnham to defend in California was 
slight due to modern transportation and as evidenced as the fact that 
he had traveled there before.237   
 The first and third points prove too much.  So long as a state 
clearly announced that it had a given long-arm statute, then that 
would give a potential parties notice of the types of activities that 
might subject it to suit in that state.238  This argument does not 
                                                
235 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 635–37 (“I find the historical background relevant 
because . . . the fact that American courts have announced the rule for perhaps a 
century . . . provides a defendant voluntarily present in a particular State today 
‘clear notice that [he] is subject to suit’ in the forum.” (quoting World-Wide, 444 
U.S. at 297) (alteration in original)).  
236 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 637–38 (“By visiting the forum State, a transient 
defendant actually ‘avail[s]’ himself of significant benefits provided by the State.  
His health and safety are guaranteed by the State’s police, fire, and emergency 
medical services; he is free to travel on the State’s roads and waterways; he likely 
enjoys the fruits of the State’s economy as well.” (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 
476) (alteration in original)). 
237 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 638. 
238 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 624–25 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (“The only 
reason for charging Mr. Burnham with the reasonable expectation of being subject 
to suit is that the States of the Union assert adjudicatory jurisdiction over the 
person, and have always asserted adjudicatory jurisdiction over the person, by 
serving him with process during his temporary physical presence in their 
territory.”); see also Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 
91 (“If a defendant can be charged with knowing the history of jurisdictional 
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specifically support tag jurisdiction so much as almost any exercise 
of jurisdiction that is widely known.  As far as the ease of travel and 
lack of burden, that would be true of many, if not most, defendants 
in the twentieth (now twenty-first) century.  If one were to take 
Justice Brennan at his word, it would “justify the exercise of 
jurisdiction over everyone, whether or not he ever comes to 
California.”239 
 The second point depends only upon the defendant’s having been 
within the state at some point, not on his having been served process 
there.  A defendant who is served one minute or six months after 
leaving the state has enjoyed the benefits of the state as surely as one 
who was tagged while present therein.240  Almost all the personal 
jurisdiction cases in the Supreme Court and elsewhere involve 
defendants who derived some benefit from a state, whether from 
being there at some point, or having sold a product to, or contracted 
with, a party within that state.  Also, Justice Brennan does not seem 
to root his opinion in the fact that Burnham had been in California 
for three days when he was served as opposed to three minutes – the 
latter would also seem to suffice for Justice Brennan, even though 
Mr. Burnham would likely have incurred no benefit in that 
situation.241 
 Burnham had upheld the type of service allowed in Pennoyer.  
But the Justices could not agree why.  Personal jurisdiction was in a 
sorry state, with a confusing doctrine and a badly divided court 
                                                                                                            
practice in the United States for the last century or so, however, he can be charged 
with knowledge of a state’s long-arm statute.”). 
239 Burnham, 495 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added); see 
also Condlin, supra note 115, at 118–19 (“On Justice Brennan’s view, it is hard to 
know what kind of claim Mr. Burnham could not be sued on in California, or who 
could not be sued in California.”).  
240 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[E]ven if one 
agreed with Justice Brennan’s conception of an equitable bargain, the ‘benefits’ 
we have been discussing would explain why it is ‘fair’ to assert general 
jurisdiction over Burnham-returned-to-New-Jersey-after-service only at the 
expense of proving that it is also ‘fair’ to assert general jurisdiction over Burnham-
returned-to-New-Jersey-without-service—which we know does not conform with 
‘contemporary notions of due process.’” (emphasis in original)). 
241 See id. at 625 (“Suppose, for example, that a defendant in Mr. Burnham’s 
situation enjoys not three days’ worth of California ‘benefits,’ but 15 minutes’ 
worth.”);  see also Condlin, supra note 115, at 117 (“The argument based on the 
benefits and protections of California law are equally unavailing.”). 
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leaving lower courts, litigants, and anyone planning personal or 
business affairs in the dark.242  The Court would allow things to 
worsen by not addressing and cleaning up this mess for the next two 
decades.  Then the Court would make things even worse by trying to 
clean up their mess. 
 
(g) J. McIntyre 
 
  In 2010, the Court granted certiorari in J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. V. Nicastro,243 and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. 
Brown.244  Despite the fact that at this time the Court still examined 
the defendant’s contacts as ends in themselves, the Court’s decisions 
in the mid to late 1980s had seemingly tempered the most rigid 
aspects of the sovereignty-based approach apparent in Hanson and 
World-Wide.245  These grants of certiorari therefore raised 
expectations that the Court would revisit and simplify the most 
problematic aspects of the minimum contacts doctrine.246  These 
hopes were dashed.247 
                                                
242 See Condlin, supra note 115, at 119 (“What started as an uncomplicated two-
factor, four-permutation test, designed to deal with the relatively simple telephone-
and-automobile connected world of the 1950s, has grown exponentially into an 
elaborate, multi-factor, pseudo algorithmic, balancing test, designed to deal with 
the electronically linked world of the twenty-first century.  Unfortunately, the 
development of the doctrine has not always been linear, cumulative, consistent, or 
clear.”). 
243 131 S.Ct. 2780 (2011). 
244 131 S.Ct. 2846 (2011). 
245 See Parry, supra note 82, at 840 (“[B]efore [J. McIntyre], and with the 
exception of Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Burnham, which dealt with 
presence in the forum, it seemed settled that personal jurisdiction questions turned 
on the two-part analysis derived from International Shoe.  [World-Wide’s] 
endorsement of purposeful availment was the closest thing the Court had to a 
controlling precedent on the question of how to apply the International Shoe test, 
but Burger King and Asahi had thrown the precise definition of that term into 
doubt.  The Court had also rejected the federalism/state sovereignty rationale 
advanced by [World-Wide] as justification for the minimum contacts test, in favor 
of the claim that the focus of the personal jurisdiction inquiry is on the due process 
liberty interests of the defendant who contests personal jurisdiction.”); Freer, 
supra note 32, at 579 (“At the end of the century, then, the two-step approach from 
[World-Wide] seemed to be in place.”). 
246 See Patrick J. Borchers, Symposium, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and 
the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 
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 J. McIntyre, the more important of the two cases to jurisdictional 
jurisprudence, involved a suit against the U.K. manufacturer, 
McIntyre (UK), of a scrap metal machine that injured Nicastro, the 
employee of a New Jersey company (Curcio), which bought the 
device.248  McIntyre (UK) sold the machine to its exclusive 
American distributor, McIntyre (US), which was based in Ohio.249  
Nicastro’s employer bought the machine from McIntyre (US) at a 
Las Vegas trade show, and it was shipped from Ohio to Curcio’s 
New Jersey location.250   McIntyre (UK) and McIntyre (US) were 
entirely separate companies.251  Moreover, McIntyre (UK) had no 
offices or employees in New Jersey, did not directly sell into or 
                                                                                                            
(2011) [hereinafter “Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test”] (“[J. 
McIntyre and Goodyear] marked for the first time in almost a quarter of a century 
that the United States Supreme Court engaged in an extended discussion of the 
minimum contacts test. . . . Law professors who teach Civil Procedure and related 
subjects waited eagerly for the new cases. . . . Of more practical significance, the 
bench and bar were hoping for guidance on . . . difficult issues that have bedeviled 
the subject.”). 
247 Robin J. Effron, Letting the Perfect Become the Enemy of the Good: The 
Relatedness Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 867, 
868 (2012) (“The Supreme Court’s recent decision in [J. McIntyre] had the 
potential to resolve nearly two decades of confusion in personal jurisdiction 
doctrine. . . . [But] the Court produced a fractured 4-2-3 opinion that resolved 
little . . . . The academic community met the [J. McIntyre] decision with almost 
unanimous disapproval, decrying the Court’s inability to resolve the stream of 
commerce theory in particular and to articulate a coherent theory of personal 
jurisdiction in general.”); Koppel, supra note 17, at 916 (“The Supreme Court’s 
grant of certiorari in [J. McIntyre] gave it the opportunity to finally resolve the 
confusion over the Asahi Court’s ‘four to four division on the proper scope of the 
stream of commerce principle [that] has left matters somewhat of a muddle.’  
Missing this opportunity, the Court splintered along formalist-functionalist lines, 
as it did in Asahi.” (quoting 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.4, at 497 (3d ed. 2002))); id. at 958 
(“[The] doctrinal split [which has existed since Hanson] would appear once again 
in [J. McIntyre], which would fail to resolve the question whether the minimum 
contacts principle is primarily a sovereign limitation of the power of States or a 
standard of reason and fairness.” (quotation omitted)); Parry, supra note 82, at 841 
(“[J. McIntyre] compounds the uncertainty that Asahi and Burnham fostered.”).  
248 Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 577 (N.J. 2010). 
249 Id. at 578.  McIntyre Machinery of America, Inc. was not part of the case as it 
was insolvent. 
250 Id.  
251 Id. at 579. 
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solicit business in that state, and had no physical presence there.252  
The record indicates that this was the only product of McIntyre (UK) 
that was sold to a resident of, or made its way into, New Jersey.253   
 In October 2001, the machine severed several of Nicastro’s 
fingers.254  In 2003, he sued in New Jersey state court.255  The case 
then made its way through the courts for years on the personal 
jurisdiction issue.  The trial court granted McIntyre (UK)’s motion to 
dismiss for a lack of personal jurisdiction.256  Then New Jersey’s 
appellate court reversed and remanded for jurisdictional 
discovery.257  Following discovery, the trial court again granted 
McIntyre (UK)’s motion to dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction, which 
the intermediate appellate court again reversed.258  The matter was 
then appealed to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which, in a divided 
opinion affirmed the lower appellate Court’s ruling that New Jersey 
had jurisdiction over McIntyre (UK).259   
 The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that by selling its 
machine to an exclusive distributor who was given the mission of 
selling throughout the United States, McIntyre (UK) could 
reasonably anticipate that this product might end up in New Jersey, 
and cause injury there if defective.260  Under those circumstances, 
jurisdiction would be exercised absent the defendant’s showing an 
undue burden,261 thereby invoking the second-branch fairness 
considerations that the Court had implemented in Burger King.262  
                                                
252 Id. 
253 See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct at 2786.  The record indicates the possibility, but not 
the certainty, that three additional machines made their way into New Jersey.  This 
discrepancy had no effect on any of the various opinions issued in this case, and it 
is of no significance. 
254 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 577. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 578. 
257 Id. 
258 Id. at 579–80. 
259 Id. at 577. 
260 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 593. 
261 Id. 
262 Id.; see also Koppel, supra note 17, at 915 (“The New Jersey Supreme Court’s 
opinion also reflects Justice Brennan’s shift of emphasis, expressed in his [World-
Wide] dissent, from the majority’s threshold purposeful availment requirement, 
which, in Brennan’s view, ‘focuses tightly on the existence of contacts between 
the forum and the defendant,’ to the fairness prong of the minimum contacts 
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Given that various high-level employees of McIntyre (UK) had 
traveled to the United States for various reasons, the company could 
not make that showing.263   
 Notably, the New Jersey Supreme Court misunderstood the 
stream-of-commerce test as a substitute for minimum contacts, 
rather than a means of establishing them.264  This observation is not 
a swipe at this highly respected State high court.265  Instead, it is 
evidence of how abstruse personal jurisdiction doctrine has 
become.266 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, and on the last day of the 
2010-2011 term, ten years after the accident and eight years after the 
initial suit, reversed and held that McIntyre (UK) was not subject to 
jurisdiction in New Jersey.267  This decision was a major 
disappointment.  The outcome was as illogical and unfair as any 
previous Supreme Court personal jurisdiction decision.  Despite a 
                                                                                                            
doctrine, which focuses on the forum state’s interest in providing a convenient 
forum for local residents.” (quoting World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 299)). 
263 Nicastro, 987 A.2d at 593. 
264 See id. at 582 (“We do not find that J. McIntyre had a presence or minimum 
contacts in this State—in any jurisprudential sense—that would justify a New 
Jersey court to exercise jurisdiction in this case.  Plaintiff’s claim that J. McIntyre 
may be sued in this State must sink or swim with the stream-of-commerce theory 
of jurisdiction.”); see also J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2790–91 (“It is notable that the 
New Jersey Supreme Court appear[ed] to agree, for it could not find that J. 
McIntyre had a presence or minimum contacts in this State—in any jurisprudential 
sense—that would justify a New Jersey court to exercise jurisdiction in this case.  
The court nonetheless held that petitioner could be sued in New Jersey based on a 
stream-of-commerce theory of jurisdiction.  As discussed, however, the stream-of-
commerce metaphor cannot supersede either the mandate of the Due Process 
Clause or the limits on judicial authority that Clause ensures.” (quotations 
omitted)).  Of course, minimum contacts itself is a metaphor, so it is piling 
metaphor upon metaphor to insist that stream-of-commerce is a form of minimum 
contacts as opposed to an independent way for establishing personal jurisdiction. 
265 See Colleen O’Dea, Have Politics, Power Struggles Tarnished the Reputation 
of NJ’s Judiciary, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Apr. 4, 2014), 
http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/04/04/have-politics-power-struggles-
tarnished-reputation-of-nj-s-judiciary/ (“New Jersey’s judiciary [is] nationally 
recognized for its independence and important legal precedents.”). 
266 See Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at 
1247 (“The fundamental doctrinal confusion is evident in the Supreme Court’s 
most recent efforts, particularly J. McIntyre[’s] . . . splintered and muddled 
opinion.”). 
267 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2791 (plurality opinion). 
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major change in personnel from the Asahi and Burnham decisions,268 
the Court remained as fractured as in those cases, with no majority.  
And the opinions that were issued continued to strain logic, with the 
plurality’s analysis and reasoning being particularly frustrating.269   
 J. McIntyre suffered from the process and inefficiency infirmities 
that characterize so much of personal jurisdiction disputes.  The suit 
wound through four courts—two of them twice—over eight years, 
just to decide that jurisdiction did not exist, thereby draining time 
and resources in this procedural dispute.  Not only did this leave the 
parties to restart the litigation elsewhere, but the defendant who 
claimed to be immune from suit in New Jersey, paradoxically spent 
years in New Jersey—and in Washington D.C.—arguing that it 
should not have to litigate in that State.270 
 Justice Kennedy’s plurality decision, joined by Chief Justice 
Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, was the worst of the 
three opinions issued by the justices in this case.  Kennedy 
emphasized that jurisdiction depended upon whether a defendant had 
freely chosen to submit to a sovereign.  He used the term 
“sovereignty,” or a variation of the word, seventeen times271 and 
gave state lines a level of importance that had not been enjoyed since 
at least Hanson, and perhaps Pennoyer.272  Yet, relying on Insurance 
                                                
268 Only two justices, Scalia and Kennedy, remained from Burnham, with only 
Scalia remaining from the Asahi case. 
269 See Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at 
1245–46 (“The Supreme Court performed miserably.  Its opinion in J. 
McIntyre . . . is a disaster.  As in its 1987 Asahi decision, the Court produced no 
majority opinion, but the plurality opinion attempted to roll back the clock by a 
century or more and re-ground personal jurisdiction in a dubious sovereignty 
theory that the Court had apparently rejected several times before.”). 
270 But see Parry, supra note 82, at 844 (“The new approach [in J. McIntyre] would 
lower the cost of litigation, apparently because it would allow a low-cost dismissal 
of suits against defendants of this kind in other states, or deter the filing of such 
suits altogether.”). 
271 See Koppel, supra note 17, at 917 (“To make the primary role of sovereignty in 
limiting state-court jurisdiction unmistakably clear, the plurality opinion 
mentioned the word ‘sovereign’ or ‘sovereignty’ seventeen times, and referred 
eight times to the requirement that the defendant submit to the power of a 
sovereign.”).  
272 See, e.g., J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2787 (plurality opinion) (“A court may 
subject a defendant to judgment only when the defendant has sufficient contacts 
with the sovereign.”); id. at 2788 (“The principal inquiry in cases of this sort is 
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Corp., Justice Kennedy maintained that the Due Process Clause 
remained the sole limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction.273  This 
illogic persisted through much of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, 
as far back as Hanson, and certainly since Insurance Corp.  
However, following that case, the Court had finessed the issue.  
Never had an opinion served as such a paean to sovereignty, while 
simultaneously insisting that in so doing it was fulfilling the 
demands of due process as did Kennedy’s McIntyre plurality.274   
                                                                                                            
whether the defendant’s activities manifest an intention to submit to the power of a 
sovereign.”); id. at 2789 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or 
sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.  The question is whether a defendant has 
followed a course of conduct directed at the society or economy existing within 
the jurisdiction of a given sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject 
the defendant to judgment concerning that conduct.”); see also Freer, supra note 
32, at 581 (“Professor Rhodes points out [that] the Court had never employed the 
term [submission] for personal jurisdiction under International Shoe, and had 
limited it to cases of consent to jurisdiction.”); Koppel, supra note 17, at 916 
(“Two-thirds of [the] six-justice majority was comprised of a plurality opinion that 
is solidly grounded in the  concept of state sovereignty, the formalist pedigree of 
which dates back to Pennoyer and the agrarian economy of the mid-nineteenth 
century.”); Parry, supra note 82, at 860 (“By characterizing the defendant’s 
relationship to a court as submission to a sovereign, Justice Kennedy asserts, first, 
the formality of judicial power as something not invoked lightly or accidentally 
and, second, its majesty as a manifestation of sovereignty.”); cf. Freer, supra note 
32, at 580 (“[Kennedy’s plurality opinion] seems to signal a return to the assertion 
in [World-Wide] that personal jurisdiction operates to guard interstate 
federalism.”). 
273 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (“Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts 
“judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual 
liberty,” for due process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful 
power.” (quoting Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 702)). 
274 In fact, in the sentence right after Kennedy states that personal jurisdiction 
depends upon whether the defendant had “followed a course of conduct” that 
would allow a “sovereign . . . to subject the defendant to the judgment concerning 
that conduct,” he states: “Personal jurisdiction, of course, restricts ‘judicial power 
not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty,’ for due 
process protects the individual’s right to be subject only to lawful power.”  J. 
McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (quoting Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 702).  
Kennedy then shifts back to discussing sovereignty.  Cf. Parry, supra note 82, at 
848–49 (“Justice White’s reliance on sovereignty [in World-Wide] arose from 
constitutional structure and the concrete facts of federalism.  Justice Kennedy’s 
use of sovereignty, by contrast, arises from traditional ideas of judicial power that 
may be consistent, but are not necessarily interwoven with the structure of the 
Constitution or the federal system more generally. . . . Justice Kennedy’s approach 
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 Kennedy’s opinion laid bare the flaws of linking personal 
jurisdiction, due process, sovereignty, and contacts as comprising a 
neat package.  Clearly, McIntyre (UK) did not affirmatively choose 
to submit itself to New Jersey’s adjudicatory authority.  Then again, 
the same could be said of pretty much all of the defendants since 
International Shoe over whom the Court found personal jurisdiction.  
Can one say that the magazine writer and editor located in Florida 
who wrote about California resident Shirley Jones in Calder, or the 
Michigan franchisee who entered into a contract with a company that 
happened to be located in Florida, Burger King, chose to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the states in which they were sued any more than 
McIntyre (UK) did with New Jersey?275   
 The problematic nature of treating personal jurisdiction as only 
appropriate when a defendant has freely submitted to the sovereign 
authority of a state is further reinforced by the fact that the defendant 
here was from the U.K.  Sovereignty in personal jurisdiction had 
previously been discussed in terms of interstate federalism, not in 
allowing one state to impinge on another state’s area of authority.276  
To be sure, one might think in terms of New Jersey’s authority not 
overreaching into the U.K.’s realm.  But here it was conceded that 
McIntyre (UK) was subject to jurisdiction in the United States, 
including, if allowed by federal statute, a New Jersey federal 
court.277  From the standpoint of U.K. sovereignty, how could it 
                                                                                                            
therefore lays itself open to the charge that it serves no particular material or 
constitutional interests and instead represents formalism for its own sake or, at 
best, for the sake of tradition.”). 
275 See discussion supra Parts II.B.3.c–II.B.3.d. 
276 See Koppel, supra note 17, at 959 (“The key issue confronting the Court in [J. 
McIntyre]—and unresolved since Asahi—is whether state sovereignty within the 
federal system makes sense in the international context.” (footnote omitted)). 
277 See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (“Because 
the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in principle be subject to 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States but not of any particular state.”).  
Not that Kennedy was limiting his overall analysis to international defendants.  Id. 
at 2790 (“It must be remembered, however, that although this case and Asahi both 
involve foreign manufacturers, the undesirable consequence of Justice Brennan’s 
approach in World-Wide are no less significant for domestic producers.”); see id. 
at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“New Jersey’s exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign manufacturer whose dangerous product caused a workplace injury 
in New Jersey does not tread on the domain, or diminish the sovereignty, of any 
sister State.  Indeed, among the States of the United States, the State in which the 
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make any difference if it was a New Jersey state court, an Ohio state 
court, or a New Jersey federal court that sought to adjudicate the 
rights of a corporation located in the UK?  They would either all 
violate or all not violate UK sovereignty.  As the latter two courts 
concededly could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction, it is hard to 
understand how sovereignty concerns would come into play only 
with the New Jersey state court.  This posture demonstrates that 
Kennedy was not merely incorrect on how things played out in J. 
McIntyre.  Rather, it shows the problem of thinking of personal 
jurisdiction in terms of sovereignty at all, because even the most 
extensive jurisdictional reach would implicate only the rights of the 
defendant, and not the sovereign concerns of another state or 
country. 
 Justice Kennedy also proffered hypothetical cases in which 
allowing jurisdiction over McIntyre (UK) might allow jurisdiction to 
be extended to distant defendants in cases where doing so would 
result in unfair burden.  The examples he gave were situations where 
one might validly argue that due process would compel finding 
jurisdiction lacking like “a small Florida farm [that] sell[s] crops to a 
large nearby distributor . . . . [the farmer could then] be sued in 
Alaska or any number of other States’ courts without ever leaving 
town.”278  But the standard for deciding jurisdictional issues that 
Kennedy indorsed does not provide a meaningful device for 
distinguishing fair from unfair exercises of jurisdiction.  A small 
business owner or farmer might sell one or a handful of items 
directly to someone located in a distant state, through mail order or, 
more likely in the 21st century, a website.  That would establish 
jurisdiction under the contacts/sovereignty approach that Kennedy 
approved.  In fact, an overall fairness/burden approach is more likely 
to protect the small farmer or business person from distant litigation 
than Kennedy’s sovereignty approach, while allowing it go forward 
in an appropriate case, like one against a major international 
corporation like McIntyre (UK). 
 All of the problems with Kennedy’s opinions can be said to be 
by-products of his—and the Court’s—longstanding attempt to link 
                                                                                                            
injury occurred would seem most suitable for litigation of a products liability tort 
claim.”). 
278 Id. at 2790. 
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personal jurisdiction with both sovereignty and due process.  As 
Kennedy’s opinion notes, McIntyre (UK) did not choose to submit 
or did not even implicitly submit to New Jersey’s sovereignty.279  
Yet, in what sense would its due process rights be violated by 
allowing the case to proceed there?  If one accepts the conclusion 
that a lack of submission to a sovereign means that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction violates the defendant’s due process rights, then 
by means of circular reasoning, that assertion appears to stand up 
because the conclusion is assumed to be correct.  But this case 
demonstrates in spades the flaw of that assumption.  There would be 
nothing unfair or particularly burdensome about requiring McIntyre 
(UK) to adjudicate in New Jersey, wherein the plaintiff and much of 
the evidence was located.280  It was essentially conceded that 
McIntyre (UK) could be required to litigate in Ohio, although that 
would presumably be harder.  Ohio is further away, though only 
slightly.  But because little or no evidence or witnesses were there, 
adjudication there would make it harder for McIntyre (UK) to mount 
a meritorious defense.281  Yet for Kennedy, sovereignty trumps all, 
even while he claimed that his approach furthers due process 
concerns.282 
                                                
279 See id. (“Respondent has not established that J. McIntyre engaged in conduct 
purposefully directed at New Jersey.”). 
280 Justice Kennedy’s opinion said that fairness was beside the point and that it was 
incorrect to look at that factor, even though he also urged that the Due Process 
Clause was the sole criteria on which personal jurisdiction was to be judged.  
Compare J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (plurality opinion) (“The conclusion that 
jurisdiction is in the first instance a question of authority rather than fairness 
explains [cases like] Burnham.”), with id. (“Personal jurisdiction, of course, 
restricts ‘judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of 
individual liberty’ . . . . ) (quoting Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 702).  How can 
personal jurisdiction both be a matter of authority and not fairness, while also 
being a matter of due process and not sovereignty? 
281 Of course, if the evidence did not help J. McIntyre, then it might have a better 
chance of winning in Ohio, but surely that is not an interest that due process law 
should protect. 
282 Parry, supra note 82, at 844–45 (“Justice Kennedy . . . suggested scenarios that 
confirm his intention to create a relatively restrictive rule for personal 
jurisdiction. . . . [U]nder Justice Kennedy’s approach, there is no fairness inquiry 
at all. . . . [H]e relied heavily on Justice Scalia’s opinion in Burnham and never 
suggested that ideas of fair play and substantial justice have any meaningful and 
separate role in personal jurisdiction.” (footnote omitted)). 
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 In particular, the attempt to meld due process and sovereignty 
shows that the approach in Kennedy’s opinion and much of personal 
jurisdiction law since the mid-20th century misapprehends the nature 
of what is at stake in civil litigation: an allocation of property 
between two private parties, not state action vis-à-vis the defendant.  
Nicastro claimed he was hurt, that it was McIntyre (UK)’s fault, and 
that therefore the company should pay him money.  McIntyre (UK) 
disagreed.  Some adjudicatory body must decide.  Requiring that 
decision to be undertaken by a New Jersey court, where McIntyre’s 
machine found its way, however indirectly, no more violates its due 
process rights or undermines sovereignty concerns, than to require 
plaintiff Nicastro to have to travel to Ohio, Nevada or the UK for 
adjudication. 283  
 In short, it makes no sense to say that personal jurisdiction is 
limited only by the strictures of the Due Process Clause while 
simultaneous maintaining that jurisdiction also requires a finding 
that the defendant freely submitted itself to the sovereignty of the 
forum state, and should not turn upon fairness considerations.  The 
problem of course is not of Kennedy’s making, but a result of his 
attempt to hold onto the myriad fragments of three-quarters of a 
century of strained personal jurisdiction jurisprudence.  The most 
generous thing that one might say about Kennedy’s opinion was 
offered by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent: “I take heart that the plurality 
opinion does not speak for the Court, for that opinion would take a 
                                                
283 See Koppel, supra note 17, at 962–63 (“As a result of the majority’s ruling that 
due process requires an alien manufacturer’s contacts to target specifically the 
forum state’s market to justify subjecting the manufacturer to the jurisdiction of 
the state’s courts, Nicastro, injured in his home state of New Jersey by a machine 
targeted by the British manufacturer at the U.S. market, may have to seek redress 
in Ohio, where the McIntyre UK’s American distributor did business, or in 
Nevada, the site of the trade convention attended by the manufacturer. . . . [A]s 
noted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, ‘defending the product-liability action in 
Ohio . . . or in Nevada . . . would be no more convenient, [to McIntyre (UK)] than 
in New Jersey’ which, of course, is closer to Britain.” (quoting Nicastro, 987 A.2d 
at 593)); Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at 
1247 (“[Kennedy’s opinion] overlooked the obvious point that fairness to the 
plaintiff in providing a realistic forum is at least as important as protecting a 
foreign defendant.”). 
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giant step away from the ‘notions of fair play and substantial justice’ 
underlying International Shoe.”284 
 Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justice Alito, concurred 
in the judgment that jurisdiction should not be found, but believed 
that this case could easily be decided under existing precedent, 
because in his view on the facts of this case jurisdiction could not be 
found under either of the two plurality opinions in Asahi.285  In 
Breyer’s view, the fact that this involved a single, isolated sale 
compelled the result under existing case law that jurisdiction did not 
exist over McIntyre (UK).286  He felt that the plurality went too far in 
reaching a result that might apply to a different set of facts.  By 
citing the fact that a single sale was insufficient, Breyer implied that 
a larger volume of similar type sales might merit the extension of 
jurisdiction.287  Moreover, the plurality’s requirement that the 
defendant “target” the forum state before being required to submit to 
its jurisdiction presents an analytically suspect approach when 
applied to modern forms of marketing and sales, such as web-based 
sales and consignments to online intermediaries like 
Amazon.com.288 
 While Breyer identifies a problem with the plurality’s approach, 
his argument misunderstands Kennedy’s opinion as being primarily 
                                                
284 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Parry, supra 
note 82, at 830 (“[The] failure [to achieve a majority] may turn out to be the best 
thing about [J. McIntyre]. . . . [B]ecause the [J. McIntyre] opinions collectively 
undermine more personal jurisdiction doctrine than they create, the door is open 
for rethinking the scope of and reasons for constitutional limitations on personal 
jurisdiction.”). 
285 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing both Justice 
O’Connor’s Asahi opinion and Justice Brennan’s Asahi concurrence). 
286 Id. at 2792.  In making this argument, “Breyer overlooked McGee [which 
upheld jurisdiction based upon one contact by the defendant].”  Freer, supra note 
32, at 582.  “Moreover, the Court has upheld jurisdiction in tort cases based on a 
single contact at least three times: in Hess v. Palowski, Calder, and Keeton.”  See 
id.   
287 See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that basing 
jurisdiction on a stream of commerce required a finding of a “regular flow or 
regular course of sales” in the forum state) (quotation omitted).  
288 See id. at 2793 (“But what do [the plurality’s] standards mean when a company 
targets the world by selling products from its Web site?  And does it matter if, 
instead of shipping the products directly, a company consigns the products through 
an intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders?). 
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incoherent only because it is overly broad in possible application.  
Breyer aptly recognizes that targeting, or submission to, a sovereign 
as the touchstone of jurisdiction makes little sense when applied to 
modern marketing arrangement, or when involving a single sale.  
But he fails to recognize that the plurality’s approach, much like the 
jurisprudence it is based on, is problematic, period.289   
 Like Kennedy, Breyer presents hypotheticals involving 
defendants who might be burdened if summoned to a distant state.  
He cites an “Appalachian potter”; “a small Egyptian shirt maker”; 
and a “Kenyan coffee farmer, selling [their] products through 
international distributors.”290  Like Kennedy, Breyer misapprehends 
the problems presented as rooted in the plurality’s narrow approach.  
He overlooks that personal jurisdictional law itself has so lost sight 
of its basic purpose of determining an appropriate location for 
resolution of a dispute between two private parties, that it cannot 
appropriately distinguish between allowing suit over a major 
international corporation, with frequent and strong connections to 
the United States—even if lacking formal presence—and a distant 
bit player, whose product finds its way here through intermediate 
channels, and who could not properly defend in a particular 
forum.291 
 Justice Ginsburg, with Justices Sotomayor and Kagan on board, 
dissented.  She believed that the overriding concern of due process 
                                                
289 See Parry, supra note 82, at 851 (“[A]lthough Justice Breyer’s approach to the 
case may be defensible on pragmatic grounds, as a kind of muddling through 
within the existing doctrinal structure, it does nothing to solve the problems of 
personal jurisdiction doctrine that were created by the very cases that he embraces.  
Although he reached a result and made assertions about fairness and connections 
with the forum, those claims were not grounded in any specific theory of the 
interests that personal jurisdiction serves.”). 
290 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2793–94 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
291 See Freer, supra note 32, at 583–84 (“The most remarkable thing about the 
opinion by Kennedy and Breyer is the lengths to which each justice goes to 
conclude that there was no relevant contact.  Each supports his conclusions with 
hypotheticals worthy of a classroom. . . . The answer to these hypotheticals is not 
to strain to find that there is no contact.  By finding no contact, the Justices rule 
out jurisdiction even in convenient venues.  When Kennedy concludes that the 
Florida farmer selling through a distributor has no contact with Alaska, he must 
also conclude that the farmer has no contact with Alabama.  And Breyer’s 
Appalachian potter who has no contact with Hawaii also must have no contact 
with the state next door to his Appalachian home.” (footnote omitted)). 
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was fairness, and that it was clearly fair to require McIntyre (UK) to 
litigate in New Jersey, since it targeted the entire United States and 
caused injury in New Jersey.292  Moreover, she concluded, in 
contrast to Justice Breyer, that jurisdiction was proper under existing 
precedent, whether either Justice Brennan’s or Justice O’Connor’s 
views of stream-of-commerce, as expressed in their competing Asahi 
pluralities, controlled.293  In sharp contrast to Kennedy’s plurality, 
Ginsburg said that personal jurisdiction under International Shoe 
“gave prime place to reason and fairness” and not sovereignty.294   
 Justice Ginsburg had thus taken up where Justice Brennan left 
off in Burger King and Asahi.295  She clearly thought that a fairness-
type assessment more properly comports with the goals of due 
process than does the Court’s fetish with contacts and state lines, and 
that in a modern economy the latter approach foils important fairness 
considerations.296  Even so, she did not feel the need to advocate for 
a complete rework of the personal jurisdiction standard to return it to 
a pre-Hanson, McGee-like approach.  Instead, the basic current 
structure of the doctrine could fulfill her visions, as Brennan had 
                                                
292 See J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
293 See id. at 2803. 
294 Id. at 2800; see also id. at 2799 (“[T]he plurality’s notion that consent is the 
animating concept draws no support from controlling decisions of this Court.  
Quite the contrary, the Court has explained, a forum can exercise jurisdiction 
when its contacts with the controversy are sufficient; invocation of a fictitious 
consent, the Court has repeatedly said, is unnecessary and unhelpful.”); Id. at 2795 
(“[The plurality’s approach] turn[s] the clock back to the days before modern 
long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being haled into court where a 
user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands of a product by having 
independent distributors market it.” (quoting Weintraub, supra note 98, at 555)). 
295 See Koppel, supra note 17, at 913 (“[The New Jersey Supreme Court’s] 
flexible application of the minimum contacts standard, echoed in Justice 
Ginsburg’s [J. McIntyre] dissent, derived doctrinally from Justice Brennan’s 
version of [World-Wide’s] stream-of-commerce test [that was also] articulated in 
his Asahi concurrence.” (footnote omitted)). 
296 See id. at 916 (“The dissenting justices countered with a functionalist approach 
that gave prime place to reason and fairness, rather than state sovereignty.” 
(quotation omitted)); Parry, supra note 82, at 849 (“Justice Ginsburg’s dissent . . . 
comes very close to the fairness-based approach to jurisdiction that Justice 
Brennan outlined in his [World-Wide] dissent.  She insisted that the personal 
jurisdiction inquiry is entirely about reasonableness, and she made no separate, 
free-standing inquiry into contacts.”); id. at 847 (“Justice Ginsburg never used the 
phrase ‘minimum contacts.’”). 
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demonstrated in his Burger King opinion for the Court, even though 
Ginsburg also endorsed Brennan’s view that International Shoe’s 
defendant-focus might be outdated.297 
 Once again the Court left behind a fractured opinion.  Although 
the Court has since issued additional opinions, including one decided 
on the same day as McIntyre, which have garnered near unanimity, 
those cases dealt with unusual facts.  Lower courts remain prisoner 
to a jurisprudence that lacks a coherent approach when having to 




 This case was issued on the same day as Nicastro.299  The suit 
was brought against the foreign manufacturers of tires that were 
allegedly defective and resulted in injury and death to several 
Americans traveling in France.300  The plaintiffs were all residents of 
North Carolina.301  They brought suit in that state based on the fact 
that defendants sold several hundred thousand tires there, even 
though that activity had nothing to do with the bus crash.302  Thus, 
this case was based upon so-called general jurisdiction.  The North 
Carolina courts agreed with the plaintiff that jurisdiction was 
proper.303 
                                                
297 See Koppel, supra note 17, at 918 (“[Ginsburg’s] dissenting opinion’s emphasis 
on second-prong fairness also evokes Justice Brennan’s functionalist observation 
that International Shoe’s ‘almost exclusive focus on the rights of defendants, may 
be outdated’ and that ‘the model of society on which the International Shoe Court 
based its opinion is no longer accurate’ in light of the ‘nationalization of 
commerce.’” (quoting World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 307–09)). 
298 See Parry, supra note 82, at 851 (“The two principal opinions reject [the] two-
part [Burger King] analysis that has been crumbling for years and perhaps 
deserves demolition. . . . The justices may have torn down the two-part test, but 
they left behind only the incomplete foundations of incompatible structures. . . . 
Nor is there any obvious way to combine [the various J. McIntyre approaches] . . . 
for compromise is inconsistent with the positions that Justice Kennedy and Justice 
Ginsburg have marked out.”). 
299 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850. 
300 Id. at 2851–52. 
301 Id. at 2850. 
302 Id. at 2852. 
303 Id. 
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 The Supreme Court, per Justice Ginsburg, unanimously reversed 
in only the third general jurisdiction case that it ever decided.  The 
outcome was uncontroversial under existing precedent.304  
 
(i) Walden v. Fiore 
 
 During the 2013-2014 session, the Supreme Court returned to the 
personal jurisdiction arena with two cases, Walden v. Fiore305 and 
Daimler AG v. Bauman.306  Walden has the greater relevance for this 
article.  
 Walden arose when a Covington, Georgia police officer, Walden, 
who was deputized as a federal DEA agent, stopped two Nevada 
residents at an Atlanta airport.307  Walden’s search uncovered a large 
amount of cash, which he seized, believing that it represented the 
proceeds of drug sales.308  The Nevada residents sued in federal 
court in Nevada, claiming that this seizure violated the Fourth 
Amendment.309  They argued that jurisdiction was proper in Nevada 
because Walden knew that the plaintiffs were Nevada residents 
when he seized the cash, thereby allowing Nevada jurisdiction under 
Calder.310 
 The Supreme Court reversed.  To do so it had to distinguish the 
seemingly directly-on-point Calder decision, where the Court held 
that Florida-based defendants could be subject to jurisdiction in 
California when they intentionally defamed a California resident.311  
The theory in Calder was that the defendants purposely directed 
their activity toward that state when they wrote false things about 
                                                
304 See Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at 
1246 (“[Although it is not] nearly as bad as J. McIntyre . . . . [i]t remains to be 
seen whether [Goodyear presents] a workable test . . . but at least it is a test, of 
sorts, supported by a majority of the Court.”).  See discussion infra Part II.B.3.j.  
This description is included here for the sake of completeness because the article 
ultimately takes the view that a proper personal jurisdiction jurisprudence will not 
distinguish between general and specific jurisdiction.  
305134 S. Ct. 1115. 
306134 S. Ct. 746. 
307 Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1119. 
308 Id.  
309 Id. at 1120.  
310 Id. at 1124. 
311 See Calder, 456 U.S. 783. 
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one of its residents, thereby causing her to suffer harm there.  
According to Justice Thomas’s majority opinion, in contrast, the 
harm in Walden that the defendant allegedly caused the plaintiffs by 
depriving them of their money while they were travelling to and 
living in Nevada was only fortuitously connected with that state.312  
This appears to be a distinction without a difference. 
 The fact that this case was brought in federal court on a federal 
claim also demonstrates the major flaws in the minimum contacts 
standard from both a due process/fairness standpoint, as well as in 
terms of the reach of state power.  Purely in terms of fairness, 
wherever the suit was brought it would be within the same judicial 
system—i.e., federal court—and decided under federal law.  So, the 
only relevant fairness or traditional due process issue would be 
whether it would be unduly burdensome for Walden to have to 
litigate in Nevada, a factor that the Court never considered.  
Moreover, the federal system allows the transfer of cases to an 
appropriate district for the purposes of convenience, efficiency, and 
other relevant considerations, thereby allowing court flexibility to 
ensure the best location for all concerned, a point emphasized in 
Burger King.313 
 To be sure, even though the Supreme Court has consistently 
discussed personal jurisdiction in terms of due process, it has always 
considered state lines to have a special place in this analysis to one 
degree or another.  That is, the Court has gone to great lengths to 
hold that somehow the relationship between the defendant and the 
state is important in deciding whether due process will allow the 
personal jurisdiction in a given forum—that somehow by requiring 
the defendant to litigate in a state with which the defendant lacks 
contacts thwarts meaningful rights irrespective of how easy or hard it 
would be for the defendant to litigate there.314 
 This case shows that this focus on state lines is misguided, even 
if one omits traditional due process analysis.  Whether in Nevada or 
in Florida, Walden would be litigating a federal law issue in federal 
court.  That those courts happen to be located in those states has 
nothing to do with the source of those courts’ authority.  Congress 
                                                
312 See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123. 
313 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.d; see also Burger King, 471 U.S. at 486. 
314 See Hanson, 357 U.S. 235; World-Wide, 444 U.S. 286. 
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could have authorized suit anywhere in the United States.315  That it 
has not chosen to do so does not mean that this choice represents a 
constitutional limitation.  Specifically, Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1) 
provides that in a suit in federal court personal jurisdiction exists so 
long as the defendant would be subject to personal jurisdiction in the 
courts of the state where the federal court is located.316  And the 
Nevada long-arm statute allows jurisdiction to the extent allowed by 
the United States Constitution.317   
 By circular reasoning, the Supreme Court has concluded that the 
constitutional limit of the federal court is determined by Nevada 
state lines because a federal rule instructs federal courts to limit their 
personal jurisdictional reach—except as otherwise allowed by rule or 
statue—to the reach of the courts of the state in which it sits.  
Nevada’s long arm statute says that jurisdiction may be exercise to 
the full extent allowed by the United States Constitution.  The Court 
concluded that a constitutional standard should be determined by 
looking to a federal rule that looks to a state rule that itself then 
looks to the Constitution.  Even though it is hard to understand what 
this approach actually means, it is easy to recognize that it is 
illogical. 
 Not only does the Court’s analysis make no sense as a 
constitutional (as opposed to a statutory) limit on federal court 
power, but it also demonstrates the problem of applying state lines 
and minimum contacts in any case in our federalist system, whether 
in state or federal court.  In a system where federal and state courts 
often have concurrent jurisdiction, each mandated to apply 
consistent substantive law,318 the limits on the sovereignty of either 
court system being defined by state lines strains both logic and 
reason.     
 
                                                
315 See Andrews, supra note 16, at 1375 (“Since the early nineteenth century, the 
Supreme Court has suggested that a different standard governs personal 
jurisdiction in federal court than in state court, and that Congress may authorize 
federal courts to serve process anywhere in the United States.” (citing Toland v. 
Sprague, 37 U.S. 300, 328 (1838))). 
316 It also authorizes jurisdiction as authorized by federal statute.  No federal 
statute governs a Bivens suit, the type of claim that the plaintiff brought in Walden. 
317 See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1121. 
318 See Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (requiring federal courts in diversity to apply state 
substantive laws in diversity cases). 
128           UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW       Vol. 13, No. 2 
 
 
(j) Daimler AG v. Bauman 
 
 Daimler AG v. Bauman319 presents facts sufficiently exotic that 
only brief mention is necessary.  Several Argentines brought suit in 
federal court in California against the German-based automaker, 
Daimler AG, seeking recovery under federal, state, and Argentine 
law for the automaker’s Argentine subsidiary’s alleged support for 
Argentina’s dirty war.320  The plaintiffs conceded that the suit did 
not arise out of the defendant’s contacts with California, but argued 
that general jurisdiction was valid based upon the extensive contacts 
of the German automaker’s American subsidiary under an agency 
theory.321  The Court, in an 8-0 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, 
found jurisdiction lacking, relying primarily on Goodyear.322 
 
III.  ANALYSIS OF CURRENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION DOCTRINE 
  
 Having discussed some of the shortcomings of personal 
jurisdiction in the historical record above, this section organizes and 
critiques those shortcomings in terms of several important criteria.  
The shortcomings in the personal jurisdiction have both practical and 
theoretical components.  Although problems in either area alone 
would be troublesome, that the Court’s approach fails on both 
accounts truly justifies change.  A doctrine that fails in practice and 
also lacks a sound theoretical basis, has little to recommend it.  This 
section traces the practical and theoretical problems inherent in the 
                                                
319 134 S. Ct. 746. 
320 Id. at 751. 
321 Id. at 752. 
322 Justice Sotomayor concurred.  In her view, the facts as accepted by the 
Supreme Court were sufficient for the exercise of general jurisdiction in California 
federal court.  She chided the majority for not simply limiting itself to examining 
the extent of contacts between defendant and the forum state, rather than 
concluding that the defendant was not home in the forum because it had more 
extensive contacts elsewhere.  See id. at 763–73 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  She 
makes a good point.  If personal jurisdiction depends on forum contacts 
sufficiently extensive that it is fair to require defendant to answer to suit there, that 
the defendant has other, even more extensive contacts elsewhere, should not 
change the calculus from either a sovereignty or due process perspective.  Clearly, 
the connection between personal jurisdiction doctrine, and policy and theory, 
remains strained.   
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Court’s due process and minimum contacts rooted approach to 
personal jurisdiction.  
 
A. Practical Shortcomings 
 
 While often discussed in terms of deep theory and frequently the 
subject of scholarship, personal jurisdiction doctrine also has 
important consequences for litigants, and is not just the stuff of 
abstract concern and meaningless tactical forays.323  The practical 
flaws of personal jurisdiction doctrine can be separated into two 
baskets.  First, the outcomes of personal jurisdiction cases are often 
troubling on several fronts.  Second, the manner in which decisions 
are reached is often wasteful of judicial and party resources and 
time.324  I shall call these “outcome flaws” and “process flaws,” 
respectively. 
 
1. Outcome Flaws 
 
 The flaws in the outcome of personal jurisdiction disputes fit into 
three categories.  First, defendants are often able to duck jurisdiction 
in states where they would face no unfairness to defend, even when 
doing so works unfair advantage to the plaintiff, while raising 
inconvenience and costs due to the location of witnesses and 
evidence.  Second, plaintiffs can hale defendants into particular fora 
based upon arbitrary criteria, where the defendants may well suffer 
inconvenience.  Third, there are sets of cases where although it is not 
                                                
323 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 101 (“A suit at 
law is not a children’s game, but a serious effort on the part of adult human beings 
to administer justice.” (quoting United States v. A.H. Fischer Lumber Co., 162 
F.2d 872, 873 (4th Cir. 1947))); Rex R. Persbacher, Fifty Years of International 
Shoe: The Past and Future of Personal Jurisdiction, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 513, 
521–11 (1995) (“[T]he effect of jurisdictional rules is not restricted to academic 
debate; the rules appear to have real consequences, especially when a litigant is 
standing at the courthouse door deciding whether to enter.”). 
324 Other commentators have noted the fact that the practical problems with the 
current personal jurisdiction approach that the Supreme Court employs creates 
problems in terms of both outcomes and the time-consuming, and expensive 
manner in which those outcomes are reached.  For example, Borchers has referred 
to these two types of problems as internal costs and external costs. See Borchers, 
Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 584–89. 
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apparent that any single case was incorrectly decided in terms of the 
interests that attend personal jurisdiction, taken collectively the 
outcomes cannot be squared with each other.325  That is, if one or 
some of the cases in this group is deemed to be correctly decided, the 
outcomes of other cases cannot withstand logical and policy 
scrutiny.326  
 The first set, those cases in which the unfairness and illogic of 
defendants avoiding personal jurisdiction is most apparent in 
Hanson, World-Wide, and J. McIntyre.  Each of those cases denied 
personal jurisdiction while conceding that the defendant would 
suffer no hardship in being required to adjudicate in the forum in 
question.327 
 The Hanson defendants were trustees of two Delaware trusts that 
stood neither to lose nor gain any beneficial interest in property.328  
The real dispute was between two sets of parties who themselves had 
no objection to jurisdiction in the Florida forum.329  Moreover, there 
would have been very little burden on two trust companies sending 
representatives from Delaware to Florida.330  The outcome simply 
cannot withstand practical scrutiny.331 
 World-Wide and J. McIntyre each involved suits brought by 
injured plaintiffs in the place where they were injured and/or 
lived.332  In the former, the plaintiffs had suffered serious injury, and 
therefore would have been hard-pressed to travel elsewhere, at least 
                                                
325 See McFarland, supra note 7, at 779 (“Not only has the Court over the past 
half-century been unable to create a consistent, coherent law of personal 
jurisdiction, but also it has issued some opinions that are flatly inconsistent with 
others. . . . The situation is not . . . one of differing views of what the law should 
be.  The rub is that opinions appear to be inconsistent from inadvertence and 
confusion, not crafty analysis and writing.”). 
326 See, e.g., Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 102 
(“Certainly, [the results of personal jurisdiction cases] are nothing that one would 
seek to emulate if creating jurisdictional rules from scratch.”); see generally 
Weintraub, supra note 98, at 531–32, 540–45. 
327 See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 531–32 (“[D]eference to the convenience of 
nonresident defendants has frustrated the reasonable interests of plaintiffs and their 
home states.”). 
328 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
329 See id. 
330 See id. 
331 See id. (discussing Hanson in more detail). 
332 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a; discussion supra Part II.B.2.g. 
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at the time suit was filed.333  In J. McIntyre, the injured plaintiff 
lived and was injured in New Jersey, where he sued.334   
 In both cases, much of the evidence, physical and witnesses, 
were located in the forum state, meaning that the defendants would 
have had to travel there to examine evidence and to take depositions, 
no matter where the trial was held.335  The defendants themselves 
certainly had the resources to litigate in these fora, demonstrated by 
the fact that they each spent more time litigating the personal 
jurisdiction issue in the objectionable forum than they would have 
spent litigating the merits there.336  In neither case would litigation 
elsewhere been easier for anyone.337  In World-Wide, two of the 
defendants had dropped any opposition to litigation in Oklahoma, 
and some of the parties would have had to travel to a state not their 
own, no matter where the litigation was held.338  Therefore, 
prohibiting jurisdiction in Oklahoma, where the evidence and 
plaintiff was located, made no sense.339 
 In J. McIntyre, New Jersey made more sense than Ohio for 
adjudication, where the defendant was almost surely subject to 
jurisdiction under the Court’s approach.340  Neither party was located 
in Ohio, and most of the evidence was probably in New Jersey.341  
Moreover, even if the plaintiff could have traveled to the UK to 
litigate, why would that make more sense than requiring the 
defendant to come to New Jersey?  As a logical and practical matter, 
it is hard to defend prohibiting the case from going forward in the 
plaintiff’s chosen forum of New Jersey.  More generally, the current 
minimum contacts approach, advertised as a means to protect a 
defendant’s due process rights, often allows defendants to avoid 
adjudication even in a forum where the defendant would suffer no 
unfairness or inconvenience, while leaving only jurisdictions that 
would be illogical and often unfair to others as possible fora.  J. 
                                                
333 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a. 
334 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.g. 
335 See id. 
336 See id. 
337 See id. 
338 See id. 
339 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.a (discussing World-Wide in greater detail). 
340 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.g. 
341 New Jersey was actually was slightly closer to the defendant’s UK home than 
Ohio. 
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McIntyre, like World-Wide, provides an example of this type of 
outcome in which real fairness and logic is sacrificed for illusory 
fairness for the defendant.  Perhaps, at least, J. McIntyre’s outcome 
is sufficiently troublesome that it will increase the pressure on the 
Court to reevaluate the minimum contacts approach to personal 
jurisdiction.342   
 The second group of outcome problems involves cases where 
defendants have had to defend in places where it is arguably 
burdensome or unfair to require them to do so.  The current regime 
has been less problematic in terms of allowing jurisdiction where it 
should not—i.e., this second group of cases—than it has in 
excluding jurisdiction where it should allow jurisdiction.  Even so, 
some cases in this category bear mention.  Most noteworthy is 
Burger King.343  There, the individual defendant lacked any 
meaningful connection with the forum state that was several 
thousand miles away.344  Yet the Court found jurisdiction in that 
case without truly analyzing whether the defendant would be 
burdened by having to litigate in Florida, instead focusing on the 
formality of the defendant’s contacts through the contract with a 
Florida-based company.345  
 The third set of outcome flaws can be seen by comparing some 
of the Court’s personal jurisdiction cases.  Doing so, demonstrates 
how illogical the results of the current approach are.  First, consider 
                                                
342 See Borchers, Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, supra note 246, at 
1247 (“[J. McIntyre is] further, and unfortunate, evidence that the Court should 
abandon the idea that the Constitution limits state-court jurisdiction, except in the 
most extreme of circumstances in which the defendant’s opportunity to mount a 
defense is realistically compromised.”).  Some commentators had previously been 
less than sanguine that the Court would engage in a major reworking of its focus 
on contacts, which has proven true so far.  See Linda J. Silberman, “Two Cheers” 
for International Shoe (and None for Asahi): an Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary 
of International Shoe, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755, 766 (1995) (“Obviously, the 
Supreme Court is not going to unravel its long history of constitutional jurisdiction 
jurisprudence.  But some shift is possible.”); see also discussion supra Part 
II.B.3.g (discussing J. McIntyre in greater detail). 
343 Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; see also discussion supra Part II.B.3.d (further 
discussing Burger King). 
344 See generally Burger King, 471 U.S. 462. 
345 See id.; see also discussion supra Part II.B.3.d. 
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Mullane346 in contrast to Hanson.347  Both involved trusts.  In the 
former, because the trust was located in New York, the Court held 
that the meaningful rights of beneficiaries throughout the United 
States could be determined there even without those parties 
consenting to that state’s jurisdiction.348  That outcome can probably 
be defended.  But then how can a Florida court be deprived of 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the status of a trust whose settler lived and 
died in Florida, and where all parties who stood to benefit or lose by 
a Florida court’s ruling lived there, or were otherwise subject to 
jurisdiction in Florida, merely because nominal parties had not 
purposefully directed their activities toward the state, as the Supreme 
Court held in Hanson?349  The cases cannot be reconciled. 
 Next compare Kulko350 and Burnham.351  Both involved East 
Coast husbands being sued by their wives in California.352  Both 
cases concerned domestic relation issues such as child support.353  
Yet jurisdiction was found proper only in the latter case merely 
because the defendant was handed papers while he happened to be 
within California’s borders.354  How do the outcomes in these cases 
comport with any sense of logic, fairness, or other practical concern?  
Even in terms of sovereignty, it is hard to understand how California 
could have sovereign authority over one defendant but not the other, 
where the only difference between the two was where they were 
handed process papers.355  These groups of cases should all come out 
the same way, save if there was some showing of burden of fairness 
that would compel a different result.   
 
2. Process Flaws 
                                                
346 339 U.S. 306; see also discussion supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Mullane in 
greater detail). 
347 357 U.S. 235; see also discussion supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Hanson in 
greater detail). 
348 See Mullane, 339 U.S. 306. 
349 See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
350 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.f (discussing Kulko in greater detail). 
351 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.f (discussing Burnham in greater detail). 
352 In Kulko, the spouses were already divorced, although that was immaterial to 
the cases. 
353 See generally Burnham, 495 U.S. 604; Kulko, 436 U.S. 84.  
354 See discussion supra Part II.B.3 and Part II.B.3.f. 
355 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.f. 




 Beyond the ultimate dispositions in personal jurisdiction cases, 
the inefficiency, cost,356 and unpredictability357 of how those 
dispositions are reached also creates major problems.  The Court’s 
doctrines are overly complex.358 The Court has also often changed 
course, making it difficult to predict how a given case will turn out if 
it does reach the Supreme Court.359  Moreover, the fact that the 
Court has been unable to muster a majority on major personal 
jurisdiction cases, combined with the fact that its major opinions rest 
on shifting justifications, makes it difficult for lower courts to 
implement the doctrine.360  In addition, the Supreme Court’s 
ungainly personal jurisdiction jurisprudence361 has resulted in case 
outcomes turning upon minute factual differences as each new case 
obscures rather than clarifies,362 and has also caused division among 
                                                
356 See McFarland, supra note 7, at 795 n.181 (“The transaction costs of the 
current minimum contacts/fair play test are high.”). 
357 See Effron, supra note 247, at 868 (“The critiques leveled against the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdictional jurisprudence are well-known: that the doctrine is fuzzy, 
malleable, and highly case specific, and that the Court has been either unable or 
unwilling to provide comprehensive and coherent legal and political theory 
underlying the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendants in a forum state.”). 
358 See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 531 (“[T]he Supreme Court has added layer 
upon layer of complexity to the due process test for personal jurisdiction.”). 
359 See Wendy Collins Purdue, Personal Jurisdiction and the Beetle in the Box, 32 
B.C. L. REV. 529, 530 (1991) (“[E]very few years, the Court’s description of 
personal jurisdiction is inconsistent with its recent prior precedent.”). 
360 See Parry, supra note 82, at 828 (“[T]he Supreme Court allowed the law of 
personal jurisdiction to fester as lower courts and commentators struggled to make 
sense of cases such as Asahi [and] Burnham.”); id. at 852 (“Various majorities and 
pluralities of the Court have advanced ever more complicated variations on the 
theme of purposeful availment. . . . But the specific results of the search for clarity 
and limits do not add up to a sensible doctrine.”); Weintraub, supra note 98, at 545 
(“[T]he issue of the due process limits of state-court jurisdiction not only is one of 
the most frequently litigated issues on the civil side of the docket, but also 
repeated litigation of the same fact pattern does not increase predictability.  Courts 
cannot agree on how specific facts should influence the result.”).   
361 See Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum Contacts: Toward a 
Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 189 (1998) 
(“Ambiguity and incoherence have plagued the minimum contacts test.”). 
362 See Parry, supra note 82, at 851–52 (“Tension may be inherent in personal 
jurisdiction doctrine.  But doctrinal tensions ought to grow out of the effort to 
accommodate or balance interests that are actually present in specific cases.  
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different lower federal and state courts, thereby adding to the 
jumble.363 
 That personal jurisdiction should muck up litigation is 
unfortunate.  Personal jurisdiction should not be as important as it 
has become.364  It does not involve inherently contentious issues, 
like abortion, racial preferences, or the death penalty, matters about 
which jurists and individuals in general have deeply held beliefs that 
merit drawn out debate.365  Rather, personal jurisdiction generally 
involves which courtroom within the United States a case is to be 
tried in,366 which should be a relatively straightforward 
determination given the philosophy the modern of American justice 
system.367  Personal jurisdiction should be secondary to the main 
event—substantively resolving the dispute—rather than a central 
                                                                                                            
Current doctrine fails to meet this standard.”); Weintraub, supra note 98, at 558 
(“[L]itigating the same situations over and over does not increase predictability.”). 
363 See Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction 
Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387, 411 (“Lower 
courts have struggled in their attempt to apply the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements, especially to new forms of conducting business such as the 
Internet.” (footnote omitted)). 
364 See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 558 (“It is a disgrace that we have made what 
should be a matter of interstate venue a constitutional issue and then have 
micromanaged state-court jurisdiction to adjudicate so that this threshold issue is 
one of the most litigated.”). 
365 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 102–03 
(“Intense judicial supervision, complicated doctrine, and unpredictable results are 
a necessary cost if the social consequences are extremely important.  Personal 
jurisdiction, however, is not one of those areas in the law in which the stakes are 
so high.” (footnote omitted)).  
366 True, technically a court in one state is part of a different sovereign than a court 
in another state.  Even so, the states are not completely independent sovereigns in 
the sense that the United States and China are, procedures are generally uniform, 
and courts are now adept at being able to determine the content of the law of 
another jurisdiction.  Travel across state lines requires no special effort.  And, in 
many cases, a single system, the federal system, is available to parties, so that 
often one is not even talking about different sovereigns, but merely location. 
367 See Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and 
Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 286, 288 (2013) (“When the Federal Rules were promulgated, in 
1938, they embodied a justice-seeking ethos.  As has been recognized repeatedly 
by the Supreme Court, [the people who wrote them] believed in citizen access to 
the courts and in the resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or traps or 
obfuscation.”). 
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matter that wastes time and other valuable resources.368  
Unfortunately, personal jurisdiction often relegates the underlying 
litigation to the undercard.369  
 The process flaws can be grouped into two categories.  First, the 
unpredictability in personal jurisdiction doctrine create barriers to 
parties’ ability to plan their affairs in general, and also after litigation 
is contemplated, in terms of deciding where to sue, or whether they 
have a sound personal jurisdiction defense.  Second, the current 
complexity invites tactical maneuvers, thereby draining resources 
from the parties and courts, and allows cases to be decided based on 
clever lawyering rather than merit.   
 As a result of the doctrinal disarray in personal jurisdiction 
parties have difficulty planning their affairs prior to and at the outset 
of litigation.370  The current complex standard makes it difficult for 
parties who suspect a future suit to predict where they may be 
subject to suit.  When a dispute arises, the complexity of current 
doctrine means that plaintiffs cannot be sure where they can bring a 
suit, and defendants will not know whether they will have legitimate 
jurisdictional arguments.  
                                                
368 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 102 (“Worse 
than the strange results, however, is the lack of predictability and the resources 
consumed litigating the most elementary of questions: Where can I file suit?”).  
Between 1960 and 1983 that there were at least 3900 reported personal 
jurisdiction cases in the United States, and presumably many more unreported 
ones.  See id. at 102–03.  
369 See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 531 (“As a result [of the Court’s complex 
minimum contacts jurisprudence], the threshold determination of personal 
jurisdiction has become one of the most litigated issues in state and federal 
courts.”). 
370 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1179 (1989) (“[A]nother obvious advantage of establishing as soon as 
possible a clear, general principle of decision: predictability.  Even in simpler 
times uncertainty has been regarded as incompatible with the Rule of Law.”); 
Weintraub, supra note 98, at 540 (“It is a commonplace that the results of [the 
minimum contacts] analysis are fact driven; minor changes in circumstances can 
change the result.  That alone would make prediction in a particular case difficult, 
but the task is even more formidable because courts cannot agree on which facts 
matter.  A court surveying decisions on a specific recurring jurisdictional issue is 
likely to find ‘the case law in a muddle.’” (quoting Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. 
Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 208 (1st Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted)). 
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 Second, once a plaintiff decides to sue, the complexity of the 
doctrine leads to prolix litigation.  Cases often wind through several 
levels of courts over the better part of a decade purely on the 
jurisdictional issue.  This may be the result of tactical attempts by 
parties, but may happen even if both parties are simply pursuing 
what they think is the proper jurisdictional approach.371  This post-
litigation turmoil itself will absorb litigation and judicial resources, 
and delay resolution of the merits.372   
 The waste of resources due to tactics and delay is nicely 
demonstrated by both World-Wide and J. McIntyre, where 
defendants objected to personal jurisdiction in states where it 
probably would have been easier for them to litigate than where suit 
would otherwise be brought.373  Moreover, these defendants spent 
time and money litigating the personal jurisdiction issue through 
multiple rounds in the very locations where they sought to avoid 
litigation on the merits.374  These personal jurisdiction squabbles 
                                                
371 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 103 (“The real 
social costs are a consequence of the convoluted doctrine that engenders expensive 
litigation before the parties even get to the starting gate.”); cf. Parry, supra note 
82, at 852 (“[M]any considerations play a role in [a plaintiff’s] choice of forum.  
They range from such things as a simple desire to sue either in the plaintiff’s home 
jurisdiction or where the harm took place, to obtain the benefit of favorable law, 
all the way to the desire to burden or prejudice the defendant.  Defendants 
understandably seek to frustrate plaintiff’s choice and to substitute a more 
favorable forum.”). 
372 See Bruce Posnak, The Court Doesn’t Know Its Asahi from Its Wortman: A 
Critical View of the Constitutional Constraints on Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 
41 SYRACUSE L. REV. 875, 896 (1990) (“[T]he trial of the jurisdictional issue 
[will] often consume more time and resources than the trial on the merits.”).  
373 To be fair, in World-Wide the plaintiff was also seeking a tactical advantage by 
naming defendants who would destroy federal subject matter jurisdiction.  See 
Adams, supra note 58, at 1139 (“World-Wide and Seaway Volkswagen were 
merely “straw defendants” joined by the Robinsons’ attorney to prevent removal 
from Creek County state court to the federal court in Tulsa.”). 
374 In World-Wide, the personal jurisdictional issue was litigated through two 
levels within Oklahoma in addition to the United States Supreme Court over a 
three-year period.  See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 288–91.  In J. McIntyre, three 
levels of courts in New Jersey—two of the courts twice—plus the U.S. Supreme 
Court were involved in the personal jurisdiction dispute over an eight-year span.  
See J McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2786 (plurality opinion).  Regarding World-Wide, 
Borchers commented on the harm that this delay caused: “It is bad enough to tell 
the [plaintiffs in World-Wide] that their suit cannot be brought in the most logical 
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drain attorney and judicial resources.  They also delay adjudication 
on the merits, which reduces the likelihood of the correct outcome, 
as memories fade, witnesses die or otherwise become unavailable, 
and evidence is lost.  Moreover, the resources used to resolve these 
personal jurisdiction matters are diverted from other cases in an 
already overworked American judicial system.  From a practical and 
utilitarian standpoint, the Court’s current approach to personal 
jurisdiction falls short in many ways. 
 
B. Doctrinal/Theoretical Shortcomings 
 
 Practical problems alone might not be a sufficient impetus for a 
major doctrinal shift.  Certain constitutionally compelled standards 
may result in outcomes that are frustrating in particular cases.375  But 
if those outcomes do not follow from sound constitutional theory, 
and in fact are contrary to it there is reason to rethink the Court’s 
current approach.  Moreover, the utilitarian failures of personal 
jurisdiction very much result from the theoretical flaws in the 
Court’s approach,376 rather than merely being the detritus of a well-
                                                                                                            
and sensible forum; it is worse yet to tell them so only after three levels of 
appellate review, with the result of flipping back and forth as each new court 
reviews the case.”  Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 
102; see id. at 96–97 (“Often, the asserted ‘inconvenience’ is a Trojan horse. . . . 
[I]n World-Wide the real reason for the defense motion to dismiss the dealer and 
the retailer was to create complete diversity.”). 
375 For example, the broad protections that the First Amendment provides to 
freedom of expression means that society often must tolerate speech that most 
people would rather not hear.  See, e.g., Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of 
Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 204, 213 (1972) (“There are certain harms, 
although they would not occur but for certain acts of expression, nonetheless 
cannot be taken as part of a justification for legal restrictions on [such 
expressions].”).  The Fourth Amendment’s requirement that most searches be 
supported by probable cause thwarts authorities in certain cases to the benefit of 
those engaged in criminal wrongdoing.  See e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 
328 (1987) (“[T]here is nothing new in the realization that the Constitution 
sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us 
all.”).  Because these constitutional protections further larger goals, the tradeoffs 
are accepted as the price of living in a representative democracy that takes rights 
seriously. 
376 See Effron, supra note 247, at 868–69 (“[The problems with the minimum 
contacts approach] can be attributed to a lack of a coherent theory underlying the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction at all.”). 
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reasoned model.  In short, having already argued that the minimum 
contacts approach fails in practice, the article now posits that this 
doctrine is also a theoretical failure. 
 The personal jurisdiction doctrine and its underlying theory has 
many modes of expression.  Cases mention nebulous concepts like 
“substantial justice and fair play”377 and purposeful availment.378  
They consider various factors like “the interstate judicial system’s 
interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; 
and the shared interest of the several States in furthering 
fundamental substantive social policies.”379  These factors might 
defeat jurisdiction even if minimum contacts were satisfied, or, 
conversely, might allow the exercise of jurisdiction on a lesser 
showing of contact.380  In addition, the Court has mentioned 
tradition,381 foreseeability,382 submission to the sovereign,383 and the 
Due Process Clause serving as a vehicle of interstate federalism.384  
The Court has thus applied a medley of terms and concepts to this 
area of law.385  One might think that the inability to even identify the 
Court’s personal jurisdiction doctrine and its underlying theory(ies) 
presents a considerable barrier to providing a meaningful critique.386  
But once one plows through the thicket of formulae and metaphors, 
                                                
377 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316. 
378 See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 
379 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292. 
380 See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477–78. 
381 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 619 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
382 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 297. 
383 See J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion). 
384 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 294. 
385 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 78 (“The 
Court has listed a huge number of factors in its modern jurisdictional cases, but 
without ascribing any particular weight to any of the factors. . . . [As an example], 
[i]n the space of twenty-nine years the Court has accepted, then rejected, then 
accepted, then rejected, and then accepted the ‘federalism’ or ‘sovereignty’ factor 
in the jurisdictional calculus.” (footnotes omitted)). 
386 See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 583 
(“Constitutionalized personal jurisdiction . . . is a doctrine created by implication 
and accident, as opposed to, for instance, the Court’s deliberate effort to 
constitutionalize defamation law.  Lacking any clear foundation, the Court has 
constantly reversed itself on such fundamental questions as whether personal 
jurisdiction is a personal right or whether it implicates federalism and sovereignty 
concerns.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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the core of the problem in the Court’s approach can be easily 
identified. 
 The above noted panoply is the symptom, not the root, of the 
doctrinal wreck.  Terms like “purposeful availment” or 
“foreseeability” are used in personal jurisdiction disputes to 
concretize the nebulous minimum contacts standard within the due 
process framework.  The problem however is not with the 
implementation, but rather the underlying attempt to ground personal 
jurisdiction in the Due Process Clause, and to then to use minimum 
contacts to midwife the doctrine to the facts of particular cases. 
 The Court has linked personal jurisdiction, due process, and 
minimum contacts for so long that it sounds correct to merge these 
three concepts—although some commentators have challenged 
this.387  But these concepts are incompatible.  Specifically: 1) due 
process does not make sense as the primary source of limitation on 
the geographic reach of state courts; 2) even if due process were to 
play that role, minimum contacts would not be the appropriate 
vehicle for furthering due process goals; and 3) even if due process 
is the wrong agent for defining personal jurisdiction limits, 
minimum contacts would not be an appropriate standard for limiting 
personal jurisdiction under any other theory either.  
 
1. The (lack of) Connection Between Personal Jurisdiction and 
Due Process 
 
 Due process is not entirely irrelevant to personal jurisdiction 
matters.  The problematic use of due process in personal jurisdiction 
cases involves the use of that clause as the primary geographic 
determinant of a state court’s personal jurisdiction reach, something 
that the Court has taken for granted since at least the time of 
Pennoyer.388   
                                                
387 See, e.g., Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 20 (“For 
over a century American procedural law has labored under the suggestion that the 
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits the jurisdictional reach of 
state courts.  Although the Court, and most commentators, have not questioned the 
correctness of this major premise, I believe it is time to re-examine seriously the 
supposed fountainhead of our jurisdictional jurisprudence.” (footnote omitted)). 
388 See id. at 100 (“Due Process has been an unwelcome stranger to personal 
jurisdiction.  The Court did not explain in Pennoyer why it was invoking due 
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 Apart from that above-noted incorrect use, however, the Due 
Process Clause does have two less central roles in personal 
jurisdiction doctrine.  First, irrespective of the source of geographic 
limitations on a court’s personal jurisdiction, a defendant can utilize 
the Due Process Clause to challenge an adjudication made without 
jurisdiction—what I will call the “facilitation role.”  Second, 
although not a primary definer of the geographic scope of personal 
jurisdiction, in a particular case a defendant might be able to 
demonstrate that adjudication in a particular forum is so burdensome 
that to allow the case to go forward there would violate the 
defendant’s due process rights—what I will call the “backstopping 
role.”389  These themes will be developed in the proposal section of 
this article.390 
 Two problems undermine due process as a primary limitation on 
personal jurisdiction.  First, examining due process doctrine as 
developed and applied in circumstances other than personal 
jurisdiction involving the deprivation of property demonstrates that 
those standards do not justify general limitation on the geographic 
scope of a State’s geographic reach.  Second, the Due Process 
Clause, like other constitutional provisions that protect individual 
rights should operate as a basis for arguing that a particular practice 
in a given case violates one’s rights under that provision, which is 
how due process issues are generally evaluated.  It is inappropriate to 
use a rights-protecting provision as a starting point for affirmatively 
crafting a set of procedures, which is exactly how the Supreme Court 
has (mis)used the clause in developing and implementing the 
                                                                                                            
process.”); Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 101, 101 (2010) (“[The Court has been unable] to enunciate a 
coherent theory of precisely why the Due Process Clause imposes limitations on 
the states’ exercises of personal jurisdiction.”). 
389 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 100 (“I am not 
arguing that state long-arm statues should be insulated from constitutional 
review[.] [But] [a]bsent such a bizarre statute, however, . . . long-arm jurisdiction 
is not unconstitutional.”); cf. Parry, supra note 82, at 853–54 (“Under [traditional 
procedural due process standards], a court should be able to exercise jurisdiction 
over a defendant if (1) there is a legitimate or rational basis—such as a forum state 
interest—for suing the defendant in the chosen forum, and (2) the course of 
proceedings—including the burden of litigating in that forum—will be 
fundamentally fair.” (footnote omitted)). 
390 See discussion infra Part IV. 
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minimum contacts test.  These two defects are discussed in the next 
two subsections. 
 
(a) Traditional Due Process Standards and the Lack of 
Connection to General Geographic Limits on State 
Adjudicatory Power 
 
 Due process falls into two categories, procedural and substantive.  
Given that personal jurisdiction is essentially a procedural issue—
involving what rights a defendant has prior to adjudication of 
property rights—substantive due process has no role in personal 
jurisdiction, and the Court has not relied on it its minimum contacts 
analysis.  Therefore only a brief discussion of substantive due 
process is in order here.  
 Substantive due process is not only oxymoronic,391 it is a 
misnomer.  The Court’s decisions in this area involve only substance 
and not process.  Specifically, the Court has prohibited both state 
and federal government from implementing certain laws whose 
substance it deems constitutionally problematic.  Most of the limits 
involve prohibiting the Court from infringing on certain fundamental 
rights in a narrow set of circumstances.392  Other limits come into 
play when a State seeks to enact a legislative provision that lacks any 
rational basis.393  Private civil adjudication over property rights does 
not implicate the narrow set of fundamental interests that the Court 
has indicated are usually necessary before a substantive due process 
argument will succeed.  Moreover, none of the Court’s personal 
                                                
391 See John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 
VA. L. REV. 493, 494 (1997) (“In fact, the whole idea that the Due Process Clauses 
have anything to do with the substance of legislation, as opposed to the procedures 
that are used by the government, is subject to the standard objection that because 
‘process’ means procedure, substantive due process is not just an error but a 
contradiction in terms.”). 
392 See id. at 501 (“[Substantive Due Process prohibits] governmental actions that 
impinge on interests the Court regards as fundamental.”). 
393 See id. at 500–01 (“Substantive Due Process . . . requires that most 
governmental actions bear a rational relationship to a permissible governmental 
objective.”). 
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jurisdiction cases have ever indicated that a State has no rational 
basis for asserting jurisdiction over defendants sued in its courts.394 
 Procedural due process has a greater relationship to the private 
civil adjudication of property rights than does substantive due 
process.  It requires that a person, including entities like corporations 
and partnerships, be afforded sufficient protections before the 
government deprives that person of property, as well as life or 
liberty.395  Although personal jurisdiction generally arises in disputes 
between private parties, meaning the government itself is not directly 
depriving anyone of property, it is generally agreed that before a 
civil judgment may be rendered against a party, that the party be 
afforded the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause—
namely procedural due process.   
 Procedural due process is thus a protection that gives defendants 
the fair opportunity to defend themselves in a suit that might dispose 
of their property rights.396  Personal jurisdiction, in contrast, involves 
the court’s authority over a particular defendant.  To be sure, a 
defendant’s due process rights would be violated by adjudication in a 
Court which does not have authority to adjudicate that defendant’s 
rights, as would adjudication by a court lacking subject matter 
jurisdiction, even though subject matter jurisdiction itself is not a 
function of fairness.397  But, whether it is fair to allow adjudication is 
                                                
394 Cf. id. at 501 (“[The] rationality requirement is extremely lenient.”); Parry, 
supra note 82, at 853 (“For substantive due process, the test is reasonableness—
that is, a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest—unless a fundamental 
right is involved (and the Court has never indicated that personal jurisdiction 
implicates a fundamental right.”).  Perhaps in unusual circumstances an exercise of 
jurisdiction could be so irrational that it would violate a defendant’s substantive 
due process rights.  Actually, tag jurisdiction seems the most likely candidate for 
this. 
395 See Craig W. Hillwig, Giving Property all the Process that’s Due: A 
‘Fundamental’ Misunderstanding about Due Process, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 
707 (1992) (“The procedural component of the Due Process Clause guarantees that 
the state shall not deprive a person of property without ‘constitutionally adequate’ 
process.” (footnote omitted)); Parry, supra note 82, at 853 (“For procedural due 
process the basic test is fundamental fairness.”). 
396 As civil adjudication disposes of property rights between two parties (or among 
three or more parties in some cases), due process protections should also protect 
plaintiffs. 
397 See Hillwig, supra note 395, at 708 (“Once a court determines that an interest 
constitutes property, the state may not deprive a person of the interest without 
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generally a separate issue from whether a particular court has 
authority in a particular case.   
 More specifically, due process guarantees that a defendant 
receives a fair adjudication of his or her property rights.  This 
generally means that the defendant must be given notice and a 
hearing,398 an adequate opportunity to present evidence, and an 
opportunity to call and cross-examine witnesses.399  For example, a 
person facing the loss of welfare benefits must be afforded “timely 
and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a proposed termination, 
and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse 
witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and evidence 
                                                                                                            
providing constitutionally adequate procedural safeguards to prevent erroneous 
deprivations.”).  Note, as discussed here, the disconnect between due process, a 
protection of the defendant’s rights to fair adjudication, and personal jurisdiction; 
the power of a court over the defendant is separate from the issue of whether an 
adjudication lacking personal jurisdiction violates the defendant’s rights.  It 
certainly does under the facilitation role of due process.  See discussion infra Part 
IV.  But to say that adjudication where the court lacks personal jurisdiction 
violates due process is not incompatible with the argument that the Due Process 
Clause should not be the primary source in determining whether personal 
jurisdiction exists as an initial matter.  By way of analogy, consider the following.  
Adjudication by a court where the judge is not qualified to serve, either because 
not properly appointed or elected to office, or because lacking the statutory 
requirements to be a judge, would almost certainly violate the due process rights 
of parties whose rights were adjudicated.  But that would not mean that the Due 
Process Clause should be the primary source to determine whether a particular 
person was in fact qualified to be a judge in a particular court.  In a sense, to say 
that the Due Process Clause provides the source of a court’s jurisdictional power 
would also be circular.  A court’s adjudication without personal jurisdiction 
deprives a defendant of due process.  Thus, if due process were the source of 
personal jurisdiction authority and a limit thereon, then in essence the personal 
jurisdiction test would amount to saying that if the Due Process Clause does not 
allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a particular case, then the exercise of 
jurisdiction in that case would deprive the defendant of due process. 
398 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (“The fundamental requisite 
of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.” (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 
234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914))); see also Hillwig, supra note 395, at 708 (“The 
Supreme Court has usually held that due process requires the state to afford pre-
deprivation process in the form of some notice and opportunity to be heard.”). 
399 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267 (“The hearing must be ‘at a meaningful time and 
in a meaningful manner.’” (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 
(1965)).  
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orally.”400  The purpose for these protections is to minimize the risk 
that a party will be deprived of property incorrectly in the sense that 
the facts or law do not support deprivation. 
 In terms of the location of the forum, unless the location of a 
particular court is so distant that it would interfere with this right—
which concern is addressed by the backstopping role for due process 
in the proposed model401—where an adjudication takes place does 
not generally implicate due process concerns, whereas personal 
jurisdiction is entirely about the location of an adjudication.  Thus, 
the two concepts—personal jurisdiction and due process—involve 
two separate concerns, rather than being separate flavors of the same 
concept, which is how the Supreme Court has treated them.402  That 
very treatment is central to the ills of personal jurisdiction doctrine. 
 Two other aspects of due process demonstrate that attempts to 
make it the center of personal jurisdiction law are quixotic.  First, 
personal jurisdiction in the United States predated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by almost a century.  Even the 
underlying personal jurisdiction dispute in Pennoyer itself predated 
the effective date of that provision.403  Neither Pennoyer itself nor 
subsequent cases have argued that personal jurisdiction limits only 
came into play with the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
Indeed, since that enactment, personal jurisdiction authority has 
generally expanded.  Therefore, although the Court has argued 
otherwise, strictures on the scope of geographic adjudicatory 
authority must spring primarily from a source other than the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 Second, civil adjudication involves determining property rights 
between plaintiff and defendant.404  If due process prohibits a 
defendant from having to have his or her rights adjudicated in a 
                                                
400Id. at 267–68. 
401 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
402 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 78 (“The 
suggestion in Pennoyer that due process has anything to do with the territorial 
reach of the state courts was ill-considered.”). 
403 See Kogan, supra note 19, at 302 (“In [Pennoyer] Justice Field invoked the 
fourteenth amendment due process clause, not in effect at the time of the events in 
issue in the lawsuit.”). 
404 This is not to say that allowing a court to unfairly decide a case between two 
parties would not implicate due process merely because the state itself is not going 
to obtain the property. 
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particular forum because of the defendant’s lack of relationship with 
the forum, then logic would dictate that plaintiffs would be denied 
due process if they had to have the case adjudicated in a forum with 
which they had no connection.  Of course, the Court has not held, 
nor has anyone seriously argued, that a plaintiff’s due process rights 
are violated when a plaintiff must go elsewhere to adjudicate against 
the defendant.  Due process requires fairness of adjudication, not 
adjudication in a particular location. 
 
(b) The Due Process Clause Protects Rights and 
Therefore is Appropriately Raised as a Defense and 
Should not Serve as a Starting Point for Formulating 
a Particular Procedure 
   
 Another flaw in the Court’s personal jurisdiction with due 
process approach arises from the fact that the Due Process Clause is 
not a source of authority that a proponent of a practice need satisfy.  
Rather, it is a protection that a party claiming a property deprivation 
would cite to argue that a particular procedure employed in a 
particular matter violated his rights.  Put differently, the odd, but 
often unnoticed, aspect of the Court’s modern-day due process 
jurisprudence is that in each case the court starts with the Due 
Process Clause to construct a rigid and specific test to determine 
whether personal jurisdiction is present rather than simply consulting 
typical due process standards to evaluate a given exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.405   
 The Court’s approach to due process in this way is backwards.  
A provision that protects one’s rights against the government cannot 
be the source for the government to exercise authority.  No one 
would claim that the First Amendment gives the government the 
authority to enact a particular provision that may or may not hamper 
protected speech.  The authority must come from elsewhere, with the 
constitutional amendment limiting that authority.  So too the 
authority of a state court to adjudicate the rights of a defendant must 
derive from some fount other than the Due Process Clause. 
                                                
405 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 101 (“The due 
process clause does not give the Court the final word on personal jurisdiction.”). 
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 Certainly, as discussed in Section IV below, the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction in a given case may violate the rights of a 
defendant because the defendant may not be able to adequately 
defend in a particular forum—i.e., the backstopping function of the 
Due Process Clause as applied to personal jurisdiction.  This is 
analogous to how due process protects defendants against unfair 
procedures in other circumstance, yet does not itself serve as the 
source of authority, or the starting point, for crafting a particular 
procedure.  That approach is correct and should be used in 
evaluating whether a given exercise of personal jurisdiction violates 
the Due Process Clause. 
 An example will help sharpen the above point.  In a civil matter, 
a defendant might argue that his due process rights were violated 
because he was not informed about a key witness for the plaintiff 
until that witness was called to testify: so too with personal 
jurisdiction.  In a given case a defendant might argue that the 
location of the court in which the plaintiff sued was so distant and 
hard for the defendant to litigate in that to allow the suit to proceed 
there would violate the defendant’s due process rights.406  But as 
things now stand in personal jurisdiction disputes, the Court has 
made due process the starting point and a very specific standard for 
evaluating personal jurisdiction emerges.   
 In the witness example above, using the Court’s current approach 
to due process in the personal jurisdiction doctrine would be akin to 
saying that the Due Process Clause requires anyone calling a witness 
to satisfy a very specific standard in terms of notice.  By extension, 
this would be the same for every other procedural matter if the 
personal jurisdiction approach were followed.  Of course, this is not 
how courts proceed in civil adjudication.  Nor could they.  If every 
procedural issue were subject to the lengthy crimped screening 
standard as personal jurisdiction issues are, cases would take decades 
to conclude.  Just by itself, personal jurisdiction stretches out 
litigations.407  Due process thus has a role in personal jurisdiction, 
but that role is more limited and qualitatively different than the one 
that the Court has been assigning it for the last seventy years. 
                                                
406 See discussion infra Part IV (addressing this role of due process in the personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence). 
407 See discussion infra Part IV (discussing this shortcoming). 




2. Minimum Contacts Do Not Follow from Due Process 
 
 Just as the generally unquestioned connection between due 
process and personal jurisdiction fails to withstand close 
examination, so too does the connection between due process and 
minimum contacts, which courts and commentators often 
uncritically accept as correct.408  Thus, even if this article were 
incorrect in the argument just made that due process should not play 
a central role in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence; minimum 
contacts would nonetheless not the proper test for effecting due 
process goals.409   
 The prior subsection already discussed that due process is 
generally about ensuring that a party receive fair procedures before 
being deprived of property.  But a lack of minimum contacts does 
not necessarily deny this protection to a defendant this, just as the 
presence of those contacts would not ensure fairness of 
adjudication.410  In some cases, to be sure, minimum contacts will 
correlate with convenience or fairness, because the location of the 
forum vis-à-vis the defendant may make it burdensome for the 
defendant to litigate there.411  Perhaps that is what International 
                                                
408 This section discussion necessarily accepts arguendo that due process provides 
content to the personal jurisdiction standard even though the article has just 
rejected that connection.  See Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process 
Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 SUP. CT. REV. 77, 89 (1980) (“By 
prohibiting unreasonable deprivations [of property] and requiring a justification 
for state imposition of legal burdens, the Due Process Clause seems to require that 
the person who would suffer the deprivation have some contact with the State by 
which he has subjected himself to its power.” (emphasis added)). 
409 See Harold L. Korn, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in 
Multistate Mass Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2183, 2183–84 (1997) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court must with all deliberate speed disavow the doctrine that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or anything else in the United 
States Constitution, requires a territorial nexus between forum and defendant as a 
sine qua non for the exercise of in personam jurisdiction.”). 
410 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 90 (“[T]he 
Court has reviewed most assertions of state authority deferentially . . . . The 
minimum contacts test, however, developed independently, and has turned out to 
be a far more searching inquiry.”). 
411 See id. at 99 (“Perhaps there are some cases in which a defendant is put to the 
test of defending or defaulting, and it is economically rational for the defendant to 
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Shoe was aiming at in linking minimum contacts with substantial 
justice and fair play.  And some court members have attempted to 
interpret International Shoe in a way that focused on fairness and 
burden on the defendant rather than on minimum contacts as an end 
in itself.412  This approach, however, has been a losing argument in 
the Court since the Hanson decision in 1958.  Instead, from the late 
1950s through the present term, the Court has been treating 
jurisdiction as if it involved subjecting the defendant to State 
regulation of the defendant’s behavior—i.e., almost as though the 
issue were the choice to allow the application of the forum state’s 
law—something that would seem to require a meaningful 
relationship between defendant and the state.413 
 Moreover, even though the minimum contacts test would be less 
problematic if used as a proxy for burden and fairness, it would at 
best be an approximation.414  The contacts that the courts look to are 
those between the defendant and the forum state prior to and during 
the dispute, rather than the physical relationship between the 
defendant and the state at the time of the suit.415  In addition, the 
                                                                                                            
make a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. . . . [But] if there are 
such cases, they are few and far between.”). 
412 See, e.g., Hanson, 357 U.S. at 258–59 (Black, J., dissenting); World-Wide, 444 
U.S. at 299–300 (Brennan, J., dissenting); discussion supra Parts II.B.2 and 
II.B.3.a. 
413 See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 536 (“Hanson also proclaimed a proposition 
that defied common sense—that a contact with a state sufficient to make it 
reasonable for that state to apply its laws to the defendant was not necessarily 
sufficient to permit exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant.  In future 
decisions, repetition of this concept invariably signaled the least cogent passage in 
the opinion.” (footnote omitted)). 
414 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 94–95 (“The 
Court has suggested, [and several academics] have advanced with some force, the 
right to have access to process as a rationale for using the due process clause to 
analyze jurisdiction. . . . All of those proposals are much more palatable 
alternatives than the Court’s approach of the last several years.  Certainly the 
formula resulting from such an approach would have no resemblance to ‘minimum 
contacts.’  Even this clipped back and more sensible role for due process, 
however, does not justify a constitutional law of personal jurisdiction.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
415 Of course if the defendant has actually moved to or is present in the state when 
suit is commenced, that would be sufficient for jurisdiction under Milliken v. 
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940), and Burnham.  But a defendant who had little contact 
with the suit at the time of the events leading to litigation, who thereafter increased 
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minimum contacts analysis focuses purely on state lines, rather than 
geographic proximity or other factors that correlate with the fairness 
of requiring the defendant to litigate in a particular state.416  A 
defendant may live just over the line outside of the state where he or 
she is sued, and yet have no contacts with the state that would satisfy 
due process.  Another defendant may live in one corner of a large 
state, and yet the Court’s minimum contacts test would afford no 
protection against a suit brought over 1,000 miles away, at the other 
edge of the state.417  For this reason, to the extent that a particular 
adjudication would be unfair or burdensome, the due process issue 
should be evaluated with an eye towards those factors themselves, 
rather than through an intermediary concept like minimum contacts, 
which is not only vague, but also necessarily over-inclusive in some 
cases and under-inclusive in others.418   
                                                                                                            
its contacts, would not thereby be subject to jurisdiction in the forum absent 
contacts sufficient to create the rarely invoked doctrine of general jurisdiction.  See 
discussion supra Part II.A. 
416 See Juenger, supra note 80, at 1029 (“[Pennoyer] lump[ed] together the two 
disparate ideas of sovereignty and fairness, but ever since the two have coexisted 
uneasily in the realm of jurisdiction.”). 
417 Consider states like California, Texas, Florida, Montana, Alaska, and even New 
York, where parts of those States are quite distant from other parts.  A defendant 
living near one border of the State might find it quite easy if sued just over the 
border in the next State—say a defendant living on the California side of the 
California/Oregon border sued in southern Oregon.  Yet, if sued at the far end of 
the defendant’s own state, the defendant might be quite burdened—and it might be 
unfair—to require that defendant to defend in that distant courthouse.  Although 
State venue rules might limit this, to the extent that they did not, the Supreme 
Court’s strange interpretation of due process with a focus on state boundaries 
would provide no relief.  See Parry, supra note 82, at 855 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction 
is not a constitutional issue when the defendant is a resident of the forum, no 
matter how inconvenient the specific in-state venue may be.  Personal jurisdiction 
is a due process issue only when a person is required to litigate in the courts of a 
state with which he or she claims to have no meaningful connection.”).  
418 In cases like Hanson, World-Wide, and Nicastro, where minimum contacts 
were in fact lacking, adjudication was almost certainly less burdensome (and no 
more unfair) for the defendants than in cases like Burger King and Calder, where 
contacts were established.   This probably explains why these cases have lead to 
such a great divide on the Court. See discussion supra Part II.  Minimum contacts 
is clearly the test, but it also is supposedly driven by due process concerns.  In 
these cases, like many others, the two concepts do not line up.  
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 The poor match between contacts and fairness/burden may 
explain why many of the Court’s opinions have relied on minimum 
contacts for some purposes other than fairness.  Moreover, the lack 
of fit is the best explanation for the Court’s making the odd 
assertions that due process is the sole limit on the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction, while simultaneously maintaining that personal 
jurisdiction requires contacts even if fairness considerations 
counseled in favor of finding jurisdiction.419   
 The inadequacy of the minimum contacts test as an agent of due 
process comes into sharper focus by looking at the manner in which 
it arrived in the personal jurisdiction lexicon in the first place.  
International Shoe promulgated minimum contacts as the personal 
jurisdiction touchstone without giving a reason that that particular 
language or test made more sense than another standard, like strong 
contacts, presence, slightest contacts, reasonable contacts, etc.  In 
asserting that the permissibility of jurisdiction over a particular 
defendant depended upon sufficient minimum contacts that did not 
offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice,” 
International Shoe cited Miliken.420  But Milliken itself, a case 
involving jurisdiction over a resident of a state, did not refer to 
minimum contacts.  Instead, it discussed the due process concepts of 
fair play and substantial justice in connection with the issue of 
whether the form of service of process gave the defendant notice of 
suit and an adequate opportunity to be heard,421 criteria that are 
central to traditional due process analysis.422  That International 
Shoe substituted minimum contacts for notice of suit and an 
opportunity to be heard indicates that it stretched due process beyond 
                                                
419 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.g (discussing J. McIntyre). 
420 See International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (“[I]n order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he 
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of suit does not 
offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” (quoting Milliken, 
311 U.S. at 463)). 
421 See Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463 (“Its adequacy so far as due process is concerned 
is dependent on whether or not the form of substituted service provided for such 
cases and employed is reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the 
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard.  If it is, the traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice implicit in due process are satisfied.” (citation 
omitted)). 
422 See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
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its logical and theoretical boundaries, or that it was primarily 
concerned with true due process concerns, and used minimum 
contacts only casually to indicate that idea.  Whatever International 
Shoe intended, ever since Hanson the Court has relied upon 
minimum contacts as an end in themselves, and has not decided 
personal jurisdiction disputes primarily with an eye toward fairness. 
 In addition, the Court turned to minimum contacts in 
International Shoe based on a series of cases decided in the decades 
prior to International Shoe that essentially reached outcomes that 
could be explained by minimum contacts even though they used 
legal fictions like consent and presence to justify their results rather 
than that actual language.423  Believing the outcomes of those cases 
correct and that personal jurisdiction over International Shoe should 
be found, but unsatisfied with the legal fictions as a rationale, the 
International Shoe Court groped for an alternative legal theory and 
settled on the minimum contacts language used in a different context 
in Milliken. 
 International Shoe’s logic was thus: Pennoyer required presence 
or consent; these other cases conclude that defendants were present 
or had consented but in reality that was incorrect because the 
defendants were not actually present and did not consent; we believe 
that the outcomes are correct but that the reasoning is wrong; the 
only other way to justify those outcomes then is that those 
defendants had minimum contacts; ergo, minimum contacts will 
replace the legal fictions of presence and consent for out-of-state 
defendants. 
 This logic brings to mind the statement: “This isn’t right!  This 
isn’t even wrong.”424  The reasoning that inheres in the Court’s 
position is that prior case outcomes cannot be squared with the 
reasoning in those cases or the underlying doctrine—elucidated in 
Pennoyer—that those cases purport to rely on; therefore the Court 
will adopt a standard that explains those outcomes.  The Court 
apparently reasoned in International Shoe that even if the tests relied 
upon in those cases are wrong, the case outcomes must be right 
under some standard, even though they were not decided under a 
                                                
423 See discussion supra Part II.A. 
424 STEVEN GEORGE KRANTZ, MATHEMATICAL APOCRYPHA REDUX: MORE 
STORIES AND ANECDOTES OF MATHEMATICIANS AND THE MATHEMATICAL 194 
(2005) (attributing the statement to physicist Wolfgang Pauli).  
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standard that the Court was now endorsing.  The problem is that if 
some or all of those outcomes are wrong, then a standard that 
justifies all of them as though they were all correct is bound to be 
flawed.  Moreover, even if all of those cases were correctly decided, 
the fact that the standard explains them does not necessarily mean it 
will be a sound approach to future cases.  For this reason, not 
surprisingly, the Court has continued make various revisions to the 
minimum contacts test in an attempt to make it work upon the facts 
of each particular case.  This continued attempt to force minimum 
contacts to work has made personal jurisdiction doctrine difficult to 
apply. 
 
3. Beyond Due Process, No Other Theory or Rational Supports 
Minimum Contacts as a Component of Personal Jurisdiction 
Jurisprudence  
 
 As noted, since International Shoe, the Court has united three 
concepts: 1) personal jurisdiction; 2) due process; and 3) minimum 
contacts.  It has already been argued—hopefully persuasively—that 
the links between personal jurisdiction and due process, and between 
due process and minimum contacts are weak and illogical.425  Even 
so, perhaps the appropriate test of personal jurisdiction remains 
minimum contacts.  Perhaps the primary error involved the 
introduction of due process into the mix, and if that idea were 
dismissed then minimum contacts would make sense as an 
appropriate test under a different theory for defining the scope of 
personal jurisdiction.  
 The Court itself assumed this posture in World-Wide where it 
said that minimum contacts do not only protect the defendant’s 
liberty interest, but also further goals of state sovereignty and 
interstate federalism.426  Of course, it had to retreat from that 
position two years later in Insurance Corp. by indicating that due 
process was the only limit on personal jurisdiction.427  Justice 
Powell’s separate opinion in that case argued that the Court was 
mistaken in its decision to put all its personal jurisdiction eggs in the 
                                                
425 See discussion supra Parts III.B.1 and III.B.2. 
426 See World-Wide, 444 U.S. at 292; discussion supra Part II.B.3.a. 
427 Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10; discussion supra Part II.B.3.b. 
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due process basket, maintaining that important sovereignty interests 
beyond due process were furthered by the minimum contacts test.428  
He was saying that minimum contacts were important, and that they 
did flow from something other than due process.  Minimum contacts 
do not make any sense as a central component of personal 
jurisdiction based on any theory. 
 Justice Powell was correct that at times the Court has suggested 
that interstate federalism and/or sovereignty puts limits on a court’s 
exercise of personal jurisdiction and requires minimum contacts.429  
Even the Court’s current approach—at least the current plurality 
approach as articulated in J. McIntyre—which emphasizes due 
process as the sole source of limitation, has spoken in terms of state 
power and the defendant’s submission to sovereign authority.430  
Some commentators are sympathetic to this view.431  The Court now 
                                                
428 See Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 709–716 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment).  
Powell predicted that this change in direction would signal the end of contacts, 
which the Court had previously indicated in both Hanson and World-Wide was 
inappropriate.  Powell was incorrect.  The Court has continued to hold on to the 
centrality of contacts while simultaneously maintaining that this is purely a matter 
of due process.  The incompatibility of due process and minimum contacts is most 
pronounced in Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion in J. McIntyre.  See discussion 
supra Part II.B.3.g. 
429 See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 536 (“The United States Supreme Court has 
alternately embraced and rejected [the] notion that states’ rights play a significant 
role in interstate jurisdiction to adjudicate.”). 
430 J. McIntyre, 131 S.Ct. at 2789. 
431 See Freer, supra note 32, at 580 (“The liberty interest is more than a right to be 
free from litigation in an onerous venue. . . . [I]t is the right to be free from the 
imposition of authority by a sovereign with which the defendant lacks sufficient 
ties.  Limitations on personal jurisdiction reflect not a matter of transgressing other 
states’ authority, but of political legitimacy.” (footnote omitted)); Parry, supra 
note 82, at 854–55 (“[The] divergence of result[s] between standard due process 
analysis and the actual outcomes of Supreme Court personal jurisdiction cases 
leads to three possible conclusions: (1) personal jurisdiction doctrine requires 
radical change that would remove most obstacles to state court jurisdiction over 
out-of-state defendants; (2) due process has additional content in personal 
jurisdiction cases that generates further restrictions on personal jurisdiction; or (3) 
some other constitutional principle is also at work.  Although I sympathize with 
the first option, I suspect that the third is most likely to be correct.  Something else 
in the Constitution, other than due process, provides a basis for further restrictions 
on personal jurisdiction.  The most obvious principle is federalism.”); id. at 855–
56 (“The question is whether the consequences of crossing state borders are 
sufficiently important to require additional federalism safeguards.  The Supreme 
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may be simply hanging onto the language of due process, while 
actually implementing a sovereignty-based standard that would 
otherwise make sense if due process were abandoned as a central 
component of personal jurisdiction.  In addition to sovereignty and 
federalism, some have treated the exercise of jurisdiction as akin to 
the State’s regulating a defendant’s behavior, something that would 
understandably require some connection between the defendant and 
the forum. 
 Minimum contacts, however, does not withstand scrutiny as a 
agent of sovereignty, interstate federalism, or any other apparent 
theory, even if due process is put to one side, something that a few 
commentators have recognized.432  Prior to International Shoe, the 
                                                                                                            
Court’s continued search for restrictions that go beyond those of minimal due 
process indicates a collective judgment that more is necessary.”). 
432 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 58 (“I am . . . 
more concerned with the fundamental question of why the Court employs the 
minimum contacts test, or any test for that matter, to limit state court jurisdiction, 
and less concerned with the nuances of that test.”); Koppel, supra note 17, at 949 
(“Several writers have counseled [for] . . . the elimination of sovereignty and state 
lines from the due process analysis or the removal of due process from ‘the 
equation’ altogether.”) (footnote omitted); cf. Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: 
On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 STAN. J. INT’L L. 65, 90 
(1996) (“Borders are no longer as significant as they once were.  From the 
economic standpoint at least, they are hardly impenetrable frontiers, but rather 
flimsy and insubstantial curtains of gauze, through which goods, ideas, and people 
flow rather easily.”); Judith Resnick, Afterword, Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE 
L. & POL’Y REV. 465, 492–93 (1996) (“Given cyberspace and globalization, the 
coherence of physicality as the basis of jurisdiction diminishes, with variation 
depending on the context.”).  Some have tried to see minimum contacts as 
protecting the individual’s due process rights through its allocation of adjudicatory 
authority into separate States.  See Allan R. Stein, Styles of Argument and 
Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 689, 
711 (1987) (“The federalism-individual rights debate thus poses a false dichotomy.  
Due process protects the sovereign interests of other states, but only incidentally, 
through its protection of the individual from illegitimate assertions of state 
authority.  Legitimacy, though, is defined by reference to the state’s allocated 
authority within the federal system.”).  Many commentators, moreover, believe 
that the minimum contacts test is workable, and simply needs to be reworked.  See, 
e.g., John B. Oakley, The Pitfalls of “Hint and Run” History: A Critique of 
Professor Borchers’s “Limited View” of Pennoyer v. Neff, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
591, 752 (arguing for “a reformulation of the ‘minimum contacts’ theory in which 
the concept of purposefulness is more carefully defined as the criterion for what 
‘contacts’ count, and in which the intertwined concepts of the magnitude of the 
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Court’s standard for personal jurisdiction was presence within the 
state, even if courts resorted to fictions to find that a defendant was 
present where realistically speaking the defendant was not.433  That 
standard stood up to logic if a court literally could not exercise 
power over those outside of its territories. If adjudication required 
the ability of the rendering court itself to enforce its judgment with 
no help from the Full Faith and Credit Clause or statute, then 
understandably there would be a problem if the defendant were 
located elsewhere.   
 Once one accepts that state courts have jurisdiction over some 
defendants found outside of their state lines—which one must in a 
country structured as the United States is and which the minimum 
contacts tests clearly does—then sovereignty falls away as a possible 
basis for limits on personal jurisdiction.  To the extent that there are 
sovereign limits on state power, those end at the state border.  The 
state logically cannot have sovereign authority over those outside the 
border, whether those persons have contacts with the state or not.  So 
if personal jurisdiction were a matter of sovereignty, then minimum 
contacts could not represent the appropriate test.434  That is why 
between truly sovereign nations, jurisdiction over those outside a 
country can only be exercised by way of comity or agreement.  The 
current approach at least since International Shoe, and in some cases 
before then, has conceded that states have some authority to 
adjudicate rights of those beyond their borders, ergo sovereignty 
cannot be the source of a limit on personal jurisdiction reach or the 
basis of the minimum contacts test. 
                                                                                                            
contacts and their relationship to the claim in issue are more carefully defined as 
criteria for whether the cognizable contacts meet the required ‘minimum’”).  
433 See generally Pennoyer, 95 U.S. 714; discussion supra Part II.A. 
434 See Parry, supra note 82, at 852 (“Unless one is simply convinced that the 
Constitution requires a particularly strict approach to jurisdiction—something 
along the lines of Pennoyer v. Neff’s focus on territory, property, and domicile—it 
is difficult to see why courts should do very much to limit personal jurisdiction.”); 
cf. Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 581 (“All of the 
preoccupation with minimum contacts might just as well be preoccupation with 
implied consent, because there is little practical difference between the two.”). 
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 Interstate federalism has been used to express a slightly different, 
but related, basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction.435  This 
term is actually a misnomer since federalism concerns relations 
between federal and state government.  Essentially, what is meant 
here is the relationship between states within a federalist system.  
Posed this way, the issue is not so much that states are exercising 
sovereign authority without their borders to the detriment of those 
upon whom it is exercised.  Rather, some have argued that the 
overbroad extension of one state’s personal jurisdiction reach, would 
upset the balance of authority among states in the American 
constitutional federation.436   
 This formulation, too, falls apart upon closer scrutiny.  The 
forum state is adjudicating the rights of two private parties.437  By so 
doing, it is not acting upon another state, but only upon someone 
who is present within that state.  Enforcement would either take 
place within the adjudicating state, assuming that the defendant had 
assets therein, or only with the cooperation of a state where the 
defendant had assets, probably through the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause.  Thus, the adjudicating state would in no way be taking any 
action against, within, or affecting the sovereignty of any other 
state.438 
 Sovereignty and interstate federalism also cannot support the 
minimum contacts test for another reason: a defendant may waive or 
                                                
435 See Koppel, supra note 17, at 910–11 (“More generally, the debate continues 
over the relevance of state lines—the concrete manifestation of interstate 
federalism—in state-court jurisprudence.”). 
436 See Kogan, supra note 21, at 262–63 (“The existence of boundary lines 
between states is a fact of our constitutional life.  A central issue of federalism is 
the significance of these boundaries.  Personal jurisdiction doctrine addresses this 
issue with respect to one feature of our federalist nation, the existence of separate 
court systems in each of the fifty boundaried areas.  It attempts to justify the 
constitutional limits placed on the adjudicatory authority of each of these court 
systems over nonresidents.  In performing this seemingly narrow task, however, 
the doctrine necessarily implicates a vision of the nature of American federalism.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
437 See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 582 (explaining that 
personal jurisdiction is almost completely procedural, and it allocates business 
between courts rather than involving primary rights and liabilities). 
438 Indeed, it would be surprising if a state were deemed to have standing to object 
to another state’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over one of its residents. 
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even forfeit its personal jurisdiction argument.439  Therefore, if 
minimum contacts devolved from sovereignty or interstate 
federalism, then the power of individuals and private companies to 
forfeit, waive, or otherwise affect the sovereign rights of the states 
where they were located, would clearly be incompatible with the 
notion of sovereignty.  Not surprisingly, it was when the Court had 
to confront this contradiction that it abandoned the posture that the 
minimum contacts test protected sovereign interests themselves 
rather than merely the rights of the defendants.440 
 Another aspect of the federalist system that counsels against 
minimum contacts as a function of sovereignty or minimum contacts 
is that federal courts retain parallel diversity jurisdiction in many 
cases arising under state law.  Those cases could be brought in, or 
removed to, federal court in the state where jurisdiction is objected 
to.441  Most of these cases are decided using the same minimum 
contacts test applied in state court, but only as a matter of federal 
rule.442  Courts and commentators generally agree that Congress 
could extend the personal jurisdiction of a federal court throughout 
the entire country, and does not, in fact, have to organize federal 
courts by state.443  If Congress did that, then state lines and 
minimum contacts would only matter for cases brought in state 
court.  Since the same dispute between the same parties would be 
decided under the same substantive law444 whether in state court, or 
in a federal court located nearby—often across the street—then the 
                                                
439 See Insurance Corp., 456 U.S. at 703 n.10. 
440 See discussion supra Part II.B.3.b (discussing Insurance Corp). 
441 Several of the Supreme Court’s personal jurisdiction cases were brought in 
federal court under diversity jurisdiction, and one, Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115, was 
there based upon federal jurisdiction. 
442 See, e.g., Burger King, 471 U.S. 462; Walden, 134 S. Ct. 1115. 
443 See U.S. v. Union P. R. Co., 98 U.S. 569 (1978) (suggesting that Congress has 
the power to create a single federal trial court with nationwide personal 
jurisdiction); Stafford v. Briggs, 444 U.S. 527, 554 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(“[Because] due process requires only certain minimum contacts between the 
defendant and the sovereign that has created the court. . . . suits against residents 
of the United States in the courts of the Untied States [presents] [n]o due process 
problem.”); Andrews, supra note 16, at 1375 (same). 
444 Erie, 340 U.S. 64; Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) 
(requiring federal courts sitting in diversity to follow the choice of law rules of the 
state in which they are located).  A case like Walden would be decided under the 
same federal law whether in state court or federal court. 
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relevance of state lines and minimum contacts therewith seems 
illogical as a sovereignty-based criteria for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction.445 
 Yet another way that minimum contacts is defended is by means 
of argument presenting a state’s adjudicatory authority as similar to 
its power to regulate with regard to particular parties. There is some 
surface appeal to this approach.  After all, it would not only be odd, 
but probably unconstitutional, for a state to create substantive 
standards that would apply outside its boundaries.446  But as already 
noted, the exercise of personal jurisdiction involves arbitrating 
property rights between private individuals, rather than the state 
regulating or sanctioning the defendant, or the plaintiff for that 
matter.447  The application of state substantive law to the dispute 
would involve some measure of after-the-fact regulation, and should 
require some connection to a party who would be subject to it.448  
                                                
445 Surely the United States remains sovereign throughout the country while states 
do not.  But ultimately the court, whether federal or state, is not acting outside the 
boundaries of a state by engaging in an adjudication.  Moreover, that the current 
approach limits federal personal jurisdiction, in almost all cases, to the same extent 
as state jurisdiction, sovereignty cannot be the driving force because the 
sovereignty of the federal government obviously extends even to those outside the 
forum state who lack minimum contacts therewith. 
446 For example, the state of New York could not pass legislation requiring people 
in New Jersey to drive a particular speed limit; Florida could not regulate 
pharmacies located in Minnesota; and California could not promulgate fishing 
license regulations for Maine. 
447 See discussion supra Part III.B.1.a. 
448 Notably, the Court has generally taken a laissez-faire approach to choice of law 
matters.  See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 326 (1981) (Stevens, J. 
concurring) (“The forum State’s interest . . . is . . . sufficient, in my judgment, to 
attach a presumption of validity to a forum State’s decision to apply its own law to 
a dispute over which it has jurisdiction.”); David P. Currie, THE CONSTITUTION IN 
THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888–1986 581 (University of 
Chicago Press 1990) (“Allstate v. Hague [449 U.S. 302 (1981)] . . . seemed to 
carry the deferential attitude of earlier modern cases to extremes in 1981 by 
permitting a State to apply its own law . . . for injuries inflicted by one or more 
nonresident on another outside its borders.”). This is backwards, for a party would 
seem to care much more about the governing law than where in the United States 
the dispute is litigated, especially with federal court being an option in most 
interstate cases.   
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But state courts do not automatically apply their own substantive 
laws to matters that they adjudicate.449   
 Other aspects of personal jurisdiction doctrine also undermine 
the regulatory basis for personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts.  
Whatever the basis for jurisdiction (consent, tag, minimum contacts), 
the exercise of it has the same implications.  So if the exercise of 
jurisdiction equated with regulation as a basis for minimum contacts, 
the jurisdiction would also amount to regulation when a defendant 
was tagged in the state, or forfeited or waived its jurisdictional 
argument.  But clearly handing a defendant a piece of paper while he 
happened to be in a given state (Burnham),450 or merely flying over 
it (Grace),451 is not sufficient to subject him to state regulation.  The 
same could be said about a state applying its laws to a person who 
simply failed to timely object thereto.  Put differently, if jurisdiction 
were equated with regulation, then many of the ways in which 
jurisdiction is conferred would afford a state the ability to regulate 
even his activities outside its borders, which would generally be 
deemed improper.  The exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves 
something other than regulation.  State regulatory authority therefore 
does not provide a justification for the minimum contacts test. 
 Leaving aside the particular theory on which one would base 
minimum contacts, examining the nature of a civil suit—a battle 
between two or more private parties—undermines minimum 
contacts as a basis for personal jurisdiction.  The parties to a civil 
suit have a congruent relationship to the suit and the forum.  
Reduced to the essentials, both plaintiffs and defendants seek to have 
                                                
449 Even with the fairly lax constitutional strictures on choice-of-law, the Supreme 
Court imposed some limits.  See Allstate, 449 U.S. at 326 (Stevens, J. concurring) 
(“The forum State’s interest . . . is clearly not sufficient, however, to justify the 
application of a rule of law that is fundamentally unfair to one of the litigants.”); 
Currie, supra note 448, at 581 (“Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts made clear for 
years after Hague that the Constitution still imposed limits on the authority of one 
state to meddle with the affairs of another.”).  If applicable law is the problem, 
then the answer is not to use personal jurisdiction doctrine to direct matters to 
another court where a different law may be applied, but provide stronger limits on 
application of substantive law to those without a connection to the state whose law 
is being applied. 
450 495 U.S. 604; see supra Part II.B.3.f. 
451 170 F. Supp. 442; see supra Part II.B.3.f. 
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the court of a particular forum allocate disputed property rights.452  
Since the parties are similarly situated, if minimum contacts were 
constitutionally essential for a defendant to be subject to 
adjudication, so too would contacts be required between plaintiff and 
forum before the plaintiff’s rights could be adjudicated by a given 
court.453  Of course that is not a requirement, nor should it be for 
either plaintiff or defendant.   
 In sum, minimum contacts has no logical place in the personal 
jurisdiction lexicon either as a function of due process or otherwise.  
It has previously been shown that due process itself has only a 
limited role.  It is now necessary to formulate a new approach to 
personal jurisdiction that does not include minimum contacts, and 
involves due process only in the limited roles already suggested. 
 
IV.  A PROPOSAL FOR A NEW APPROACH TO PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
 
 A major problem with the current personal jurisdiction approach 
is its complexity.454  It would make little sense to replace it with 
something else complex.  As it has been argued that personal 
jurisdiction need not be primarily a constitutional matter, the 
groundwork has been established to create a straightforward 
doctrine. 
 The approach being advocated calls for the Supreme Court to get 
out of the way and allow states to be the primary arbiters of personal 
jurisdiction.  Around that state-law core, both the Constitution as 
applied by the courts, including the Supreme Court, and Congress 
have secondary roles to fill in gaps where necessary.  The model 
proposed here is primarily for use with defendants located in the 
                                                
452 The term “property rights” is used here in a liberal fashion.  The dispute may 
not be about a particular piece of property.  It may involve a suit for damages or 
even an injunction.  But even then, both sides are essentially beseeching the court 
to give it something—and thereby take something from the other side—that has 
the quality of property, be it money or the right to enjoin or not be enjoined. 
453 A similar argument has been made already regarding the incongruity that arises 
between a plaintiff’s rights and a defendant’s rights when due process is made a 
central component of the personal jurisdiction analysis. 
454 See Weintraub, supra note 98, at 558 (“It is a disgrace that we have made what 
should be a matter of interstate venue a constitutional issue and then have 
micromanaged state-court jurisdiction to adjudicate so that this threshold issue is 
one of the most litigated.”). 
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United States being sued in other states.  Because policy concerns, 
rather than high theory and constitutionalism, ought to drive personal 
jurisdiction, the appropriate exercise of jurisdiction over defendants 
located in foreign countries should be a matter of negotiation 
through bi-lateral agreements and/or more comprehensive treaties, a 
matter beyond the scope of this article.  Even so, the model proposed 
here, could still provide guidance for those types of negotiations. 
 
A. States as the Primary Arbiters of Personal Jurisdiction 
 
 Personal jurisdiction over defendants located in the United States 
should be primarily a matter of state law.455  States would decide, as 
a matter of policy, to which parties and disputes to open their 
courts.456  This state-focused approach would be supplemented by 
limited constitutional protection and, as needed, congressional 
legislation, as discussed in the next two subsections 
 As jurisdiction is being put forth as a policy decision, no specific 
approach will be advocated here as to what personal jurisdiction 
standards states ought to craft.  Some states already have long-arm 
statutes that provide specific limitations.457  But under the Supreme 
                                                
455 Cf. Geoffery C. Hazard Jr., A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 
S. CT. REV. 241, 281–82 (1965) (“The long-arm statutes are settling into familiar 
application in multistate tort and contract cases.  If drafted to embrace multiparty 
litigation . . . they would close the gap that has long existed.”). 
456 Cf. Borchers, supra note 71, at 101 (“There are plenty of sound reasons for, and 
sensible methods of, regulating jurisdiction. These choices, however, are 
legislative, not constitutional, choices.”). 
457 See, e.g., N. Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (Consol. 2014) (“Personal jurisdiction by acts of 
nondomiciliaries. (a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction.  As to a cause of 
action arising from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise 
personal jurisdiction over any nondomiciliary, or his executor or administrator, 
who in person or through an agent: 1. transacts any business within the state or 
contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in the state; or 2. commits a 
tortious act within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of 
character arising from the act; or 3. commits a tortious act without the state 
causing injury to person or property within the state, except as to a cause of action 
for defamation of character arising from the act, if he (i) regularly does or solicits 
business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives 
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in the 
state, or (ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences in 
the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or international 
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Court’s current approach most states have long-arm statutes that 
explicitly—or as interpreted by their own courts—permit jurisdiction 
to the full extent allowed under the Due Process Clause.458  The 
current state statutes that provide specific limitations, or model 
jurisdictional provisions, could provide models for drafting new 
long-arm statutes in those states who statutes now extend to the full 
extent of the Due Process Clause. 
 This description might seem open-ended, and some might 
assume that it will lead to mischief and inappropriate and over-
extensive jurisdictional grabs.  Section V below addresses this 
concern.  That section concludes that these fears will likely not come 
about.  And while it might seem strange to argue that states should 
be the primary drivers of personal jurisdiction law, that peculiarity 
results from the long-standing history of the current doctrine.  In 
fact, allowing states to take the lead in defining personal 
jurisdictional reach is consistent with the traditional role of these 
entities, especially as most of the disputes involving personal 
jurisdiction arise under state substantive law.459  Moreover, defining 
the boundaries of personal jurisdiction was primarily a state function 
during portions of this country’s first one hundred plus years.460 
 
B. The Role of the Constitution in Personal Jurisdiction 
 
 Although states will be called on to lead in creating personal 
jurisdiction standards, there is still some role for some mild 
constitutional and federal legislative limits to supplement what will 
                                                                                                            
commerce; or 4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the 
state.”). 
458 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (Deering 2015) (“A court of this state 
may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of 
this state or of the United States.”); Vedder, Price, Kaufman & Kammholz, Long-
Arm Statutes: A Fifty-State Survey (2003) 
http://euro.ecom.cmu.edu/program/law/08-732/Jurisdiction/LongArmSurvey.pdf.  
459 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 101 (“I am not 
arguing that jurisdiction should be a free-for-all, unregulated phenomenon.  There 
are plenty of sound reasons for, and sensible methods of, regulating jurisdiction.  
These choices, however, are legislative, not constitutional, choices. ”). 
460 See Kogan, supra note 19, at 279-97 (discussing pre-Pennoyer personal 
jurisdiction cases in federal and state court). 
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now be primarily a state-law policy matter.461  Due process should 
not provide the starting point or play a prominent role in determining 
the test for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, with the various 
arbitrary criteria that the Court has created under the auspices of that 
provision—minimum contacts, purposeful availment, state 
sovereignty and the like.462  Instead, the Due Process Clause will 
play two minor roles in personal jurisdiction, channeling and 
backstopping, as alluded to above,463 and discussed more fully here. 
 First, under the channeling role, although the contours of 
personal jurisdiction will generally spring from non-constitutional 
sources, where personal jurisdiction is lacking, the defendant will 
have an argument that adjudication will violate its due process 
rights.  This will allow defendants to directly challenge the improper 
exercise of jurisdiction, as they do now, rather than raising a lack of 
jurisdiction under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, in response to an 
enforcement action.  
 Whenever a court lacks proper authority to adjudicate, a 
deprivation of property rights by that tribunal denies the deprived 
party due process.  The lack of authority could be a lack of personal 
jurisdiction, a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, a lack of proper 
appointment or qualification for the judge, or other irregularity that 
divests a tribunal of appropriate adjudicatory power.  The Due 
Process Clause need not be the source of the standard for 
determining whether the court may properly proceed.  Certainly, due 
process does not determine whether a court has subject matter 
jurisdiction.  So too, personal jurisdiction need not be—and ought 
not be—primarily evaluated based upon due process considerations.  
Rather, if personal jurisdiction in fact is missing in a given case, then 
                                                
461 See Borchers, supra note 71, at 94 (“The Court has suggested, and [several 
commentators] all have advanced with some force, the right to have access to 
process as a rationale for using the due process clause to analyze 
jurisdiction. . . . All of these proposals are much more palatable alternatives than 
the Court's approach of the last several years.”) (collecting cases and 
commentary).  All of these proposals are much more palatable alternatives than the 
Court’s approach of the last several years. 
462 Cf. Koppel, supra note 17, at 949 (“Several writers have counseled . . . [in favor 
of] the elimination of the reasonableness inquiry and, on the functionalist end, the 
elimination of sovereignty and state lines from the due process analysis or the 
removal of due process from ‘the equation’ altogether.”). 
463 See discussion supra Part III.B.1. 
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a defendant has the right to argue that the adjudication has deprived 
him or her of property without due process of law.  The language of 
Pennoyer certainly suggests—even if it does not make absolutely 
clear—that this is an appropriate role for due process.  Several 
commentators have read Pennoyer this way.  Whether or not that is 
what was actually intended in that case, it is nonetheless a role that 
this procedural provision should play to prevent adjudication of 
property rights by a tribunal lacking authority over the deprived 
party. 
 Second, the Due Process Clause will have a backstopping role.  
Unlike the current approach in which due process has a primary role 
in shaping personal jurisdiction limits, the role would be more 
limited.  Irrespective of contacts or other criteria that has found its 
way into post-International Shoe personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, 
defendants’ due process challenges to personal jurisdiction would be 
treated under the same standard as other procedural due process 
challenges.   
 Due process generally requires that a party have notice and a fair 
opportunity to defend.464  The procedures afforded should be ones 
that minimize the risk that a party will lose property without a fair 
assessment of the facts and law—that the likelihood of mistake be 
minimized.465  As applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by a 
particular court, the inquiry would focus on how difficult or 
burdensome it would be for a defendant to litigate in that court.  This 
would involve an assessment of the distance to be traveled, the ease 
of litigating from afar, and consideration of any other element that 
could undermine the defendant’s ability to have his or her day in 
court.466 
                                                
464 See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267; Parry, supra note 82, at 853 (“For procedural 
due process the basic test is fundamental fairness.”). 
465 See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 577–79 (arguing for 
applying the Matthews v. Eldridge due process standard to the personal 
jurisdiction context); Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 
99 (“[To show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction is constitutionally invalid] 
should require a defendant to show a practical inability to defend.”); cf. Russelll J. 
Weintraub, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.8 A(1)(E), at 191 (6th 
ed. 2010) (“[Courts should] permit a plaintiff to bring suit against a United States 
defendant in any forum that has a reasonable interest in adjudicating the case.”).   
466 See Borchers, supra note 71, at 99 (“Perhaps there are some cases in which a 
defendant is put to the test of defending or defaulting, and it is economically 
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 This approach will be consistent with due process doctrine as 
applied to other matters.  It will thereby correct the over-
inclusiveness and under-inclusiveness of the current minimum 
contacts standard as a proxy for due process.  Due process will serve 
to protect those defendants who are truly unduly burdened by the 
exercise of jurisdiction, while affording no relief to those who are 
not.467  No longer will due process protections help create legal 
fictions like purposeful availment or in-state service that have little 
relevance to whether it will be unfair to hale a particular party before 
a tribunal.468  This will mean that those defendants like J. McIntyre 
and World-Wide, parties who clearly would not have been burdened 
by defending in the plaintiff’s chosen forum, will not escape on due 
process grounds, while parties like those that both Kennedy and 
Breyer were concerned about in each of their J. McIntyre opinions—
Appalachian potters, and Egyptian shirt-makers—will be protected if 
                                                                                                            
rational for the defendant to make a motion to dismiss for lack of personal 
jurisdiction.  This much, however, should be clear: if there are such cases, they are 
few and far between.  Such a motion should require a defendant to show a 
practical inability to defend.”).  Additionally, courts can employ other devices, like 
a forum non conveniens dismissal to minimize inconvenience when burdens do not 
rise to a constitutional level. 
467 See Parry, supra note 82, at 854 (“[Due process evaluation in personal 
jurisdiction is an] open–ended but also deferential inquiry into the likelihood that 
the proceedings will be fundamentally fair to the defendant.  At the core of this 
inquiry is the inconvenience, if any, caused by crossing a border.”).  Moreover, 
because both plaintiff and defendant may suffer burdens in litigating in a distant 
forum, there is no reason that the due process evaluation should focus purely on 
the defendant.  See id. (“[T]he fairness analysis can also include an assessment of 
plaintiff’s interests.”); cf. id. at 857 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction doctrine should reflect 
basic due process doctrine supplemented by federalism values.  An appropriate 
standard is something like the following: a state court may presumptively exercise 
jurisdiction over non-consenting defendants who know or ought to know that their 
voluntary acts or omissions, and/or the effects of those acts or omissions, implicate 
the legitimate regulatory interests of the forum state, unless the defendant 
demonstrates that (1) the forum state’s interests in the litigation are minimal and 
significantly outweighed by those of another state or (2) the burdens on the 
defendant would make litigation in that forum significantly unfair in relation to 
another available forum and the potential burdens on the plaintiff.”). 
468 But see McFarland, supra note 7, at 794 (“[S]tate boundaries are meaningful. 
This rules out a test based on convenience—similar to forum non conveniens—in 
which state boundaries are irrelevant.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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they can show that they cannot reasonably defend in the plaintiff’s 
chosen forum.469 
 
C. The Role of Congress 
 
 Congress will also have a role as needed.  If states, freed from 
the minimum contacts diktat, enact problematic jurisdictional 
statutes, Congress could intervene using its authority under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.470  That provision gives Congress the 
authority to determine under what circumstances a judgment will be 
entitled to recognition.  It is generally agreed that Congress could 
use this to create substantive jurisdictional rules.471  True, technically 
this would not allow a direct attack on a court’s jurisdiction, but only 
allow the defendant to raise a defense to collateral enforcement.472  
Even so, where the defendant is not located within the forum state, a 
                                                
469 See Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre in Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 465, 475–76 (2012) (“Despite the expressed concern of Justice 
Kennedy for the small Florida farmer whose produce may be marketed nationally, 
and of Justice Breyer for the Appalachian potter being sued in Alaska or Hawaii, 
the obvious beneficiaries of McIntyre’s constriction on personal jurisdiction will 
be manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, and other significant economic 
entities.  In my view, the four plurality Justices should not have focused on formal 
contacts and notions of sovereignty and the defendant’s intent to submit to the 
forum, with no acknowledgement that the farmer and potter can be protected by 
the principles of fair play and substantial justice recognized in International Shoe 
and reprised in Asahi Metal.” (footnote omitted)). 
470 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to 
the public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And the 
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records, 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.” (emphasis added)); see 
Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A 
Historical-Interpretative Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due 
Process Clauses (Part One), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 504 (1981) (“[T]he Full 
Faith and Credit Clause . . . authorize[s] Congress to legislate on the topic [of 
personal jurisdiction].”). 
471 See Borchers, Death of the Constitutional Law, supra note 71, at 105; cf. 
Whitten, supra note 470, at 604 (“Congress may enact a set of nationwide long-
arm jurisdictional rules to govern the validity of the judgments of state courts in 
sister state proceeding.”). 
472 But see Whitten, supra note 470, at 604–05 ([T]his congressional power is not 
limited to provision of jurisdictional rules available only on collateral attack of 
state-court judgments in other states.” ). 
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judgment that cannot be enforced elsewhere will likely be of little 
value, so that plaintiffs would have no incentive to bring suits that 
they could not enforce in sister states.  At any rate, for reasons 
discussed above and in the next section, states will probably be 
sufficiently careful in crafting jurisdictional statutes that little, if any, 
congressional intervention of the type discussed in this paragraph 
will be necessary.473 
 Congress could also play a helpful role by amending the current 
diversity statute to prevent clever ways for plaintiffs to thwart 
federal jurisdiction.474  The purpose of diversity jurisdiction is to 
protect plaintiffs and defendants from being disadvantaged by the 
other party’s court system.  And with regard to personal jurisdiction, 
the federal court system, being one national system, has the 
flexibility to take a holistic approach to where the trial and various 
proceedings may be had.475  Whether the current transfer of venue 
provisions are sufficient or require tweaking will require evaluation, 
but certainly either under current or amended provisions, Congress 
could create a fair, uniform, and common sense personal jurisdiction 
regime.  Transfer of venue—and its state-court cousin, forum non 
conveniens—are better tools for determining on a case-by-case basis 
the best location for a particular case, taking into account all relevant 
interest than is the rigid doctrinal approach of constitutional personal 
jurisdiction.476 
                                                
473 Also, many current long-arm statutes say, or have been interpreted by state 
courts, to extend jurisdiction to the full extent authorized by the due process, a 
concept that would become meaningless under the proposed standard.  For this 
reason, Congress might have to create an interim statute until all states adopt 
specific long-arm provision. 
474 This does not mean that Congress need overly expand diversity jurisdiction, but 
it could ensure a federal court in situations where adverse parties are truly in 
different locales, irrespective of tactical joinders.  See generally E. Farish Percy, 
Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder Doctrine, 29 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569 (2006). 
475 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 already address this.  To the extent that the federal 
courts provide a refuge out of the personal jurisdiction trap, Congress could revise 
these statutes to lessen the incentives for the use of tactics to take advantage of 
personal jurisdiction doctrine, allowing judges to make a common sense 
determination of where to allow litigation to take place. 
476 See Parry, supra note 82, at 852 (“Venue doctrines, including removal, transfer, 
and forum non conveniens, provide some help, and other ‘procedural devices’ are 
also available to defendants.”); cf. Freer, supra note 32, at 572–73 (“[A case like] 
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 In sum, the proposed model calls for personal jurisdiction to be 
primarily a state law, policy matter.  The Constitution and Congress 
will both have secondary roles.  The system will be simpler, fairer, 
and more likely to further the goals of both personal jurisdiction and 
due process. 
 
V.  APPLYING THE PROPOSED APPROACH TO COMMON PERSONAL 
JURISDICTION SCENARIOS 
 
 How will what was proposed in Section IV work in practice?  
Will it result in absurd outcomes, or will personal jurisdiction make 
more sense and be more efficient?  Let us see by examining several 
scenarios that make up the typical personal jurisdiction cases.  First, 
there are cases in which the plaintiff picks some state that has no 
apparent connection to either party or to the dispute.  Keeton477 is the 
best example of this.  Second, are cases in which the plaintiff sues 
the defendant in the plaintiff’s home state, where that state has no 
connection to the dispute, for example a Connecticut plaintiff suing a 
New York defendant in Connecticut for a car accident that happened 
in New York or New Jersey.  Goodyear478 represents this type of 
case, although the international aspect adds a wrinkle that raises 
issues beyond the scope of this article.  Third, there are unintentional 
and intentional tort cases where at least the injury is suffered in the 
plaintiff’s home state, where the plaintiff sues, like J. McIntyre,479 
World-Wide,480 and Calder.481  Fourth, there are cases arising from 
                                                                                                            
Burger King . . . filed in federal court [makes] transfer to federal court in 
Michigan . . . at least possible; state court litigation cannot be transferred across 
state lines.  At best, a state-court defendant would have to rely on dismissal under 
forum non conveniens, which as Dean Hay reminds us, ‘is an uncertain and 
unreliable corrective mechanism.’” (footnote omitted) (quoting Peter Hay, 
Transient Jurisdiction, Especially over International Defendants: Critical 
Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593, 
603 n.76 (1990))). 
477 465 U.S. 770; see Part II.B.3.c. 
478 1315 U.S. 2846; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.g. 
479 131 S. Ct. 2780; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.g. 
480 444 U.S. 286; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.a. 
481 465 U.S. 783; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.c.  Cases like World-Wide, 
Calder, Walden, and Nicastro fit this pattern.  In some of these tort cases, the tort 
is actually committed within the plaintiff’s state (e.g. a car accident occurring in 
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transactional disputes brought as either tort or contract suits by the 
plaintiff in the plaintiff’s home state, like McGee and Burger 
King.482  Fifth, there are various domestic relations, wills, trusts, and 
other personal transaction cases, like Burnham, Kulko, Hanson, and 
McGee.483  Sixth, there are cases involving tag jurisdiction like 
Burnham and Grace.484 
 Consider the categories in turn, staring with plaintiffs picking 
states have no connection to the parties or events.  Left to make their 
own policy, most states would probably craft long-arm statues that 
exclude these types of suits.  After all, states have little incentive to 
clog their own courts with disputes where the events and the parties 
have no connection to the state.   
 Moreover, plaintiffs will rarely bring a suit in a forum having no 
connection to itself, the defendant, or the events of the case.  The 
only reason a plaintiff might do this, is to gain tactical advantage.  In 
Keeton, the plaintiff sought to take advantage of New Hampshire’s 
extra-long statute of limitations.  Conceivably, a plaintiff with 
extensive resources might choose an arbitrary, distant forum to gain 
an advantage over less well-healed plaintiff, such as a New Yorker 
suing a fellow New Yorker in Alaska over a New York car accident.  
Assuming that states even allowed these types of suits, which the 
previous paragraph argued is not likely, the Due Process Clause, in 
its backstopping role, would provide a vehicle for a defendant to 
argue that he or she really would be denied a fair opportunity to 
litigate.485 
 Actually, the proposed model with its focus on state driven 
policy and fairness will be less subject to tactical abuse and sharp 
practice than the current formalistic approach.  For example, the 
somewhat unsettling result in Keeton—a suit in New Hampshire as a 
                                                                                                            
the plaintiff’s state).  In others, some activity, like manufacturing or selling a 
product occurs outside the plaintiff’s state but causes injury there. 
482 471 U.S. 462; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.d.  In some transaction cases, the 
parties have included choice-of-forum clauses.  The Court has taken a sound 
approach to evaluating and applying these clauses, and no change is recommended 
to that doctrine.  See Carnival, 499 U.S. 595; The Bremen, 407 U.S. 1. 
483 See Burnham, 495 U.S. 604; Kulko, 436 U.S. 84; Hanson, 357 U.S. 235; 
McGee, 355 U.S. 220. 
484 See Burnham, 495 U.S. 604; Grace, 170 F. Supp. 442. 
485 See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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result of forum shopping486—would probably be avoided under the 
approach proposed here, even though on its surface my proposal 
seems more permissive.  Left to make policy, New Hampshire likely 
would have crafted a narrower long-arm statute than the one it had 
allowing the exercise of jurisdiction to the full extent of the due 
process clause.  Moreover, to the extent that due process arguments 
in personal jurisdiction would focus on fairness, and not legal 
fictions of contacts and purposeful availment, the Ohio-based 
defendant’s argument that it should not be subject to suit in New 
Hampshire in a suit by a New Yorker, for conduct that took place 
primarily outside New Hampshire, would have more traction than it 
did in Keeton itself. 
 The second category, plaintiffs suing at home for conduct 
occurring elsewhere—e.g., the suit in New York by a New Yorker 
against a New Jersey defendant for a New Jersey car accident—is 
not that common.  Most state long-arm statutes that actually place 
limits on jurisdiction beyond the constitutional strictures, do not 
allow this type of suit.487  And long-standing Supreme Court 
doctrine clearly does not allow it.  So plaintiffs generally know 
better than to bring these types of suits, although they probably 
would so if they were allowed to.  Even so, even if left to make their 
own policies, states probably may not allow jurisdiction over these 
types of suits. 
 In crafting long-arm statutes, the interest of their own citizens 
gives states incentives not to overreach to protect their own citizens 
from overreaching by sister-states.  Moreover, to the extent 
coordination problems between states do lead to overreaching, this 
would be an ideal place for congressional intervention, if desired.  
The latter modifier is added, because allowing one who is in an 
accident with an out-of-state plaintiff to be sued in the plaintiff’s 
home state is not necessarily a problematic result.  Perhaps it is.  
And for this reason, having a cogent, coordinated policy, rather than 
piece-meal results based on legal fictions promulgated by various 
courts will generally produced better, and more predictable results.  
Goodyear488 itself, which is an example of a suit in this category, 
                                                
486 465 U.S. 770; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.c. 
487 See e.g., N. Y. C.P.L.R. § 302 (Consol. 2014). 
488 131 S. Ct. 2846; see discussion supra Part II.B.3.h. 
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being a suit against a foreign defendant, raises issues that require 
treatment beyond the bounds of this article.  But suppose Goodyear 
had involved the same facts happening in a U.S. state other than 
North Carolina—the plaintiff’s home state—thereby making it an 
example of this category of case.  Under the circumstances whether 
plaintiffs should be able to sue at home, in those circumstances, as 
opposed to the defendant’s state should be a policy choice, not a 
matter of Supreme Court doctrine.   
 The third category makes up an area of great dispute.  The most 
contentious and unsatisfying Supreme Court cases come from this 
area—cases like World-Wide, Asahi, and J. McIntyre.  Yet, these 
should be easy cases.  In most of Europe, defendants are answerable 
in the jurisdiction in which they caused harm.489  And most states 
would probably allow jurisdiction in this type of situation if given 
the choice.  In none of those three cases would the defendant have 
faced any hardship or unfairness in litigating in the plaintiff’s chosen 
forum, whereas the plaintiff, as well as the witnesses, and even the 
defendants may have faced difficulties elsewhere, given the location 
of evidence and witnesses.   
 Asahi and J. McIntyre both involved international defendants.  
But in each, a plurality would not have allowed jurisdiction even if 
they were domestic defendants, and those cases are discussed for 
that reason.490  As for the small-time defendants that Justices 
Kennedy and Breyer each cite in their respective J. McIntyre 
opinions as potentially unfairly subject to suit in a distant forum over 
a single, indirect sale, the current approach will benefit them.  Their 
burdens themselves could be examined as part of the due process 
protection proposed here if the defendants argued that the exercise of 
jurisdiction was unfair, as opposed to jurisdiction turning upon the 
arbitrary nature of contacts.491  In this way, the proposed approach 
                                                
489 See Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012 (Art. 7(2)) (providing for tort jurisdiction 
where a harmful event occurred). 
490 The issue of jurisdiction over international defendants raises issues of foreign 
relations that require separate treatment beyond the scope of this article.  The 
Court has taken account of this fact in passing, but for the most part it has 
inappropriately used the same analysis for out-of-country defendants as it does for 
out-of-state defendants. 
491 Cf. Miller, supra note 469, at 475–76 (“Despite the expressed concern of Justice 
Kennedy for the small Florida . . . and of Justice Breyer for the Appalachian 
potter . . . the obvious beneficiaries of McIntyre’s constriction on personal 
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would more likely protect those defendants who would suffer 
unfairness if required to defend in a distant forum, while allowing 
adjudication to proceed against those defendants who would not be 
so disadvantaged. 
 The fourth category, transactional disputes, can often be 
addressed by forum selection clauses.  The Court has generally 
enforced these clauses, so long as the party on whom it is imposed is 
aware of and can understand the clause, and the chosen jurisdiction 
makes sense.492  While a full analysis of the Court’s forum selection 
clause jurisdiction is not undertaken here, this article’s basic 
conclusion is that this represents one area where the Court has taken 
the appropriate approach to personal jurisdiction.  For cases lacking 
a forum selection clause, the most common scenario likely to lead to 
a dispute is the Burger King situation—one contracting party suing 
the counterparty in the former’s home state.  This situation can be 
addressed much like the tort situation, and generally leave matters to 
state law and federal housekeeping provisions like transfer of venue.  
Constitutional court intervention would be limited to those cases in 
which the defendant would truly suffer unfair burden by litigating in 
the plaintiff’s home state. 
 The fifth category, domestic disputes, trusts and estates, and the 
like, presents a particularly apt area for state-crafted jurisdiction law.  
Law regarding marriage, divorce, child support, wills, and trusts 
often vary greatly by state.493  Therefore, sensitivity to local 
concerns is important, and this arena would benefit from the ability 
                                                                                                            
jurisdiction will be manufacturers, pharmaceutical companies, and other 
significant economic entities. In my view, the four plurality Justices should not 
have focused on formal contacts and notions of sovereignty . . . no 
acknowledgement that the farmer and potter can be protected by the principles of 
fair play.”).  Consider the Appalachian potter, who sells an urn via eBay.com to 
someone in Hawaii.  Under the current Supreme Court doctrine with its focus on 
the defendant’s purposeful availment, the potter probably is subject to suit, even if 
it would be hard for him to litigate thousands of miles away.  Under the proposed 
approach, the due process issue would come down to whether the defendant really 
could fairly and without undue burden (truly elements of due process) litigate in 
the Aloha State. 
492 See, e.g., Carnival, 499 U.S. 585. 
493 See generally Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law and Property, 26 STETSON L. 
REV. 257 (1996); Adrienne H. Jules & Fernanda G. Nicola, The 
Contractualization of Family Law in the United States, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 151 
(2014). 
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to states to coordinate jurisdictional policies that protect the 
important interests involved.  In many of these cases the designation 
of parties as plaintiff and defendant is arbitrary, since they generally 
involve resolving a matter in which both parties are seeking to obtain 
something—and therefore where both are effectively petitioning the 
court for relief—rather than one party seeking relief, while the other 
party is merely seeking to avoid having to pay damages.  For that 
reason, the Court’s current approach, which treats plaintiffs and 
defendants unevenly,494 is particularly inappropriate.  Again, the due 
process backstop can provide relief from unduly burdensome 
litigation.  But given that collectively states have an incentive to 
protect each other’s laws in the domestic relations area, there is 
reason to expect that they will coordinate both their jurisdictional 
and their choice-of-law standards.495 
 Finally, there is tag jurisdiction.  This will probably no longer 
constitute a separate category.  At the time Burnham was decided, 
most states that addressed the matter still allowed tag jurisdiction.496  
Yet, this was probably merely a relic from the centuries-old practice 
that had not been addressed, rather than a conscious choice.  Most 
states now demure to the Due Process Clause in writing long-arm 
statutes.497  If the Court no longer played the lead role in personal 
jurisdiction, states would be forced to give serious consideration to 
when they would open their courts.  Just as states would have no 
incentive to generally allow suits for matters not involving their state 
or their citizens, those states would probably take a similar approach 
                                                
494 Under the minimum contacts test, plaintiffs generally get to choose where to 
litigate out of all possible fora with which defendants have sufficient contacts, 
while defendants can avoid fora with which only the plaintiffs have contact.  Thus, 
the plaintiff generally will have the upper hand whenever the defendant has 
minimum contacts with the plaintiff’s forum, while being disadvantaged (and 
having to litigate away from home) whenever the defendant lacks contacts with 
the plaintiff’s forum.  
495 One reason that jurisdiction may take on so much importance in this area is that 
domestic relations law is highly state specific, and where a case is litigated may 
have important implications for the substantive law to be applied.  Ideally, states 
will seek to reach an approach that deters parties from bringing suit to gain tactical 
advantage either in locale or governing law. 
496 See Burnham, 495 U.S. at 608 (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). 
497 Since Burnham held that tag jurisdiction comported with due process 
requirements, these long-arm statutes that allow jurisdiction to the outer-reaches of 
the Constitution tacitly condone tag jurisdiction. 
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when a party was fortuitously served with process inside its borders.  
So tag jurisdiction would probably be a non-issue.  Moreover, even 
if states allowed it, the proposed approach for constitutional 
purposes, which eliminates contacts as well as sovereignty as factors 
in personal jurisdiction, would not turn upon whether or not a 
defendant was served within the boundaries of the state.  All that 
would matter is whether or not it was unfair or burdensome for the 
defendant to litigate in the particular forum, which in no manner 
would be affected by the location of service.  Thus, this odd, 
illogical, anachronistic form of jurisdiction would be effectively 
eliminated, thereby making the personal jurisdiction doctrine more 
cogent and reasonable. 
 Beyond the various categories, in most personal jurisdiction 
scenarios there is an overriding dilemma which can be better 
addressed by the proposed approach than the current doctrine.  A suit 
between parties from two different states requires either the plaintiff 
or the defendant to travel to litigate.498  There is no solution that 
treats each party equally, short of litigation on neutral turf, which is 
no solution at all.499  The current approach does not resolve this 
issue, and treats the parties unequally.  So long as the defendant has 
sufficient contacts with the plaintiff’s state, the plaintiff gets to 
choose between home and away.  On the other hand, if the defendant 
lacks those contacts, the plaintiff will have to litigate on the 
defendant’s turf, even if the plaintiff lacks contacts with that state.  
The proposed approach will allow states to experiment through their 
jurisdictional statutes and forum non conveniens rules so as to 
further fairness concerns.  Moreover, in cases that are removable,500 
the federal transfer statute (28 U.S.C. § 1404) can be used.  Freed 
from the focus on state lines, courts would then be able to decide 
between two possible states which location is best in terms of 
fairness to the parties, as well as efficient use of litigation and 
judicial resources. 
                                                
498 Obviously the situation could be more complex with several parties from 
different places on each side, but the two-party two-state solution will be used to 
address this issue. 
499 But the availability of diversity jurisdiction in federal court serves to lessen this 
unfairness. 
500 Since long-arm disputes generally arise between citizens of different states, in 
many of these cases diversity jurisdiction will be available. 
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 The above discussion shows that the proposed approach is 
superior with regard to outcomes.  It will also be better than the 
minimum contacts standard with regard to process.  The proposed 
model will likely be more predictable and more efficient to apply.  
Legislation is prospective and therefore allows the creation of more 
comprehensive law than reactive court decision.501  The advantage 
here is jurisdiction law can be part of a complete package rather than 
a series of discrete, but hard to mesh rules.  Further, parties and 
lower courts will benefit by better predictability to where suit may 
be brought.502  In short, there will be a lesser drain on litigation and 
judicial resources, which should benefit all involved other than those 




 This article has suggested a seemingly radical change to personal 
jurisdiction doctrine.  In reality, however, the proposal is consistent 
with the theoretical bases of personal jurisdiction, as well as the 
views of commentators and quite a number—albeit a minority—of 
justices that have served on the Court in the years since International 
Shoe.  Theoretically, the proposal is truer to notions of due process 
as well as the concept of personal jurisdiction itself.  Moreover, in 
practice it will lead to results that are fairer, more logical, and easier 
to apply.   
                                                
501 See Borchers, supra note 43, at 583–84 (“Adjudication is inherently concerned 
with past events. . . . This process simply does not lend itself well to announcing 
broad, easy-to-apply rules.”); cf. Cass R. Sunstein, LEGAL REASONING AND 
POLITICAL CONFLICT 106 (Oxford 1996) (“A great virtue of rules is that they limit 
permissible grounds for both action and argument.  I have said that in a 
heterogeneous society, containing people of limited time and capacities, this is an 
enormous advantage.  It saves effort, times, and expense.”). 
502 See Borchers, Jurisdictional Pragmatism, supra note 43, at 583–84 
(“Adjudication is inherently concerned with past events, and the Court necessarily 
focuses on reaching a result based upon the specific facts of that case.  This 
process simply does not lend itself well to announcing broad, easy-to-apply rules.  
Legislation, of course, is much better suited to prospective announcement of broad 
rules[.] The Supreme Court’s exceedingly close attention to personal jurisdiction 
has stunted legislative innovation.”). 
503 This may not even be a detriment to lawyers.  Law firms do not have unlimited 
resources and time and money spent litigating jurisdictional disputes may limit 
attorneys’ ability to address more important substantive matters.  
